International Transactions in Operational Research最新文献_第9页

Personalized pricing versus showrooming: competition between online and offline retailers 个性化定价与陈列展示：线上与线下零售商之间的竞争

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-02-23 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13444

Zhenzhen Ren, Junfeng Tian, Shurong Kang, Meixian Tang, Jinsong Tian

{"title":"Personalized pricing versus showrooming: competition between online and offline retailers","authors":"Zhenzhen Ren, Junfeng Tian, Shurong Kang, Meixian Tang, Jinsong Tian","doi":"10.1111/itor.13444","DOIUrl":"10.1111/itor.13444","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines how personalized pricing affects customers’ showrooming behavior in the duopoly competition with horizontal product differentiation between traditional and online retailers. For the available personalized pricing strategies, we obtained the optimal decisions for both retailers in the scenarios with and without showrooming. Our results indicate that adopting personalized pricing under particular conditions enables each retailer to be more profitable, even in the presence of showrooming purchases. This finding explains why an increasing number of online and offline retailers have implemented personalized pricing based on technical means and consumer purchase records. It is also demonstrated that personalized pricing can counter showrooming behavior of consumers amidst the competition between both retailers, which provides a novel theoretical basis for dealing with cross-channel shopping in multichannel retail competition. We further clarify how retailers can avoid being trapped in a prisoner's dilemma when both sides have access to personalized pricing. Also, the adoption of personalized pricing can improve consumer surplus and social welfare.","PeriodicalId":49176,"journal":{"name":"International Transactions in Operational Research","volume":"31 5","pages":"3371-3442"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139953477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Statistical proxy based mean-reverting portfolios with sparsity and volatility constraints 具有稀疏性和波动性约束的基于统计代理的均值回复投资组合

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-02-13 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13442

Ahmad Mousavi, George Michilidis

{"title":"Statistical proxy based mean-reverting portfolios with sparsity and volatility constraints","authors":"Ahmad Mousavi, George Michilidis","doi":"10.1111/itor.13442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.13442","url":null,"abstract":"Mean-reverting portfolios with volatility and sparsity constraints are of prime interest to practitioners in finance since they are both profitable and well-diversified, while also managing risk and minimizing transaction costs. Three main measures that serve as statistical proxies to capture the mean-reversion property are predictability, portmanteau criterion, and crossing statistics. If in addition, reasonable volatility and sparsity for the portfolio are desired, a convex quadratic or quartic objective function, subject to nonconvex quadratic and cardinality constraints needs to be minimized. In this paper, we introduce and investigate a comprehensive modeling framework that incorporates all the previous proxies proposed in the literature and develop an effective unifying algorithm that is enabled to obtain a Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) point under mild regularity conditions. Specifically, we present a tailored penalty decomposition method that approximately solves a sequence of penalized subproblems by a block coordinate descent algorithm. To the best of our knowledge, our proposed algorithm is the first method for directly solving volatile, sparse, and mean-reverting portfolio problems based on the portmanteau criterion and crossing statistics proxies. Further, we establish that the convergence analysis can be extended to a nonconvex objective function case if the starting penalty parameter is larger than a finite bound and the objective function has a bounded level set. Numerical experiments on the S&P 500 data set demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed algorithm in comparison to a semidefinite relaxation-based approach and suggest that the crossing statistics proxy yields more desirable portfolios.","PeriodicalId":49176,"journal":{"name":"International Transactions in Operational Research","volume":"289 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139953775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Optimal two-period pricing decisions and value-added service strategies of two-sided platform considering suppliers entry timing 考虑供应商进入时机的双面平台的最优两期定价决策和增值服务策略

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-02-13 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13441

Huabao Zeng, Tong Shu, Yue Yu, Jiaming Cheng

{"title":"Optimal two-period pricing decisions and value-added service strategies of two-sided platform considering suppliers entry timing","authors":"Huabao Zeng, Tong Shu, Yue Yu, Jiaming Cheng","doi":"10.1111/itor.13441","DOIUrl":"10.1111/itor.13441","url":null,"abstract":"The flourishing platform business model has been rapidly integrated into manufacturing industries, and value-added service (VAS) provided by the platforms has become a critical part of enhancing competitiveness. This study investigates the optimal two-period pricing decisions and VAS strategies of the two-sided platform for manufacturing. For both the supplier and manufacturer side, the platform decides the entry fees in each period and provides differentiated quality of basic services, as well as the VAS (if any). Moreover, the manufacturer's utility of accessing is influenced by the cross-network externality, which is related to the number of suppliers in each period. In the presence of the supplier's varying entry timing, three VAS strategies are available for the platform including: (1) VAS for suppliers in Period 1 (Model S1), (2) VAS for suppliers in Period 2 (Model S2), and (3) VAS for manufacturers in Period 1 or 2 (Model M). We establish a two-period game model under each VAS strategy. Then, the optimal platform's pricing decisions are derived, and the optimal performances in three VAS strategies are compared. Findings demonstrate that when the cross-network externality strength is large, the platform always prefers Model S1; only when both the cross-network externality strength and quality of the platform's basic service are comparatively low, the platform selects Model S2; otherwise, the platform chooses Model M. This study also extends to the scenario that the platform provides bilateral VAS in Period 1 (Model B1) or Period 2 (Model B2). Notably, the platform is not always willing to offer bilateral VAS, especially when the VAS cost coefficient is relatively high.","PeriodicalId":49176,"journal":{"name":"International Transactions in Operational Research","volume":"31 5","pages":"3341-3370"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139839642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Performance enhancement in two-stage innovation contests: Feedback and elimination schemes 两阶段创新竞赛中的绩效提升：反馈和淘汰计划

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-02-11 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13440

Yifu Li, Peng Luo, Wei Zhang, Xiaowei Fan, Shuijing Jie

{"title":"Performance enhancement in two-stage innovation contests: Feedback and elimination schemes","authors":"Yifu Li, Peng Luo, Wei Zhang, Xiaowei Fan, Shuijing Jie","doi":"10.1111/itor.13440","DOIUrl":"10.1111/itor.13440","url":null,"abstract":"Innovation is one of the driving forces of economic development and social progress, and the crowdsourcing contest is a well-established mechanism for encouraging innovation. This paper examines two incentive schemes in two-stage innovation contests: feedback and elimination. Feedback enhances the efforts by revealing the competitive status, and elimination intensifies the competition by removing less-qualified participants. We build a game theoretical model to investigate how the organizer should design the feedback and elimination schemes and then analyze the equilibrium efforts and optimal contest design in four-solver contests. The results suggest that the optimal design depends on the combined effects of the reward, effort sensitivity, and cost coefficiency. Elimination and nonelimination contests can be optimal under different conditions. Furthermore, we extend the equilibrium analysis to competitions with <math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>n</mi>\u0000 <mo>></mo>\u0000 <mn>4</mn>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation>$n&gt;4$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> contestants and investigate the optimal design with numerical studies. The most interesting result is that the elimination contest with feedback from the organizer is an ideal option for a budget-constrained enterprise that seeks an innovative solution from the public for a complex innovation project. Also, the optimal number of contestants in the second stage is not always two when feedback is combined with elimination.","PeriodicalId":49176,"journal":{"name":"International Transactions in Operational Research","volume":"31 5","pages":"3061-3089"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139765606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Competing platform owners’ entry and an OEM's cooperation response 竞争平台所有者的加入和原始设备制造商的合作对策

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-02-11 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13443

Xiangxiang Wu, Yong Zha, Liang Liang

{"title":"Competing platform owners’ entry and an OEM's cooperation response","authors":"Xiangxiang Wu, Yong Zha, Liang Liang","doi":"10.1111/itor.13443","DOIUrl":"10.1111/itor.13443","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a game-theoretic model that examines the entry decisions of two competing platform owners with differentiated research and development (R&D) efficiency and the response strategy of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in selecting which platform to cooperate with. The OEM and platform owners compete on quality and price in the face of consumers with heterogeneous preferences across the dimensions of the device and platform. We analyze the interaction between the entry decisions of platform owners and the OEM's response strategy within two cooperation models. In the charging model, we find that in the absence of entry, the OEM prefers the high-efficiency platform. When only one platform owner enters, the OEM prefers the low-efficiency platform. If the differentiated R&D efficiency and the device differentiation cost are large, both platform owners will choose to enter and the OEM will cooperate with the low-efficiency platform. In the bundling model, when only one platform owner enters, only at a large cost of device differentiation will the OEM cooperate with the platform that enters the market to weaken market competition. In particular, when only the high-efficiency platform enters, it is interesting that there exists a large cost of device differentiation that makes the high-efficiency platform more favorable in the case when the OEM cooperates with the low-efficiency platform. Our study provides practical insights into platform entry and OEM response.","PeriodicalId":49176,"journal":{"name":"International Transactions in Operational Research","volume":"31 5","pages":"3318-3340"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139765683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Discrete cooperative coverage location models with alternative facility types in a probabilistic setting 概率环境下具有替代设施类型的离散合作覆盖位置模型

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-01-25 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13426

Maria Michopoulou, Ioannis Giannikos

引用次数: 0

Special Issue on “Sustainable and Responsive Transportation and Logistics” 关于 "可持续和响应性运输与物流 "的特刊

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-01-24 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13437

引用次数: 0

Special Issue on “Efficiency and Productivity Analysis of Public Services in Practice” 实践中的公共服务效率和生产力分析 "特刊

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-01-24 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13436

引用次数: 0

Special Issue on “Decision Support Systems in an uncertain world” 不确定世界中的决策支持系统 "特刊

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-01-24 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13435

引用次数: 0

Special Issue on “Artificial Intelligence-Driven Decision Making in Health and Medicine” 人工智能驱动的健康与医学决策 "特刊

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-01-24 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13434

引用次数: 0