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Dynamic Games and Applications最新文献

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Eco-evolutionary Logic of Mutualisms 共生的生态进化逻辑
4区 数学
Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-10-27 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00533-8
Chaitanya S. Gokhale, Marcus Frean, Paul B. Rainey
{"title":"Eco-evolutionary Logic of Mutualisms","authors":"Chaitanya S. Gokhale, Marcus Frean, Paul B. Rainey","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00533-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00533-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Mutualistic interactions among members of different species are common, seemingly stable, and thus apparently enduring. This is at odds with standard mathematical models based solely on between-species interactions, which show mutualisms to be inherently unstable. Models incorporating parameters for punishment and reward strategies demonstrate that the range of conditions over which stability is observed can be extended; however, the role of community-level dynamics impacted by within-species interactions remains relatively unexplored. Here we develop a general and readily applicable approach for analysing a broad range of mutualisms. By incorporating within-species interactions, we show that mutualisms can be stably maintained across diverse environmental conditions without introducing changes to between-species interaction parameters. Further, a balance of within- and between-species interactions is sufficient to allow the persistence of mutualisms encountering ecological perturbations. Our simple and robust framework resonates with emerging empirical data highlighting the role of community-level interactions and population dynamics in maintaining mutualisms.","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"25 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136234005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
How Much is a Nonearning Asset with No Current Capital Gains Worth? 没有当前资本收益的非盈利资产值多少钱?
4区 数学
Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-10-27 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00536-5
Stephen Salant, Joshua Keller
{"title":"How Much is a Nonearning Asset with No Current Capital Gains Worth?","authors":"Stephen Salant, Joshua Keller","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00536-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00536-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"164 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136235022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Efficiency-Inducing Policy for Polluting Oligopolists 对污染寡头的效率诱导政策
4区 数学
Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-10-21 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00534-7
Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Santiago J. Rubio
{"title":"Efficiency-Inducing Policy for Polluting Oligopolists","authors":"Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Santiago J. Rubio","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00534-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00534-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"9 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135512065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Learning to Mitigate Epidemic Risks: A Dynamic Population Game Approach 学习减轻流行病风险:动态人口博弈方法
4区 数学
Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-10-21 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00529-4
Ashish R. Hota, Urmee Maitra, Ezzat Elokda, Saverio Bolognani
{"title":"Learning to Mitigate Epidemic Risks: A Dynamic Population Game Approach","authors":"Ashish R. Hota, Urmee Maitra, Ezzat Elokda, Saverio Bolognani","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00529-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00529-4","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We present a dynamic population game model to capture the behavior of a large population of individuals in presence of an infectious disease or epidemic. Individuals can be in one of five possible infection states at any given time: susceptible, asymptomatic, symptomatic, recovered and unknowingly recovered, and choose whether to opt for vaccination, testing or social activity with a certain degree. We define the evolution of the proportion of agents in each epidemic state, and the notion of best response for agents that maximize long-run discounted expected reward as a function of the current state and policy. We further show the existence of a stationary Nash equilibrium and explore the transient evolution of the disease states and individual behavior under a class of evolutionary learning dynamics. Our results provide compelling insights into how individuals evaluate the trade-off among vaccination, testing and social activity under different parameter regimes, and the impact of different intervention strategies (such as restrictions on social activity) on vaccination and infection prevalence.","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"35 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135510956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Correction: Introspection Dynamics in Asymmetric Multiplayer Games 更正:非对称多人游戏中的内省动态
4区 数学
Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-10-17 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00538-3
Marta C. Couto, Saptarshi Pal
{"title":"Correction: Introspection Dynamics in Asymmetric Multiplayer Games","authors":"Marta C. Couto, Saptarshi Pal","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00538-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00538-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"158 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135994842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do Small Players Undermine Cooperation in Asymmetric Games? 非对称游戏中的小玩家是否会破坏合作?
4区 数学
Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-10-04 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00532-9
Charles F. Mason
{"title":"Do Small Players Undermine Cooperation in Asymmetric Games?","authors":"Charles F. Mason","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00532-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00532-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135590734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Benefits of Rent Sharing in Dynamic Resource Games 动态资源博弈中租金共享的效益
4区 数学
Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-09-27 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00528-5
Frederick van der Ploeg
{"title":"Benefits of Rent Sharing in Dynamic Resource Games","authors":"Frederick van der Ploeg","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00528-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00528-5","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Ngo Van Long’s classic paper on the risk of expropriation of natural resources published in a 1975 issue of the Journal of Economic Theory was an instant classic, which spawned a huge literature. Here I pay tribute to this wonderful brilliant yet modest scholar by briefly reviewing his contribution and then sketching how his insights can be used to analyse dynamic conflict over natural resources both as expropriation game and as a differential game on which Long has published extensively too. We discuss three results. First, if an incumbent faces a threat of a rival faction, extraction is more voracious if the factions do not share rents equally. Second, never-ending political conflict cycles are more inefficient if constitutional cohesiveness or rent sharing is strong and political instability is high. Third, resource wars are more intense if rent sharing is weak, reserves of resources are high, the wage is low, and elections occur less frequently.","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135535991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stochastic Vaccination Game Among Influencers, Leader and Public 影响者、领导者和公众之间的随机疫苗接种博弈
4区 数学
Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-09-25 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00531-w
Vartika Singh, Veeraruna Kavitha
{"title":"Stochastic Vaccination Game Among Influencers, Leader and Public","authors":"Vartika Singh, Veeraruna Kavitha","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00531-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00531-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135814803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Resource Mobility and Market Performance 资源流动与市场绩效
4区 数学
Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-09-25 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00517-8
Luca Colombo, Paola Labrecciosa
{"title":"Resource Mobility and Market Performance","authors":"Luca Colombo, Paola Labrecciosa","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00517-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00517-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135815108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sequential Mergers and Delayed Monopolization in Triopoly 三强垄断中的顺序合并与延迟垄断
4区 数学
Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-09-25 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00526-7
Didier Laussel
{"title":"Sequential Mergers and Delayed Monopolization in Triopoly","authors":"Didier Laussel","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00526-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00526-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"109 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135815282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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