{"title":"People's judgments of humans and robots in a classic moral dilemma","authors":"Bertram F. Malle , Matthias Scheutz , Corey Cusimano , John Voiklis , Takanori Komatsu , Stuti Thapa , Salomi Aladia","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105958","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105958","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>How do ordinary people evaluate robots that make morally significant decisions? Previous work has found both equal and different evaluations, and different ones in either direction. In 13 studies (<em>N</em> = 7670), we asked people to evaluate humans and robots that make decisions in norm conflicts (variants of the classic trolley dilemma). We examined several conditions that may influence whether moral evaluations of human and robot agents are the same or different: the type of moral judgment (norms vs. blame); the structure of the dilemma (side effect vs. means-end); salience of particular information (victim, outcome); culture (Japan vs. US); and encouraged empathy. Norms for humans and robots are broadly similar, but blame judgments show a robust asymmetry under one condition: Humans are blamed less than robots specifically for inaction decisions—here, refraining from sacrificing one person for the good of many. This asymmetry may emerge because people appreciate that the human faces an impossible decision and deserves mitigated blame for inaction; when evaluating a robot, such appreciation appears to be lacking. However, our evidence for this explanation is mixed. We discuss alternative explanations and offer methodological guidance for future work into people's moral judgment of robots and humans.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105958"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142373272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
CognitionPub Date : 2024-10-01DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105964
Molly Brillinger, Xiaoye Michael Wang, Timothy N. Welsh
{"title":"The assumed motor capabilities of a partner influence motor imagery in a joint serial disc transfer task","authors":"Molly Brillinger, Xiaoye Michael Wang, Timothy N. Welsh","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105964","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105964","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Motor imagery (MI) of one's own movements is thought to involve the sub-threshold activation of one's own motor codes. Movement coordination during joint action is thought to occur because co-actors integrate a simulation of their own actions with the simulated actions of the partner. The present experiments gained insight into MI of joint action by investigating if and how the assumed motor capabilitiesof the imaginary partner affected MI. Participants performed a serial disc transfer task alone and then imagined performing the same task alone and with an imagined partner. In the individual tasks, participants transferred all four discs. In the joint task, participants imagined themselves transferring the first 2 discs and a partner transferring the last 2 discs. The description of the imagined partner (high/low performer) was manipulated across blocks to determine if participants adapted their MI of the joint task based on the partner's characteristics. Results revealed that imagined movement times (MTs) were shorter when the description of the imagined partner was a ‘high’ performer compared to a ‘low’ performer. Interestingly, participants not only adjusted the partner's portion of the task, but they also adjusted their own portion of the task - imagined MTs of the first disc transfers were shorter when imagining performing the task with a high performer than with a low performer. These findings suggest that MI is based on the simulation of one's own response code, and that the adaptation of MI to their partner's movements influences the MI of one's own movements.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105964"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142367038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
CognitionPub Date : 2024-10-01Epub Date: 2024-07-14DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105877
Andrew M Smith, Rebecca C Ying, Alexandria R Goldstein, Ryan J Fitzgerald
{"title":"Absolute-judgment models better predict eyewitness decision-making than do relative-judgment models.","authors":"Andrew M Smith, Rebecca C Ying, Alexandria R Goldstein, Ryan J Fitzgerald","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105877","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105877","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>When presented with a lineup, the witness is tasked with identifying the culprit or indicating that the culprit is not present. The witness then qualifies the decision with a confidence judgment. But how do witnesses go about making these decisions and judgments? According to absolute-judgment models, witnesses determine which lineup member provides the strongest match to memory and base their identification decision and confidence judgment on the absolute strength of this MAX lineup member. Conversely, relative-judgment models propose that witnesses determine which lineup member provides the strongest match to memory and then base their identification decision and confidence judgment on the relative strength of the MAX lineup member compared to the remaining lineup members. We took a critical test approach to test the predictions of both models. As predicted by the absolute-judgment model, but contrary to the predictions of the relative-judgment model, witnesses were more likely to correctly reject low-similarity lineups than high-similarity lineups (Experiment 1), and more likely to reject biased lineups than fair lineups (Experiment 2). Likewise, witnesses rejected low-similarity lineups with greater confidence than high-similarity lineups (Experiment 1) and rejected biased lineups with greater confidence than fair lineups (Experiment 2). Only a single pattern was consistent with the relative model and inconsistent with the absolute model: suspect identifications from biased lineups were made with greater confidence than suspect identifications from fair lineups (Experiment 2). The results suggest that absolute-judgment models better predict witness decision-making than do relative-judgment models and that pure relative-judgment models are unviable.</p>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"251 ","pages":"105877"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141604370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
CognitionPub Date : 2024-09-27DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105963
Junjie Wu , Yannan Ji , Hongfu Qu , Shuyue Zuo , Jinsong Liang , Juan Su , Qiping Wang , Guoli Yan , Guosheng Ding
{"title":"Transcranial magnetic stimulation of the right inferior frontal gyrus impairs bilinguals' performance in language-switching tasks","authors":"Junjie Wu , Yannan Ji , Hongfu Qu , Shuyue Zuo , Jinsong Liang , Juan Su , Qiping Wang , Guoli Yan , Guosheng Ding","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105963","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105963","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>It is widely accepted that bilinguals activate both languages simultaneously, even when intending to speak only one. A prevailing theory proposes that bilinguals inhibit the nontarget language to produce the target language, thought to be supported by evidence that the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG), a region typically associated with inhibition, is activated during language-switching tasks. However, it remains unclear whether the rIFG plays a causal or epiphenomenal role in this process. To explore the role of the rIFG, the present study employed transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to modulate its neural activity and evaluate subsequent behavior in bilinguals. Specifically, twenty-nine Chinese-English bilinguals participated in the study and performed picture-naming tasks in single- and dual-language contexts after receiving sham stimulation (Sham), continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS), or intermittent theta burst stimulation (iTBS) over the rIFG in three separate visits. Sham served as a control, with cTBS and iTBS intended to decrease and increase cortical excitability, respectively. We found that, compared to Sham, cTBS led to larger asymmetric switching costs and smaller asymmetric mixing costs, whereas iTBS resulted only in smaller asymmetric mixing costs. These findings suggest that cTBS targeting the rIFG likely impairs both local and global control. However, iTBS applied to the rIFG alone may not necessarily enhance language control mechanisms and could even hinder global control. Moreover, exploratory analyses found pronounced TMS-induced impairments in less balanced bilinguals, implying their potentially greater reliance on bilingual language control. Overall, this study is the first to suggest a causal role of the rIFG in language switching.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105963"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142322479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
CognitionPub Date : 2024-09-27DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105959
Mariel K. Goddu , Eunice Yiu , Alison Gopnik
{"title":"Causal relational problem solving in toddlers","authors":"Mariel K. Goddu , Eunice Yiu , Alison Gopnik","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105959","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105959","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate young children's capacity for “causal relational reasoning”: the ability to use relational reasoning to design novel interventions and bring about novel outcomes. In two experiments, we show that 24–30-month-old toddlers and three-year-old preschoolers use relational reasoning in a causal problem-solving task. Even toddlers rapidly inferred relational causal rules and applied this knowledge to solve novel problems––thus demonstrating both surprisingly early competence in relational reasoning and sophisticated causal inference. In both experiments, children observed a handful of trials in which a mechanistically opaque machine made objects larger or smaller. When prompted to solve a new problem, they used the machine to change the relative size of a novel object – even though its appearance and absolute size differed from previous observations, and even though subjects had never seen the machine generate objects of the required size before. This suggests that children quickly inferred abstract causal relations and then generalized these relations to determine which intervention would bring about the novel outcome required to solve the problem. These findings suggest a close link between early relational reasoning and active causal learning and inference.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105959"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142326559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
CognitionPub Date : 2024-09-27DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105950
Elodie Winckel , Anne Abeillé , Barbara Hemforth , Edward Gibson
{"title":"Discourse-based constraints on long-distance dependencies generalize across constructions in English and French","authors":"Elodie Winckel , Anne Abeillé , Barbara Hemforth , Edward Gibson","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105950","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105950","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The article presents four acceptability judgment experiments that evaluate novel predictions of the Focus-Background Conflict constraint (Abeillé et al. 2020, Cognition) with respect to the acceptability of long distance dependencies for so-called “subject islands” in English and French. In contrast with syntactic accounts, the Focus-Background Conflict constraint predicts differential behavior across different constructions. The current paper tests a novel prediction of this theory, in a construction that has not yet been tested experimentally: <em>it</em>-clefts. Experiment 1 shows that elements in clefted clauses are not uniformly backgrounded, contrary to a standard assumption in the syntax / discourse literature. Experiments 2–4 tested long-distance dependency relations in relative clauses and clefts. In both languages, there is strong evidence of a cross-construction difference when comparing the two constructions with each other: extraction of the subject complement out of a subject NP was super-additively difficult in clefts, but not in relative clauses, as predicted by the Focus-Background Conflict constraint.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105950"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142326555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"AI-induced indifference: Unfair AI reduces prosociality","authors":"Raina Zexuan Zhang , Ellie J. Kyung , Chiara Longoni , Luca Cian , Kellen Mrkva","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105937","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105937","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The growing prevalence of artificial intelligence (AI) in our lives has brought the impact of AI-based decisions on human judgments to the forefront of academic scholarship and public debate. Despite growth in research on people's receptivity towards AI, little is known about how interacting with AI shapes subsequent interactions among people. We explore this question in the context of unfair decisions determined by AI versus humans and focus on the spillover effects of experiencing such decisions on the propensity to act prosocially. Four experiments (combined <em>N</em> = 2425) show that receiving an unfair allocation by an AI (versus a human) actor leads to lower rates of prosocial behavior towards other humans in a subsequent decision—an effect we term <em>AI-induced indifference</em>. In Experiment 1, after receiving an unfair monetary allocation by an AI (versus a human) actor, people were less likely to act prosocially, defined as punishing an unfair human actor at a personal cost in a subsequent, unrelated decision. Experiments 2a and 2b provide evidence for the underlying mechanism: People blame AI actors less than their human counterparts for unfair behavior, decreasing people's desire to subsequently sanction injustice by punishing the unfair actor. In an incentive-compatible design, Experiment 3 shows that AI-induced indifference manifests even when the initial unfair decision and subsequent interaction occur in different contexts. These findings illustrate the spillover effect of human-AI interaction on human-to-human interactions and suggest that interacting with unfair AI may desensitize people to the bad behavior of others, reducing their likelihood to act prosocially. Implications for future research are discussed.</div><div>All preregistrations, data, code, statistical outputs, stimuli qsf files, and the Supplementary Appendix are posted on OSF at: <span><span>https://bit.ly/OSF_unfairAI</span><svg><path></path></svg></span></div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105937"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142311048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
CognitionPub Date : 2024-09-23DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105939
Sami R. Yousif , Sam Clarke , Elizabeth M. Brannon
{"title":"Seven reasons to (still) doubt the existence of number adaptation: A rebuttal to Burr et al. and Durgin","authors":"Sami R. Yousif , Sam Clarke , Elizabeth M. Brannon","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105939","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105939","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Does the visual system adapt to number? For more than fifteen years, most have assumed that the answer is an unambiguous “yes”. Against this prevailing orthodoxy, we recently took a critical look at the phenomenon, questioning its existence on both empirical and theoretical grounds, and providing an alternative explanation for extant results (<em>the old news hypothesis</em>). We subsequently received two critical responses. Burr, Anobile, and Arrighi rejected our critiques wholesale, arguing that the evidence for number adaptation remains overwhelming. Durgin questioned our old news hypothesis — preferring instead a theory about density adaptation he has championed for decades — but also highlighted several ways in which our arguments do pose serious challenges for proponents of number adaptation. Here, we reply to both. We first clarify our position regarding number adaptation. Then, we respond to our critics' concerns, highlighting seven reasons why we remain skeptical about number adaptation. We conclude with some thoughts about where the debate may head from here.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105939"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142311047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
CognitionPub Date : 2024-09-20DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105961
Joost Haarsma , Aaron Kaltenmaier , Stephen M. Fleming , Peter Kok
{"title":"Expectations about presence enhance the influence of content-specific expectations on low-level orientation judgements","authors":"Joost Haarsma , Aaron Kaltenmaier , Stephen M. Fleming , Peter Kok","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105961","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105961","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Will something appear and if so, what will it be? Perceptual expectations can concern both the presence and content of a stimulus. However, it is unclear how these different types of expectations interact with each other in biasing perception. Here, we tested how expectations about stimulus presence and content differently affect perceptual inference. Across separate online discovery (<em>N</em> = 110) and replication samples (<em>N</em> = 218), participants were asked to judge both the presence and content (orientation) of noisy grating stimuli. Crucially, preceding compound cues simultaneously and orthogonally predicted both whether a grating was likely to appear as well as what its orientation would be. Across both samples we found that content cues affected both discrimination and presence judgements directly, namely by biasing the orientation judgements in the expected direction and enhancing confidence in stimulus presence on congruent trials. In contrast, presence cues did not affect discrimination judgements directly. Instead, presence cues influenced discrimination judgements indirectly by enhancing the effect of the orientation cues when expecting a stimulus to be present. This was the case on trials where a stimulus was present, as well as on grating-absent trials. Further, presence cues directly affected confidence in stimulus presence. This suggests that presence expectations may act as a regulatory volume knob for the influence of content expectations. Further, modelling revealed higher sensitivity in distinguishing between grating presence and absence following absence cues than presence cues, demonstrating an asymmetry between gathering evidence in favour of stimulus presence and absence. Finally, evidence for overweighted expectations being associated with hallucination-like perception was inconclusive. In sum, our results provide nuance to popular predictive processing accounts of perception by showing that expectations of presence and content have distinct but interacting roles in shaping conscious perception.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105961"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142271536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
CognitionPub Date : 2024-09-17DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105960
Joshua Snell, Joelle Simon
{"title":"Readers encode absolute letter positions","authors":"Joshua Snell, Joelle Simon","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105960","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105960","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Reading research has long been concerned with the question of whether the reading brain accesses lexical representations via absolute or relative letter position information. In recent years, important results have been obtained with the flanker lexical decision task. Studies have shown faster decisions about target words (e.g., ‘rock’) when flanked by related letters (‘ro rock ck’) than unrelated letters (‘st rock ep')—and crucially, equal facilitation upon switching flanker positions (‘ck rock ro'), pointing to relative rather than absolute letter position coding. Yet, a later study employing longer targets and flankers yielded detrimental effects of switching flanker positions. In order to get a better grasp on the equivocal evidence thus far, here we carried out an extensive test of flanker relatedness and position effects, using various target and flanker lengths, all within a single experiment. We observed a clear reduction of flanker relatedness effects upon switching flanker positions, and this held true across target and flanker lengths. The present results unambiguously suggest that lexical access is driven by absolute letter position information, and furthermore, are accurately predicted by the recent PONG model (<span><span>Snell, 2024b</span></span>).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105960"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027724002464/pdfft?md5=657cde790cc5c0a8516adcb284016d6c&pid=1-s2.0-S0010027724002464-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142238645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}