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Taste-Based Gender Favouritism in High Stakes Decisions: Evidence from The Price Is Right 高风险决策中基于品味的性别偏好:来自《价格是对的》的证据
2区 经济学
Economic Journal Pub Date : 2023-10-09 DOI: 10.1093/ej/uead087
Pavel Atanasov, Jason D Dana, Bouke Klein Teeselink
{"title":"Taste-Based Gender Favouritism in High Stakes Decisions: Evidence from The Price Is Right","authors":"Pavel Atanasov, Jason D Dana, Bouke Klein Teeselink","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead087","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Gender discrimination is present across various fields, but identifying the underlying mechanism is challenging. We demonstrate own-gender favouritism in a field setting that allows for clean identification of tastes versus beliefs: the One Bid game on the TV show The Price Is Right. Players must guess an item’s value without exceeding it, leaving the last bidder with a dominant ‘cutoff’ strategy of overbidding another player by ${$}$1. We show that last bidders are significantly more likely to cut off opposite-gender opponents. This behaviour is explained by own-gender favouritism rather than beliefs that cutting off opposite-gender opponents is more profitable.","PeriodicalId":48448,"journal":{"name":"Economic Journal","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135045779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Parental Investments and Intra-household Inequality in Child Human Capital: Evidence from a Survey Experiment 亲代投资与家庭内儿童人力资本不平等:来自调查实验的证据
2区 经济学
Economic Journal Pub Date : 2023-10-06 DOI: 10.1093/ej/uead086
Michele Giannola
{"title":"Parental Investments and Intra-household Inequality in Child Human Capital: Evidence from a Survey Experiment","authors":"Michele Giannola","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead086","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Intra-household inequality explains 40% of child human capital variation in the developing world. I study how parents’ investment contributes to this inequality. To mitigate the identification problem posed by observational data, I design a survey experiment with parents in India that allows me to identify beliefs about the human capital production, preferences for inequality in outcomes, and the role of resources. I find that investments are driven by efficiency considerations: as parents perceive investment and ability as complements, they invest more in higher-achieving children and more so when constrained. Simulations indicate that interventions have intra-household distributional impacts through parental responses.","PeriodicalId":48448,"journal":{"name":"Economic Journal","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134943636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is Digital Credit Filling A Hole or Digging a Hole? Evidence from Malawi 数字信贷是填空还是挖洞?来自马拉维的证据
2区 经济学
Economic Journal Pub Date : 2023-10-06 DOI: 10.1093/ej/uead083
Valentina Brailovskaya, Pascaline Dupas, Jonathan Robinson
{"title":"Is Digital Credit Filling A Hole or Digging a Hole? Evidence from Malawi","authors":"Valentina Brailovskaya, Pascaline Dupas, Jonathan Robinson","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead083","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Digital credit has expanded rapidly in Africa, with opaque loan terms amidst low consumer financial literacy. Rich data from Malawi shows substantial demand for a digital loan with a base interest rate of 10% over 15 days, yet most borrowers are not aware of loan terms, repay late and incur substantial late fees. Regression discontinuity analyses show no evidence that access to small digital loans harms consumers’ perceived well-being. A short, randomised, phone-based financial literacy intervention improved knowledge but did not increase timely loan repayment, and modestly increased loan demand, ultimately increasing the likelihood of ever defaulting.","PeriodicalId":48448,"journal":{"name":"Economic Journal","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134943637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Technology shocks and predictable Minsky cycles 技术冲击和可预测的明斯基周期
2区 经济学
Economic Journal Pub Date : 2023-10-06 DOI: 10.1093/ej/uead085
Jean-Paul L’Huillier, Gregory Phelan, Hunter Wieman
{"title":"Technology shocks and predictable Minsky cycles","authors":"Jean-Paul L’Huillier, Gregory Phelan, Hunter Wieman","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead085","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Big technological improvements in a new, secondary sector lead to a period of excitement about the future prospects of the overall economy, generating boom-bust dynamics propagating through credit markets. Increased future capital prices relax collateral constraints today, leading to a boom before the realization of the shock. But reallocation of capital toward the secondary sector when the shock hits leads to a bust going forward. These cycles are perfectly foreseen in our model, making them markedly different from the typical narrative about unexpected financial shocks used to explain crises. Our dynamics obtain without a departure from rational expectations. In fact, these cycles echo Minsky’s original narrative for financial cycles, according to which “financial trauma occur as normal functioning events in a capitalistic economy.” (Minsky, 1980, p. 21).","PeriodicalId":48448,"journal":{"name":"Economic Journal","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134944331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Echo Chambers: Social Learning under Unobserved Heterogeneity 回声室:未观察异质性下的社会学习
2区 经济学
Economic Journal Pub Date : 2023-10-05 DOI: 10.1093/ej/uead081
Cole Williams
{"title":"Echo Chambers: Social Learning under Unobserved Heterogeneity","authors":"Cole Williams","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead081","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract People are often more influenced by opinions similar to their own and even seek information from those with whom they expect to most agree—behaviors often attributed to irrational biases. In this paper, I argue that these behaviors can be understood within the context of rational social learning by accounting for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in preferences or priors. Individuals display local learning by placing greater weight on opinions that are closer to their own. When individuals choose whom to learn from, local learning leads to the development of echo chambers.","PeriodicalId":48448,"journal":{"name":"Economic Journal","volume":"300 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134974850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic Campaign Communication: Evidence from 30,000 Candidate Manifestos 战略竞选沟通:来自30,000个候选人宣言的证据
2区 经济学
Economic Journal Pub Date : 2023-10-03 DOI: 10.1093/ej/uead082
Caroline Le Pennec
{"title":"Strategic Campaign Communication: Evidence from 30,000 Candidate Manifestos","authors":"Caroline Le Pennec","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead082","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Politicians seeking to persuade voters may not always be able to say what they would like to. Adopting policy positions opposite to that of their party or contradicting their previous policy announcements may be costly. I use computational text analysis on 30,000 candidate manifestos from two-round French elections to show that politicians take these costs into account, by toeing the party line and sticking to their platform, while also strategically adjusting their campaign communication and advertising neutral non-policy issues when they need to reach a broader electorate. I provide suggestive evidence that this moderation of electoral discourse predicts better performance in office and may therefore provide valuable information to voters.","PeriodicalId":48448,"journal":{"name":"Economic Journal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135648620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Child Penalties in Politics 政治上对儿童的惩罚
2区 经济学
Economic Journal Pub Date : 2023-10-03 DOI: 10.1093/ej/uead084
Jon H Fiva, Max-Emil M King
{"title":"Child Penalties in Politics","authors":"Jon H Fiva, Max-Emil M King","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead084","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Women tend to experience a substantial decline in their labour income after their first child is born, while men do not. Do such ‘child penalties’ also exist in the political arena? Using comprehensive administrative data from Norway, we find that women are less likely than men to secure elected office after their first child is born. The effects manifest already from the nomination stage, where mothers receive less favourable rankings on party lists relative to comparable fathers. This paper broadens our understanding of a fundamental social issue in political representation and demonstrates how motherhood affects even positively selected women.","PeriodicalId":48448,"journal":{"name":"Economic Journal","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135744628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Negative Tail Events, Emotions & Risk Taking 消极的尾部事件、情绪和;承担风险
2区 经济学
Economic Journal Pub Date : 2023-09-28 DOI: 10.1093/ej/uead080
Brice Corgnet, Camille Cornand, Nobuyuki Hanaki
{"title":"Negative Tail Events, Emotions & Risk Taking","authors":"Brice Corgnet, Camille Cornand, Nobuyuki Hanaki","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead080","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We design a novel experiment to assess investors’ behavioural and physiological reactions to negative tail events. Investors who observed, without suffering from, tail events decreased their bids whereas investors suffering tail losses increased them. However, the increase in bids after tail losses was not observed for those who exhibited no emotional arousal. This suggests that emotions are key in explaining Prospect Theory prediction of risk seeking in the loss domain.","PeriodicalId":48448,"journal":{"name":"Economic Journal","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135425652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Boss is Watching: How Monitoring Decisions Hurt Black Workers 《老板在看:监督决策如何伤害黑人员工
2区 经济学
Economic Journal Pub Date : 2023-09-27 DOI: 10.1093/ej/uead079
Costas Cavounidis, Kevin Lang, Russell Weinstein
{"title":"The Boss is Watching: How Monitoring Decisions Hurt Black Workers","authors":"Costas Cavounidis, Kevin Lang, Russell Weinstein","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead079","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract African Americans face shorter employment durations than similar whites. We hypothesise that employers discriminate in acquiring or acting on ability-relevant information. In our model, monitoring black but not white workers is self-sustaining. New black hires were more likely fired by previous employers after monitoring. This reduces firms’ beliefs about ability, incentivizing discriminatory monitoring. We confirm our predictions that layoffs are initially higher for black than non-black workers but that they converge with seniority and decline more with AFQT for black workers. Two additional predictions, lower lifetime incomes and longer unemployment durations for black workers, have known empirical support.","PeriodicalId":48448,"journal":{"name":"Economic Journal","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135476206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Unintended Consequences of Central Bank Lending in Financial Crises 金融危机中央行贷款的意外后果
2区 经济学
Economic Journal Pub Date : 2023-09-21 DOI: 10.1093/ej/uead078
Christiaan van der Kwaak
{"title":"Unintended Consequences of Central Bank Lending in Financial Crises","authors":"Christiaan van der Kwaak","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead078","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I investigate the macroeconomic impact of central bank funding becoming a more attractive funding source to financial intermediaries in times of crisis. I show that the requirement to pledge collateral has a contractionary effect on private credit everything else equal, and thereby reduces the expansionary effect that such lending otherwise has. I use an estimated New-Keynesian model with financial frictions to show that the collateral effect explains the limited growth of Italian banks’ private credit in response to the ECB’s three-year LTROs. Finally, I explore whether changes in lending policy can offset the cumulative negative effects from the collateral effect.","PeriodicalId":48448,"journal":{"name":"Economic Journal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136102131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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