战略竞选沟通:来自30,000个候选人宣言的证据

IF 3.8 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Caroline Le Pennec
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引用次数: 2

摘要

试图说服选民的政治家不一定总能说出他们想说的话。采取与自己政党相反的政策立场或与之前的政策声明相矛盾,可能会付出高昂的代价。我对法国两轮选举的3万份候选人宣言进行了计算文本分析,结果显示,政治家们考虑到了这些成本,他们遵循政党路线,坚持自己的政纲,同时在需要吸引更广泛选民的时候,战略性地调整他们的竞选沟通,宣传中立的非政策问题。我提供了一些有启发性的证据,证明选举话语的这种节制预示着在职期间的更好表现,因此可能为选民提供有价值的信息。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Strategic Campaign Communication: Evidence from 30,000 Candidate Manifestos
Abstract Politicians seeking to persuade voters may not always be able to say what they would like to. Adopting policy positions opposite to that of their party or contradicting their previous policy announcements may be costly. I use computational text analysis on 30,000 candidate manifestos from two-round French elections to show that politicians take these costs into account, by toeing the party line and sticking to their platform, while also strategically adjusting their campaign communication and advertising neutral non-policy issues when they need to reach a broader electorate. I provide suggestive evidence that this moderation of electoral discourse predicts better performance in office and may therefore provide valuable information to voters.
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来源期刊
Economic Journal
Economic Journal ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
6.60
自引率
3.10%
发文量
82
期刊介绍: The Economic Journal is the Royal Economic Society''s flagship title, and is one of the founding journals of modern economics. Over the past 125 years the journal has provided a platform for high quality and imaginative economic research, earning a worldwide reputation excellence as a general journal publishing papers in all fields of economics for a broad international readership. It is invaluable to anyone with an active interest in economic issues and is a key source for professional economists in higher education, business, government and the financial sector who want to keep abreast of current thinking in economics.
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