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Money and imperfectly competitive credit 货币和不完全竞争信用
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106050
Allen Head , Timothy Kam , Sam Ng , Guangqian Pan
{"title":"Money and imperfectly competitive credit","authors":"Allen Head ,&nbsp;Timothy Kam ,&nbsp;Sam Ng ,&nbsp;Guangqian Pan","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106050","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106050","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a monetary economy in which banks have market power emanating from search frictions. Distributions of both deposit and loan interest rates are equilibrium phenomena exhibiting dispersion consistent with new micro-level evidence on U.S. consumer loans and deposits. The theory accounts for incomplete pass-through of monetary policy to the distributions of loan and deposit rates through a novel channel. Imperfect competition links monetary policy to real consumption and welfare through its effects on interest rate spreads driven by market power and individual liquidity risk. Market power in deposits erodes the insurance banks provide against liquidity risk, while market power in lending enables banks to extract surplus from goods market trades. For a given inflation target, welfare gains arise if a central bank uses state-contingent monetary injections to reduce lenders' market power in response to fluctuations in aggregate demand.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106050"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144564036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Undominated monopoly regulation 不受支配的垄断管制
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106049
Debasis Mishra , Sanket Patil
{"title":"Undominated monopoly regulation","authors":"Debasis Mishra ,&nbsp;Sanket Patil","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106049","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106049","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study undominated mechanisms with transfers for regulating a monopolist who privately observes the marginal cost of production. A mechanism is undominated if no other mechanism gives the regulator a strictly higher payoff at some marginal cost of the monopolist without lowering the regulator's payoff at other costs. We show that an undominated mechanism has a quantity floor: whenever the monopolist is allowed to operate, it produces above a threshold quantity. Moreover, the regulator's operation decision is stochastic only if the monopolist produces at the quantity floor. We provide a near-complete characterization of the set of undominated mechanisms and use it to (a) derive a max-min optimal regulatory mechanism, (b) provide a foundation for deterministic mechanisms, and (c) show that the efficient mechanism is dominated.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106049"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144491489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Two time-consistent Paretian solutions to the intertemporal resource allocation problem 跨期资源分配问题的两个时间一致Paretian解
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106048
Yves Sprumont
{"title":"Two time-consistent Paretian solutions to the intertemporal resource allocation problem","authors":"Yves Sprumont","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106048","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106048","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the problem of aggregating individual geometric discounting (<em>GD</em>) preferences over infinite streams of consumption profiles into a system specifying, for each consumption history, a social ranking of the streams that follow that history. Such a system is time-consistent if and only if it is generated by a single underlying preference ordering over the lifetime streams. Under the Weak Pareto Principle, Neutrality, Anonymity, and Discounting Irrelevance (individual discount factors do not affect the ranking of constant streams), lifetime streams must be ranked by applying a fixed monotonic and symmetric ordering to the profiles of range-normalized <em>GD</em> utilities they yield (<span><span>Theorem 1</span></span>). History Independence singles out the <em>range-normalized utilitarian rule</em> (<span><span>Theorem 2</span></span>) whereas the <em>range-normalized Nash rule</em> is characterized by Independence of Infeasible Consumptions (the ranking of streams delivering consumption profiles in an interval from the origin does not depend on individual valuations outside that interval) or Valuation Irrelevance (the ranking of pure timing streams is independent of individual valuations) (<span><span>Theorem 3</span></span>).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106048"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144364561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The rich are not like you and me: Income, price dispersion, and consumption 富人不像你我：收入、价格分散和消费
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106046
Eungsik Kim , Stephen Spear
{"title":"The rich are not like you and me: Income, price dispersion, and consumption","authors":"Eungsik Kim ,&nbsp;Stephen Spear","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106046","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106046","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies the impact of imperfect competition on life-cycle consumption profiles and consumption-risk sharing, along with its policy implications. We develop a framework by incorporating the Shapley-Shubik market game into a stochastic overlapping generations model. We characterize the inverse income-marginal price relationship under market power, where wealthy agents face lower prices for identical goods compared to a perfectly competitive economy. We present several novel findings due to the additional price effect channel arising from price dispersion. First, we show that income-dependent prices in an imperfectly competitive economy lead to a failure of consumption smoothing and generate hump-shaped consumption profiles without other frictions. We also demonstrate that the market power of agents increases consumption volatility and worsens consumption-risk sharing due to the double luck effect resulting from price dispersion caused by income shocks. The additional volatility from imperfect competition creates a complementary welfare loss. Lastly, we illustrate a severed link between fiscal and monetary policy in improving welfare in an imperfectly competitive economy, as monetary policies reinforce the inverse income-price relationship and adversely affect the poor, while fiscal policies do not.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106046"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144306334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Meritocracy versus diversity 精英统治vs多样性
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106047
Kenzo Imamura
{"title":"Meritocracy versus diversity","authors":"Kenzo Imamura","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106047","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106047","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A college or firm makes admissions or hiring decisions for which each candidate is characterized by priority ranking and type, which might depend on race, gender, or socioeconomic status. The admissions or hiring committee faces a tradeoff between meritocracy and diversity: Although a <em>merit-first choice rule</em> might admit candidates of the same type, a <em>diversity-first choice rule</em> might be unfair because of priority violations. To formalize this tradeoff, we introduce a measure of meritocracy and a measure of diversity for choice rules. A choice rule that uses both <em>reserves</em> and <em>quotas</em> can be regarded as a compromise and as a generalization of the two extreme rules. The first result is comparative statics for this class of choice rules: We demonstrate that as parameters change and the choice rule becomes more meritorious, the rule also becomes less diverse. The second result is a characterization of the choice rule, which might help admissions or hiring committees to formulate their policies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106047"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144322198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Never say never: Optimal exclusion and reserve prices with expectations-based loss-averse buyers 永远不要说永远：最优排除和保留价格与基于预期的损失规避买家
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106045
Benjamin Balzer , Antonio Rosato
{"title":"Never say never: Optimal exclusion and reserve prices with expectations-based loss-averse buyers","authors":"Benjamin Balzer ,&nbsp;Antonio Rosato","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106045","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106045","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze reserve prices in auctions with independent private values when bidders are expectations-based loss averse. We find that the optimal public reserve price excludes fewer bidder types than under risk neutrality. Moreover, we show that public reserve prices are not optimal as the seller can earn a higher revenue with mechanisms that better leverage the “attachment effect”. We discuss two such mechanisms: i) an auction with a secret and random reserve price, and ii) a mechanism where an auction with a public reserve price is followed by a negotiation if the reserve price is not met. Both of these mechanisms expose more bidder types to the attachment effect, thereby increasing bids and ultimately revenue.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106045"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144306327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bargaining under liquidity constraints: Experimental evidence 流动性约束下的议价：实验证据
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106035
John Duffy , Lucie Lebeau , Daniela Puzzello
{"title":"Bargaining under liquidity constraints: Experimental evidence","authors":"John Duffy ,&nbsp;Lucie Lebeau ,&nbsp;Daniela Puzzello","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106035","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106035","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Bargaining is widely used in monetary, labor and finance models to determine terms of trade. The chosen bargaining solution can matter for welfare analysis, for example when agents are liquidity constrained. Here we report on an experiment in which buyers and sellers engage in semi-structured bargaining to determine the terms of trade with the aim of evaluating the empirical relevance of two bargaining solutions, the generalized Nash bargaining solution and Kalai's proportional bargaining solution. These bargaining solutions predict different outcomes when buyers are constrained in their money holdings. We first use the case when the buyer is not liquidity constrained to estimate the bargaining power parameter, which we find to be equal to 1/2. Then, imposing liquidity constraints on buyers, we find strong evidence in support of the Kalai proportional solution. Our findings have policy implications, e.g., for the welfare cost of inflation in search-theoretic models of money.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106035"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144491490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stationary altruism and time consistency 静止利他主义和时间一致性
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106038
Antoine Billot , Xiangyu Qu
{"title":"Stationary altruism and time consistency","authors":"Antoine Billot ,&nbsp;Xiangyu Qu","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106038","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106038","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study social intertemporal preferences constructed through the aggregation of individual preferences that differ in both time discounting and instantaneous utility. We introduce weakened forms of the Pareto condition under which the social discount and instantaneous utility functions are weighted averages of their individual counterparts. We show that if individuals are time-consistent, then society can only preserve this property without falling into dictatorship by applying the condition to comparisons involving only two periods. In such cases, the social discount factor is a weighted average of individual discount factors. When the condition is applied to longer consumption horizons, the resulting social preferences display decreasing impatience. Moreover, the longer the comparison horizon, the stronger the society's preference for patience over time becomes, under mild conditions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106038"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144221901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
New fertility patterns: The role of human versus physical capital 新的生育模式：人力资本与物质资本的作用
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106037
Nicolas Abad , Johanna Etner , Natacha Raffin , Thomas Seegmuller
{"title":"New fertility patterns: The role of human versus physical capital","authors":"Nicolas Abad ,&nbsp;Johanna Etner ,&nbsp;Natacha Raffin ,&nbsp;Thomas Seegmuller","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106037","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106037","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We use an overlapping generations model with physical and human capital, and two reproductive periods to explore how fertility decisions may differ in response to economic incentives in early and late adulthood. In particular, we analyze the interplay between fertility choices—related to career opportunities—and wages, and investigate the role played by work experience and investment in both types of capital. We show that young adults postpone parenthood above a certain wage threshold and that late fertility increases with human capital. The long run trend is either to converge to a low productivity equilibrium, involving high early fertility, investment in physical capital and relatively low income, or to a high productivity equilibrium, where households postpone parenthood to invest in their human capital and work experience, with higher late fertility and higher levels of income. A convergence to the latest state would explain the postponement of parenthood and the mitigation or slight reversal of fertility decrease in some European countries in recent decades.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106037"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144243324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corrigendum to “Evaluating ambiguous random variables from Choquet to maxmin expected utility” [J. Econ. Theory 192 (2021) 105129] “从Choquet到最大期望效用的模糊随机变量评估”[J]。经济学。理论192 (2021)105129]
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106034
Tomasz Strzalecki , Juuso Toikka
{"title":"Corrigendum to “Evaluating ambiguous random variables from Choquet to maxmin expected utility” [J. Econ. Theory 192 (2021) 105129]","authors":"Tomasz Strzalecki ,&nbsp;Juuso Toikka","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106034","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106034","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"227 ","pages":"Article 106034"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144240616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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