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Corrigendum to “The screening role of market tightness in a competitive search equilibrium with adverse selection” [Journal of Economic Theory 225 (2025) 105995] “市场紧度在逆向选择竞争搜索均衡中的筛选作用”的勘误表[经济理论学报225 (2025)105995]
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106124
Hung-Chi Chang , Yiting Li
{"title":"Corrigendum to “The screening role of market tightness in a competitive search equilibrium with adverse selection” [Journal of Economic Theory 225 (2025) 105995]","authors":"Hung-Chi Chang , Yiting Li","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106124","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106124","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106124"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145925355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The multiple-volunteers principle 多志愿者原则
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106114
Susanne Goldlücke , Thomas Tröger
{"title":"The multiple-volunteers principle","authors":"Susanne Goldlücke ,&nbsp;Thomas Tröger","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106114","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106114","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We present a class of simple transfer-free rules for assigning an unpleasant task among a group of agents: agents decide simultaneously whether or not to volunteer; if the number of volunteers exceeds a threshold number, the task is assigned to a volunteer; otherwise, the task is assigned to a non-volunteer. In particular, the rule may ask for multiple volunteers although one agent is sufficient to perform the task. In a setting in which agents care about who performs the task, any multiple-volunteers rule yields a strict interim Pareto improvement over random task assignment. Some volunteers rule is utilitarian optimal across all transfer-free binary mechanisms, and a rule with a large threshold reaches the first-best approximately if the group is large. Similar results hold for the problem of assigning a pleasant task. In that case, the task is assigned to a volunteer if and only if there are sufficiently few volunteers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106114"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145694214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal screening with securities 证券最优筛选
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106125
Nicolas Figueroa , Nicolas Inostroza
{"title":"Optimal screening with securities","authors":"Nicolas Figueroa ,&nbsp;Nicolas Inostroza","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106125","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106125","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A liquidity-constrained asset owner screens an informed investor using financial securities. Information-insensitive securities reduce the investor’s information rents. The optimal screening mechanism consists of a <em>monotone debt menu</em> where more optimistic investor types purchase larger amounts of debt. Interestingly, the issuer may benefit from trading with a better informed investor. For any monotone debt menu, as the asset’s cash flows more accurately describe the investor’s private information (Lehmann, 1988), the trade surplus unambiguously increases. Further, fixing the optimal debt menu, when the investor’s private information originates from location experiments, increasing accuracy decreases (increases) information rents for low (high) types. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantee that the issuer strictly benefits from trading with a better informed investor. Our results imply that selling debt is an effective approach to raise funds in financial markets even when investors hold superior private information and provide a novel rationale for the emergence of venture debt.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106125"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145737863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Partially constructed sequential equilibrium 部分构造序贯均衡
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106111
Joel Watson
{"title":"Partially constructed sequential equilibrium","authors":"Joel Watson","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106111","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106111","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article identifies sufficient conditions under which a partial construction of sequential equilibrium—characterizing beliefs and behavior for only a subset of the information sets—is sufficient for the existence of a sequential equilibrium that coincides with the partial construction in a suitable way. Illustrative applications are also presented.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106111"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145737859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Higher-order forward guidance 高阶前向制导
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106108
Marc Dordal i Carreras , Seung Joo Lee
{"title":"Higher-order forward guidance","authors":"Marc Dordal i Carreras ,&nbsp;Seung Joo Lee","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106108","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106108","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper develops a model of business cycles with endogenous volatility at the zero lower bound (ZLB) and central-bank forward guidance. We deliver three main results. First, a credible commitment to future stabilization curbs excess volatility at the ZLB. Second, pledging not to stabilize later can shift the economy onto more favorable equilibrium paths, exposing a trade-off between future stabilization and reduced aggregate volatility at the ZLB. Third, keeping the timing of future stabilization uncertain strictly dominates other forward-guidance strategies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106108"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145694215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Middlemen, inventories and economic dynamics 中间商、库存和经济动态
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106113
Chao Gu , Lu Wang , Randall Wright
{"title":"Middlemen, inventories and economic dynamics","authors":"Chao Gu ,&nbsp;Lu Wang ,&nbsp;Randall Wright","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106113","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106113","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study dynamics in frictional markets with intermediated trade, where middlemen can buy goods or assets from sellers, hold them as inventory, and sell when contacting appropriate buyers. Importantly, buyers have heterogeneous match-specific valuations, letting us characterize equilibrium in terms of reservation trading strategies (related papers with homogeneous valuations imply bang-bang solutions that are awkward for the economics and mathematics). Using bifurcation theory, we show there are equilibria where market participation, volume, prices, liquidity and other variables fluctuate as self-fulfilling prophecies. The dynamics emerge from strategic considerations, not mechanical assumptions, like increasing returns or other such devices in related models.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106113"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intertemporal bundling 跨时期的捆绑
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106127
Jingfeng Lu , Wenbo Zhao
{"title":"Intertemporal bundling","authors":"Jingfeng Lu ,&nbsp;Wenbo Zhao","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106127","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106127","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies when and how intertemporal bundling arises in optimal dynamic selling mechanisms in a two-period setting, where two objects (<em>A</em> and <em>B</em>) are sequentially available for sale. When the buyer’s values of the two objects (<em>v<sub>A</sub></em> and <em>v<sub>B</sub></em> respectively) are independent, in contrast to conventional insight from simultaneous sales, we find in our setting that there is no loss in relying on separate sales for optimal design. This result extends under widely adopted regularity conditions when the values are positively correlated in the sense that <em>v<sub>B</sub></em> is stochastically increasing in <em>v<sub>A</sub></em>. However, if <em>v<sub>B</sub></em> is stochastically decreasing in <em>v<sub>A</sub></em>, separate sales are no longer optimal, and the optimal integrated design features intertemporal bundling. When it is always efficient to provide each good, the optimal selling mechanism is implemented by offering a menu of intertemporal bundles with different prices, where each bundle consists of the second object together with a probabilistic proportion of the first object. In particular, if the buyer’s virtual value of the first good is always non-negative, pure bundling becomes optimal.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106127"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145737778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Comment on “Assignment problems with complementarities” [J. Econ. Theory 165 (2016) 209-241] “具有互补性的分配问题”述评[J]。经济学。理论165 (2016)209-241]
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106130
Daniel Kornbluth , Alexey Kushnir , Thanh Nguyen , Rakesh Vohra
{"title":"Comment on “Assignment problems with complementarities” [J. Econ. Theory 165 (2016) 209-241]","authors":"Daniel Kornbluth ,&nbsp;Alexey Kushnir ,&nbsp;Thanh Nguyen ,&nbsp;Rakesh Vohra","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106130","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106130","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Nguyen et al. (2016) introduce the <em>Bundled Probabilistic Serial</em> and <em>Bundled Probabilistic Serial under Limited Complementarities</em> mechanisms for allocating bundles of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences over bundles. They present efficiency, fairness, and incentive properties of the two mechanisms, showing both to be ordinally efficient, weakly envy-free, weakly strategy-proof, and asymptotically strategy-proof. We provide counterexamples demonstrating that the Bundled Probabilistic Serial mechanism is not weakly strategy-proof and the Bundled Probabilistic Serial under Limited Complementarities mechanism is not weakly envy-free, weakly strategy-proof, or asymptotically strategy-proof. We also revise proofs for the remaining properties.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106130"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quantifying the inefficiency of multi-unit auctions for normal goods 对普通商品多单位拍卖的低效率进行量化
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106094
Simon Essig Aberg , Brian Baisa
{"title":"Quantifying the inefficiency of multi-unit auctions for normal goods","authors":"Simon Essig Aberg ,&nbsp;Brian Baisa","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106094","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106094","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study multi-unit auctions for homogeneous goods in a private-value setting where bidders have multi-unit demand and non-negative wealth effects. When bidders have quasilinear preferences, the Vickrey auction implements an efficient outcome in dominant strategies. When bidders have positive wealth effects, recent impossibility results find that no auction implements an efficient outcome.</div><div>We quantify the worst-case inefficiency of the Vickrey auction and other multi-unit auctions when bidders have positive wealth effects. We measure an auction's worst-case inefficiency as the largest compensating variation associated with any Pareto improvement over an undominated auction outcome. We show that the Vickrey auction is ‘nearly’ efficient when the strength of bidder wealth effects is sufficiently small. This result follows because the set of undominated bids in the Vickrey auction collapses to truthfully reporting demand as bidder wealth effects become small. We also compare the worst-case inefficiency of the Vickrey auction with that of the uniform-price and discriminatory auctions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106094"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145227584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Endogenous business cycles in overlapping generations models with time inconsistency 具有时间不一致性的重叠代模型中的内生商业周期
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106104
Eungsik Kim, Jiayi Li
{"title":"Endogenous business cycles in overlapping generations models with time inconsistency","authors":"Eungsik Kim,&nbsp;Jiayi Li","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106104","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106104","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the implications of incorporating quasi-hyperbolic discounting preferences and extending the economic lifespan for the emergence of endogenous business cycles. Using a three-period overlapping generations model, we examine how quasi-hyperbolic discounting influences the dynamics of deterministic cycles and local sunspot equilibria. The presence of a middle-aged generation plays a key role in generating an elasticity of intertemporal substitution that is lower than the inverse of risk aversion, interacting with consumers’ time-inconsistent behavior. A lower EIS strengthens gross complementarity between dated goods and thereby contributes to the existence of multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling, belief-driven fluctuations. We show that our three-period model with time-inconsistent preferences makes two-period cycles and local indeterminacy more plausible than in a standard two-period framework with exponential discounting, as it expands the set of parameter values under which such endogenous fluctuations can arise.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106104"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145578787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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