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On the core of markets with co-ownerships and indivisibilities 以共同所有权和不可分割性为核心的市场
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106135
Xiang Sun , Qianfeng Tang , Mingjun Xiao , Jun Zhang
{"title":"On the core of markets with co-ownerships and indivisibilities","authors":"Xiang Sun ,&nbsp;Qianfeng Tang ,&nbsp;Mingjun Xiao ,&nbsp;Jun Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106135","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106135","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Following Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019), we study the exchange of indivisible objects among agents with unit demand, where initially each object is either privately owned or is co-owned by multiple agents. We propose a new notion of core called the effective core for these problems to address the inadequacies of conventional notions of core. We say that a coalition effectively blocks an assignment if it weakly blocks it—as in the definition of the strong core—and the blocking is credible in the sense that no agent in the coalition takes any redundant object owned by a self-feasible subcoalition. We show that the effective core is a nonempty subset of the weak core and a superset of the strong core, and all assignments in it are Pareto efficient. We also propose a strategy-proof algorithm to find assignments in the effective core. Lastly, we make a detailed comparison between the effective core and Balbuzanov and Kotowski’s exclusion core.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"232 ","pages":"Article 106135"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145886030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Coasian dynamics and endogenous learning 高斯动力学和内生性学习
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106136
Tuomas Laiho , Julia Salmi
{"title":"Coasian dynamics and endogenous learning","authors":"Tuomas Laiho ,&nbsp;Julia Salmi","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106136","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106136","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study social learning in markets where a monopolistic seller and potential buyers learn from past buyers’ reviews and experiences. Because buyers can wait before purchasing, they have an incentive to free-ride on information from other buyers. The seller has to take this informational externality between buyers into account in her pricing. Our main result is that any Markov perfect equilibrium is inefficient because of too little and too slow sales. This is contrary to the results absent learning. We then show that the seller’s commitment power can alleviate these inefficiencies. In addition, we demonstrate that good news learning causes too little total sales and bad news learning causes too slow sales.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"232 ","pages":"Article 106136"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145940149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Managing the expectations of buyers with reference-dependent preferences 管理具有参考依赖偏好的买家的期望
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106134
Nathan Hancart
{"title":"Managing the expectations of buyers with reference-dependent preferences","authors":"Nathan Hancart","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106134","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106134","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I consider a model of monopoly pricing where a firm makes a price offer to a buyer with reference-dependent preferences without being able to commit to it. The reference point is the ex-ante probability of trade and the buyer exhibits an attachment effect: the higher his expectations to buy, the higher his willingness-to-pay. When the buyer’s valuation is private information, a unique equilibrium exists where the firm plays a mixed strategy and its profits are the same as in the reference-independent benchmark. The equilibrium always entails inefficiencies: even as the firm’s information converges to complete information, it mixes on a non-vanishing support and the probability of no trade is greater than zero. Finally, I show that when the firm can design a test about the buyer’s valuation, it can do strictly better than in the reference-independent benchmark by leveraging the uncertainty generated by a noisy test.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"232 ","pages":"Article 106134"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145940151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dominance and optimality 优势和最优性
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106128
Xienan Cheng , Tilman Börgers
{"title":"Dominance and optimality","authors":"Xienan Cheng ,&nbsp;Tilman Börgers","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106128","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106128","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce a theory of dominance that encompasses as special cases the theory of admissible decision procedures in statistics, strict and weak dominance among strategies in games, first or second-order stochastic dominance among monetary lotteries, and Pareto dominance among social alternatives. One choice dominates another if in a variety of situations the former choice yields higher expected utility than the latter. We show that under certain assumptions, which include most importantly convexity of the set of situations, and linearity of the decision maker’s utility function in the argument that describes the situation, all undominated choices are optimal in some situation. We show this result for three different definitions of dominance. Our analysis of existing dominance notions in economics in one common framework allows us to compare the properties of these concepts, and to obtain insights into why certain versions of our result apply only to some, but not all of these concepts. We motivate the concept of undominated strategies by developing a formal result relating undominated strategies to rational inattention. As an application that illustrates the general theory we investigate Blackwell dominance among experiments.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"232 ","pages":"Article 106128"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145979319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The shocks matter: Labor mobility and the welfare cost of a currency union 这些冲击很重要：劳动力流动性和货币联盟的福利成本
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106132
Sihao Chen , David Cook , Haichao Fan , Juanyi Xu
{"title":"The shocks matter: Labor mobility and the welfare cost of a currency union","authors":"Sihao Chen ,&nbsp;David Cook ,&nbsp;Haichao Fan ,&nbsp;Juanyi Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106132","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106132","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, we study the impact of labor mobility on the welfare cost of a currency union in an open economy New Keynesian model. We find that the relationship between labor mobility and exchange rate flexibility depends on the source of asymmetric regional shocks. With demand shocks, labor mobility reduces the welfare cost of a union by reducing the cost of shifting labor to concentrated areas of high demand. With supply shocks, flexible exchange rates can work in conjunction with higher labor mobility to reallocate the factors of production to higher productivity regions of potential currency areas. Therefore, higher labor mobility can widen the welfare gap between fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, implying areas with high inter-regional labor mobility may benefit more from exchange rate flexibility.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"232 ","pages":"Article 106132"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145940152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bank runs and interventions with wholesale funding 银行挤兑和大规模融资干预
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106143
Luis Araujo , Ryuichiro Izumi , Fabrizio Mattesini
{"title":"Bank runs and interventions with wholesale funding","authors":"Luis Araujo ,&nbsp;Ryuichiro Izumi ,&nbsp;Fabrizio Mattesini","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106143","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106143","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study how access to wholesale funding affects bank fragility when policymakers can intervene efficiently during a run. In a Diamond-Dybvig environment with a wholesale market, banks can refinance rather than liquidate assets. We show that the effect of wholesale borrowing on fragility depends both on the cost of funds and on the allocation of seniority among creditors. When wholesale lenders are senior, the availability of funds decreases fragility when borrowing is inexpensive; while when borrowing is costly, greater access to wholesale funding increases fragility because it delays intervention and increases depositors’ incentives to run. In contrast, when depositors are senior, wholesale borrowing always decreases fragility. These findings highlight that seniority allocation is a key determinant of how wholesale funding shapes policy responses and bank fragility. In particular, although recent episodes suggest that wholesale investors typically hold seniority, our findings suggest that granting priority to depositors could make the banking system less fragile.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"232 ","pages":"Article 106143"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146078398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Random allocations of multiple objects with incomplete information 具有不完全信息的多对象随机分配
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106131
Xu Lang , Zaifu Yang
{"title":"Random allocations of multiple objects with incomplete information","authors":"Xu Lang ,&nbsp;Zaifu Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106131","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106131","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a condition under which a system of linear inequalities can be found to characterize ex post and interim allocation mechanisms that assign multiple heterogeneous indivisible objects to many agents and also satisfy complex distributional constraints in an incomplete information environment. This condition is called total unimodularity, a well-recognized and rich class of matrices whose entries are <span><math><mrow><mo>−</mo><mn>1</mn></mrow></math></span>, 0, or 1. The condition is so general as to extend and unify a number of well-known results, offer new and general results, and cover such as hierarchies, bihierarchies, adjacency, dependence chains, <em>M</em><sup>♮</sup>-concavity, 1-substitutes, and paramodularity. We also provide several applications of practical interest.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"232 ","pages":"Article 106131"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145940150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Robust product design and pricing 稳健的产品设计和定价
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106112
Kyungmin Kim , Nenad Kos
{"title":"Robust product design and pricing","authors":"Kyungmin Kim ,&nbsp;Nenad Kos","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106112","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106112","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study design and pricing by a monopolist who has no information about the distribution of consumers’ tastes and maximizes her profit under the worst-case scenario. We show that her optimal strategy takes a simple form of dividing the taste space into a finite number of equal-length intervals and serving consumers on a randomly chosen interval. We obtain this result by studying the dual problem of finding a distribution of consumers’ tastes that minimizes the seller’s profit and establishing strong duality. The profit-minimizing distributions exhibit a uniformity property, assigning equal probability mass to a finite number of partition cells of equal width. Through the dual, we also determine the seller’s lowest profit in the Bayesian setting, establish that it is strictly positive, and derive the set of achievable profits.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106112"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145624930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A model of network formation for the overnight interbank market: When is core-periphery an illusion? 隔夜银行间市场网络形成模型：什么时候核心-外围是一种幻觉？
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106126
Mikhail Anufriev , Andrea Deghi , Valentyn Panchenko , Paolo Pin
{"title":"A model of network formation for the overnight interbank market: When is core-periphery an illusion?","authors":"Mikhail Anufriev ,&nbsp;Andrea Deghi ,&nbsp;Valentyn Panchenko ,&nbsp;Paolo Pin","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106126","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106126","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a theoretical model of network formation in the overnight interbank market, where banks manage liquidity under reserve uncertainty by strategically forming bilateral lending relationships. The model incorporates counterparty risk and the central bank’s corridor system, yielding endogenously determined equilibrium networks. A key result, relevant for systemic stability policy, is that the equilibrium network is bipartite: active banks act either as lenders or borrowers, and no strategic (interbank) intermediation arises. We also show that, via temporal aggregation of equilibrium networks, apparent intermediation and a core-periphery structure emerge. We validate these predictions using e-MID market data, showing that the model reconciles the frequency-dependent network features documented in the empirical literature for this market.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106126"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145790381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Competitive price discrimination, imperfect information, and consumer search 竞争性价格歧视、不完全信息和消费者搜索
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106133
Carl-Christian Groh
{"title":"Competitive price discrimination, imperfect information, and consumer search","authors":"Carl-Christian Groh","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106133","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106133","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I study a homogeneous goods’ model in which a consumer attains consumption opportunities via sequential search. Whenever a firm is visited by the consumer, the firm observes a private signal about the consumer’s valuation and price discriminates based on this information. If the signal is sufficiently precise and search costs are at intermediate levels, an equilibrium in which the consumer visits multiple firms with positive probability emerges. At low search costs, firms offer low prices to deter search, and the consumer does not visit multiple firms. The equilibrium prices are minimal if search costs are negligible and, if the signal is sufficiently precise, the equilibrium prices are maximal at intermediate levels of search costs.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106133"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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