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Central bank digital currency and bank intermediation: Medium of Exchange vs. Savings vehicle 中央银行数字货币与银行中介：交换媒介与储蓄工具
IF 2.8 2区 经济学
European Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104890
Remo Nyffenegger
{"title":"Central bank digital currency and bank intermediation: Medium of Exchange vs. Savings vehicle","authors":"Remo Nyffenegger","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104890","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104890","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper analyzes the effects of a retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) on bank intermediation within a general equilibrium model and provides a quantitative assessment. In the model, banks offer both transaction and savings deposits. This allows to study how a CBDC’s impact varies based on its usage as a medium of exchange or as a savings vehicle. When a CBDC is used as a savings vehicle that competes with savings deposits, the level of disintermediation almost doubles compared to a scenario where the CBDC is used solely for transactions and competes only with transaction deposits.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"170 ","pages":"Article 104890"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142658203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Social norms: Enforcement, breakdown & polarization 社会规范：执行、崩溃和两极分化
IF 2.8 2区 经济学
European Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104885
Loukas Balafoutas, Eugen Dimant, Simon Gächter, Erin Krupka
{"title":"Social norms: Enforcement, breakdown & polarization","authors":"Loukas Balafoutas,&nbsp;Eugen Dimant,&nbsp;Simon Gächter,&nbsp;Erin Krupka","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104885","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104885","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The collection of scientific contributions in this special issue explores the role of social norms in guiding collective behavior and the complexities of enforcing these norms in polarized contexts. It examines how norms, while fostering social cohesion, can also contribute to societal divisions, especially in politically charged environments. The included studies highlight three key areas: the enforcement of norms through mechanisms such as information dissemination and leadership; the breakdown of norms in polarized societies, where political affiliations and trust erosion can exacerbate discrimination; and the polarization of norms across political and generational divides, which can hinder collective action and deepen societal fragmentation. Together, these contributions provide valuable insights into how norms are maintained, challenged, or eroded in diverse settings, offering guidance for strengthening social cohesion in the face of contemporary global challenges.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"170 ","pages":"Article 104885"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142658205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Targeted monetary policy, dual rates, and bank risk-taking 目标货币政策、双重利率和银行风险承担
IF 2.8 2区 经济学
European Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104889
Francesca Barbiero , Lorenzo Burlon , Maria Dimou , Jan Toczynski
{"title":"Targeted monetary policy, dual rates, and bank risk-taking","authors":"Francesca Barbiero ,&nbsp;Lorenzo Burlon ,&nbsp;Maria Dimou ,&nbsp;Jan Toczynski","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104889","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104889","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We assess whether dual interest rates – central bank funding at rates below the interest rates on reserves – influence the size and composition of bank credit. We measure exposure to the policy using daily reactions of bank funding costs to the announcement of the recalibration of the ECB’s TLTROs in April 2020. We then use the Euro area credit register to follow the evolution of bank lending conditions and risk-taking. We find that the measure had a strong positive effect on bank credit and, in contrast to a standard rate cut, was not accompanied by an increase in risk-taking.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"170 ","pages":"Article 104889"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142561232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Don’t put all your legs in one basket: Theory and evidence on coopetition in road cycling 不要把所有的腿都放在一个篮子里：公路自行车合作竞争的理论与证据
IF 2.8 2区 经济学
European Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104892
Julian Matthes, David Piazolo
{"title":"Don’t put all your legs in one basket: Theory and evidence on coopetition in road cycling","authors":"Julian Matthes,&nbsp;David Piazolo","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104892","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104892","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study competition between two groups of individuals with team affiliations, where each group solves a coopetition problem to outperform the other group. Our analysis suggests the presence of a strategic benefit of diversification that goes beyond merely reducing outcome uncertainty. We outline applications in industrial and workplace organization and provide a detailed model of road cycling races, which naturally feature this strategic setup. We find that asymmetric groups tend to cooperate better. Also, having team members in two competing groups is beneficial for a team, as it increases free-riding opportunities in both groups. By analyzing data from over 40 seasons of professional road cycling races, we find empirical evidence in favor of these results. In particular, having a teammate in a group behind positively impacts win probability.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"170 ","pages":"Article 104892"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142657861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corrigendum to “Identity, Leadership, and Cooperation: An experimental analysis” [European Economic Review 165 (2024) 104741] 对 "身份、领导力与合作：实验分析》[《欧洲经济评论》165 (2024) 104741] 更正
IF 2.8 2区 经济学
European Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104877
Moumita Roy , Daniel Houser
{"title":"Corrigendum to “Identity, Leadership, and Cooperation: An experimental analysis” [European Economic Review 165 (2024) 104741]","authors":"Moumita Roy ,&nbsp;Daniel Houser","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104877","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104877","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"170 ","pages":"Article 104877"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142658204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Contingent payments in procurement interactions: Experimental evidence 采购互动中的或有支付：实验证据
IF 2.8 2区 经济学
European Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104886
Jason Shachat , Matthew J. Walker , Lijia Wei
{"title":"Contingent payments in procurement interactions: Experimental evidence","authors":"Jason Shachat ,&nbsp;Matthew J. Walker ,&nbsp;Lijia Wei","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104886","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104886","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A primary objective of creating competition among suppliers is the procurement of higher quality goods and services at lower prices. When procuring non-standard goods, it is often difficult to write a complete specification of desired quality in the contract. Thus, payments to suppliers cannot be perfectly conditioned on the quality provided. We develop a simple model to distil several real-world features and illustrate how contract structure within price priority competition jointly affects bid aggression and incentives for the provision of surplus-enhancing quality. We implement the contingent payments as probabilistic. The selected supplier’s payment is, according to a fixed probability, either their bid or a quality contingent amount that depends on the bid and an exogenous norm for allocating social surplus. We use a lab experiment to show that there is a ‘Goldilocks’ region for high quality in which the probability of quality contingent payment is large enough to incentivize provision, but not so large as to induce overly aggressive bidding. This implementation only relies upon preferences for maximizing one’s own profit and the rationality of backward induction. An experimental finding not predicted in our setting is that suppliers earn positive economic profits inside the Goldilocks region, which can be explained by suppliers’ risk aversion. The results have implications for the effective design of contingent payments in contracts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"170 ","pages":"Article 104886"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142573196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Herbert Glejser - Obituary 赫伯特-格莱瑟 - 讣告
IF 2.8 2区 经济学
European Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104867
{"title":"Herbert Glejser - Obituary","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104867","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104867","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"170 ","pages":"Article 104867"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142657860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Effects of extending paid parental leave on children’s socio-emotional skills and well-being in adolescence 延长带薪育儿假对儿童社会情感技能和青春期幸福感的影响
IF 2.8 2区 经济学
European Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104880
Mikkel Aagaard Houmark , Cecilie Marie Løchte Jørgensen , Ida Lykke Kristiansen , Miriam Gensowski
{"title":"Effects of extending paid parental leave on children’s socio-emotional skills and well-being in adolescence","authors":"Mikkel Aagaard Houmark ,&nbsp;Cecilie Marie Løchte Jørgensen ,&nbsp;Ida Lykke Kristiansen ,&nbsp;Miriam Gensowski","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104880","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104880","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study how children’s socio-emotional skills and well-being in adolescence are affected by longer parental care during infancy. Exploiting a Danish reform that extended paid parental leave in 2002 and effectively delayed children’s entry into formal out-of-home care, we show that longer leave increases adolescent conscientiousness, emotional stability, and well-being, and reduces school absenteeism. The effects are strongest for children of mothers who would have taken short leave in the absence of the reform. For this group, longer leave also increases school grades and reduces the risk of getting a psychiatric diagnosis. This highlights how time spent with a parent is particularly productive during very early childhood.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"170 ","pages":"Article 104880"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142554644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A field study of donor behaviour in the Iranian kidney market 对伊朗肾脏市场捐赠者行为的实地研究
IF 2.8 2区 经济学
European Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-10-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104887
Ali Moghaddasi Kelishomi , Daniel Sgroi
{"title":"A field study of donor behaviour in the Iranian kidney market","authors":"Ali Moghaddasi Kelishomi ,&nbsp;Daniel Sgroi","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104887","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104887","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Iran has the world’s only government-regulated kidney market. We report the results of the first field study of donor behaviour in this unusual market. Participants have lower risk tolerance and higher patience levels than the Iranian average but display no difference in rationality from population averages and there is evidence of altruism among participants. We provide an examination of decision-making in extreme situations by individuals in this market, typically at the very bottom of the income distribution, and shed light on the sort of people likely to participate if other nations were to operate such markets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"170 ","pages":"Article 104887"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142530024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On political ambiguity and anti-median platforms 关于政治模糊性和反中庸平台
IF 2.8 2区 经济学
European Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-10-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104884
Juha Tolvanen
{"title":"On political ambiguity and anti-median platforms","authors":"Juha Tolvanen","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104884","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104884","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper constructs a new, information-based explanation for political ambiguity and the success of anti-median platforms. It argues that voters’ and candidates’ correlated preferences about the appropriate policy combined with ambiguous platforms can help candidates with non-median preferences increase their support and even win against a median candidate. I show how ambiguity can arise in a standard citizen-candidate setting where voters have different preferences, in its extension with primaries, and even in a Condorcet jury model where disagreement arises only from differences in voters’ information. The paper also offers a formal framework that allows for dog whistle politics. The model illustrates how ambiguity can have important negative welfare implications. Specifically, I show that despite having ex-ante identical preferences with voters, politicians may choose ambiguous platforms even if voters would be keen on banning them.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"170 ","pages":"Article 104884"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142530021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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