Psychological Inquiry最新文献

{"title":"Avoiding Bias in the Search for Implicit Bias","authors":"Wilson Cyrus-Lai, W. Tierney, Christilene du Plessis, M. Nguyen, M. Schaerer, Elena Giulia Clemente, E. Uhlmann","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2106762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2106762","url":null,"abstract":"To revitalize the study of unconscious bias, Gawronski, Ledgerwood, and Eastwick (this issue) propose a paradigm shift away from implicit measures of intergroup attitudes and beliefs. Specifically, researchers should capture discriminatory biases and demonstrate that participants are unaware of the influence of social category cues on their judgments and actions. Individual differences in scores on implicit measures will be useful to predict and better understand implicitly prejudiced behaviors, but the latter should be the collective focus of researchers interested in unconscious biases against social groups. We welcome Gawronski et al.’s (this issue) proposal and seek to build on their insights. We begin by summarizing recent empirical challenges to the implicit measurement approach, which has for the last quarter century focused heavily on capturing individual differences and examining their potential antecedents and consequences. In our view, Gawronski et al. (this issue) underestimate the problems the subfield of implicit bias research is currently facing; the need for a paradigm shift in focus and approach is truly urgent. Although we strongly agree with their basic thesis, we also stress the importance of avoiding various forms of potential bias in the search for implicit bias. First, research in this area should leverage open science innovations such as pre-registration of competing predictions to allow for intellectually and ideologically dissonant conclusions of equal treatment and “reverse” discrimination against members of historically privileged groups. Second, in assessing awareness of bias, researchers should avoid equating unconsciousness with the null hypothesis that evidence of awareness will not emerge, and instead seek positive evidence that the behavioral bias is implicit in nature. Finally, to avoid underestimating the pervasiveness of intergroup bias, scientists should continue to develop and attempt to validate implicit measures of attitudes and beliefs, which may tap latent prejudices expressed in only a small subset of overt actions.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"203 - 212"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48002446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Delight in Disorder: Inclusively Defining and Operationalizing Implicit Bias","authors":"J. Dovidio, J. Kunst","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2106756","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2106756","url":null,"abstract":"Gawronski, Ledgerwood, and Eastwick (this issue) address a timely issue of both theoretical and practical importance in the burgeoning study of implicit bias. The authors “highlight conceptual and empirical problems with the widespread equation of implicit bias and bias on implicit measures” (p. 139). They are not the first to raise and grapple with a question closely related to deciphering the conceptual meaning of implicit bias and its relationship to measures of implicit bias, but they distinguish themselves with their mastery of diverse literatures, sophisticated analyses of core theoretical issues, and original insights. While maintaining a steady focus on their core question, the authors’ review and synthesis of the work that they cover makes this a valuable resource for various audiences. It provides a detailed, yet accessible introduction for those who are interested in but relatively unfamiliar with the topic, as well as a thought-provoking and well-argued contribution for those who have considerable expertise in the area and may already have well-formed perspectives on the questions posed and answers provided. Importantly, in an area in which heated debate has been common, Gawronski et al. navigate through complex issues with logic and data in an even-handed way. This is an impressive piece of scholarship. A common colloquial expression is, “If the shoe fits, wear it.” The article is particularly impressive in the way the authors examine the many ways that scholars have attempted to define implicit bias. They try on many shoes for the term “implicit,” as compared to “explicit.” Gawronski et al. (this issue) consider distinctions in process, such as in differences between “mental levels.” For instance, they discuss how implicit has been treated as reflecting associative processes “involving unqualified mental links between concepts”, whereas explicit processes are propositional “involving the perceived validity of specific relations” (p. 141). Alternative, procedural distinctions are also reviewed. These tend to be instrument-focused. For example, a measure would qualify as implicit to the extent to which the response is automatic—that is, unintentional and difficult to control. By contrast, an explicit measure would be one in which people respond in a deliberative, intentional, and selfreflective way. Indeed, the first author of this commentary falls into this procedural camp, describing implicit as activation that occurs unintentionally (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001), automatically (Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2010), and which can operate without people being aware of the “biased associations or of the role those associations play in guiding their judgment and action” (Greenwald, Dsagupta, et al., 2022, p. 8). However, Gawronski et al. (this issue) skillfully argue how and why none of these shoes fit. In the end, we resonate with Gawronski et al.’s critical conclusion that “despite 25 years of extensive research, the current","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"177 - 180"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44465910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Implicit Bias ≠ Bias on Implicit Measures","authors":"Bertram Gawronski, A. Ledgerwood, Paul W. Eastwick","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2106750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2106750","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract People can behave in a biased manner without being aware that their behavior is biased, an idea commonly referred to as implicit bias. Research on implicit bias has been heavily influenced by implicit measures, in that implicit bias is often equated with bias on implicit measures. Drawing on a definition of implicit bias as an unconscious effect of social category cues on behavioral responses, the current article argues that the widespread equation of implicit bias and bias on implicit measures is problematic on conceptual and empirical grounds. A clear separation of the two constructs will: (1) resolve ambiguities arising from the multiple meanings implied by current terminological conventions; (2) stimulate new research by uncovering important questions that have been largely ignored; (3) provide a better foundation for theories of implicit bias through greater conceptual precision; and (4) highlight the broader significance of implicit bias in a manner that is not directly evident from bias on implicit measures.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"139 - 155"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42907651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bias in Implicit Measures as Instances of Biased Behavior under Suboptimal Conditions in the Laboratory","authors":"J. de Houwer, Y. Boddez","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2106755","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2106755","url":null,"abstract":"The target paper of Gawronski, Ledgerwood, and Eastwick (this issue) provides a valuable contribution to the literature on implicit bias (IB). We find ourselves in agreement with many of the points that the authors put forward. Most importantly, we agree that it is important to realize that scores on implicit measurement tasks such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT) cannot by default be interpreted as instances of unconscious bias. We also agree that the focus on bias in implicit measures (BIM) may have slowed progress in research on IB, that the focus of bias research should be on reducing real-world instances of bias, and that societal dispar-ities can result in social discrimination in a way that is not captured by the psychological concept of bias. We are happy to see that Gawronski et al. share many aspects of our perspective on IB and implicit measures (see De Houwer, 2006, 2014, 2019; De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009, De Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; De Houwer, Van Dessel, & Moran, 2021). Most importantly, (a) IB can indeed be conceived of as a behavioral phenomenon that refers to the impact of social cues on behavior, and (b) implicit measures are not the same as indirect measures, nor do they necessarily reflect associative processes. In sum, we support much of what Gawronski et al. put forward in their target paper. Nevertheless, we also disagree with Gawronski et al. (this issue) on some points. First, we continue to believe IB should not be limited to unconscious bias but should include also instances of bias that are automatic in other ways (e.g., unintentional). Second, we continue to see a potential role for BIM in research on IB, more specifically as an educational tool and as a lab model of IB in the real world.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"173 - 176"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47285513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"So close, Yet So Far: Stopping Short of Killing Implicit Bias","authors":"Joseph Cesario","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2106753","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2106753","url":null,"abstract":"The authors of the target article (Gawronski, Ledgerwood, & Eastwick, this issue) are to be commended for their important and insightful analysis on the state of implicit bias research. They introduce and discuss the critical distinction between bias on implicit measures and implicit bias itself. However, the authors want to have their cake and eat it too, and this causes them to stop short in fully applying their analysis. In this commentary, I take the authors seriously and draw out their analysis to its logical conclusion. In doing so, three points are raised:","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"162 - 166"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41407611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Grappling with Social Complexity When Defining and Assessing Implicit Bias","authors":"Jasmine B. Norman, Jacqueline M. Chen","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2106760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2106760","url":null,"abstract":"The target article by Gawronski, Ledgerwood, and Eastwick (this issue) presents a thorough overview of the intergroup bias literature, honing in on issues that are both conceptual and methodological. In order to address these issues, Gawronski et al. present some new conceptual definitions and distinctions. One central definition provided is of implicit bias, defined as “unconscious effects of social category cues (e.g., cues related to race, gender, etc.) on behavioral responses” (Gawronski et al., this issue, p. 140). The target article subsequently discusses the implications of this definition for methodology in detail. Our commentary highlights important considerations for different aspects of the target article’s definition of implicit bias. First, we outline the complexity of a seemingly straightforward part of this definition: social category cues. We consider the implications of categorical ambiguity in relation to the current definition of bias. Further, we propose that disparate impact and the importance of social context must be definitional to implicit bias. We provide an argument for how social and structural context are inseparable from social category cues and behavior. Second, turning our attention to the criterion of unconsciousness, we discuss and illustrate the challenges of measuring constructs that are under awareness and, informed by other fields, attempt to provide some solutions.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"193 - 198"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41853818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ideologies Are Like Possessions","authors":"A. Molnár, G. Loewenstein","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065129","url":null,"abstract":"Gries, M€ uller, & Jost (this issue) address a topic of great theoretical and practical importance: the origin of the ideologies that shape—and increasingly define—the current political and social climate. Adopting an economist’s perspective on ideologies, they seek to understand what purpose belief systems serve and why specific ideologies are embraced by individuals. Their answer, in a nutshell, is that people assess how well different ideologies would satisfy their psychological needs (and consumption) and choose the belief system that addresses their needs the most (subject to constraints such as limited information about ideologies and limited supply of ideologies in the “market” of belief systems). At a time when beliefs about, and behavior toward, ostensibly scientific issues such as climate change and vaccination, have become polarized as a result of being viewed through the lens of political ideologies, these questions are of existential importance. As advocates of a new wave in economics commonly referred to as “belief-based utility,” we applaud Gries et al.’s effort to apply an economic framework to understanding how people adopt, update, and abandon their belief systems. Belief-based utility is the idea that the main sources of utility are not material consumption, as economists generally assume, but rather people’s beliefs—about the world, and especially about themselves (e.g., whether they are virtuous, smart, attractive, likeable; see Loewenstein & Molnar, 2018; Molnar and Loewenstein, in press). The idea that people care about what is in their mind, and not just about material consumption, goes way back to classical economists (see Loewenstein, 1992). For example, Jeremy Bentham, who first proposed the notion of utility that became the backbone of economics, listed only a handful of material determinants of utility in his seminal work on hedonics and utility (Bentham, 1789), but a wide range of immaterial, nonphysical concepts, such as reputation, memory, imagination, or expectations—the majority of which can be labeled as beliefs. Adam Smith, likewise, made a case for the role of beliefs driving human behavior: “To what purpose is all the toil and bustle of this world?” Smith asked, and answered: “To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages we can propose to derive from it” (Smith, 1759, pp. 108–110). Although these ideas were largely sidelined during the early to mid-20th century as a result of the ordinalist revolution in economics, behaviorism in psychology, and the ensuing exclusive focus on directly measurable goods and outcomes, economists began to re-incorporate these insights in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. For example, Thomas Schelling (1984), in a brilliant paper titled “The Mind as a Consuming Organ,” discussed how little of what we “consume” is actually observable, physical, goods (what standard economics would conceptualize as “cons","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"84 - 87"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41801466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Lost in the Supermarket? A Commentary on Gries, Müller, and Jost","authors":"D. Osborne, Nicole Satherley, C. Sibley","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065132","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars have long-debated how citizens come to adopt a political ideology. Whereas some suggest that material needs and/or self-interest motivate citizens to endorse the issue positions and ideological stances that maximize utility (see Chong, 2000; Chong & Mullinix, 2022; Sniderman, Glaser, & Griffin, 1991; Weeden & Kurzban, 2017), others argue that less rational—and even irrational—forces are at play and instead focus on the psychological needs met by (Jost, 2020, 2021; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003b), as well as symbolic attachments to (Jardina, 2019; Reny & Sears, 2020; Sears, 1993; Sears & Henry, 2005), specific ideologies. It seems that the extant literature is at an impasse over the antecedents to belief systems. Are citizens rational? Or are they not? Gries, M€ uller, and Jost (this issue) reconcile these contrasting perspectives by asserting that both rational and irrational processes motivate people’s ideological preferences. To these ends, the authors develop a comprehensive model of ideological choice that incorporates both (a) psychological and (b) consumption needs which are weighted by the importance assigned to them by the individual. On the other end of the production chain, ideological entrepreneurs supply ideologies that differentially reconcile these demands and disseminate them within a larger marketplace of beliefs. Although a formal mathematical model is used to identify the ideologies available within the frontier of options that best reconcile these dual needs, Gries et al. assert that, given the informational costs associated with becoming perfectly informed, most citizens simply “try out” different ideologies until they find one that satisfices their psychological and consumption needs. In seeking to resolve the perennial quandary over the determinants of ideology, Gries et al. (this issue) make multiple important contributions to the literature. First, in our view, much of the debate over mass belief systems entails discussions where both parties talk past one another. Those in the ideological purists camp (generally comprised of political scientists) define ideology in rigid terms focused on the presence of a stable and coherent belief system as articulated by Converse (1964) and others, whereas those in the ideological minimalists camp (often comprised of psychologists) have resuscitated the competence of the average voter by treating ideology as a self-defined/identity-based concept present in the vast majority of people (Jost, 2006, 2021). Gries et al. bridge this divide by acknowledging that ideologies are comprised of a “network of attitudes and beliefs... [that are] linked together logically and/or psychologically” (p. 65). Such a compromise brings both sides of this seemingly intractable conflict together and provides the foundations for a promising resolution to one of the most enduring debates in political psychology. In a similar manner, Gries et al. (this issue) help to reconcile the debate ov","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"95 - 100"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41747544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What a Capital Ideology! Framing Ideological Choice as a Capitalist Consumer Process","authors":"Richard P. Eibach","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065133","url":null,"abstract":"In the opening scene of Angels in America: Perestroika, Aleksii Antedilluvianovich Prelapsarianov, “the world’s oldest living Bolshevik,” delivers a speech to the Kremlin shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Empire (Kushner, 1996). His speech glorifies the Bolshevik cause and voices disappointment with the Perestroika reformers. At first glance, Prelapsarianov seems like the very caricature of the irrational ideologue; his middle name (“before the Flood”) and last name (“before the Fall”) highlight how he is stubbornly clinging to the founding ideology of a dying system. Yet when we listen to his monologue we can see past the surface appearance of irrationality to find a compelling account of the human need for ideology. Surprisingly for a Marxist-Leninist, the character does not emphasize the value of ideology for advancing class-based material interests; rather, he focuses on how ideology can satisfy deeper cravings for things like meaning, structure, and purpose: “You can’t imagine, when we first read the Classic Texts, when in the dark vexed night of our ignorance and terror the seedwords sprouted and shoved incomprehension aside, when the incredible bloody vegetable struggle up and through into Red Blooming gave us Praxis, True Praxis, True Theory married to Actual Life” (Kushner, 1996, p. 14). He even gives a vivid analogy to suggest how lost we would be without an ideology to shield us from a threatening world: “If the snake sheds his skin before a new skin is ready, naked he will be in the world, prey to the forces of chaos” (p. 14). Prelapsarianov indicates that he is open to changing his mind if only the Perestroika reformers were able to offer a better ideological product to satisfy his needs: “[O]nly show me the Theory, and I will be at the barricades, show me the book of the next Beautiful Theory, and I promise you these blind eyes will see again, just to read it, to devour that text. Show me the words that will reorder the world, or else keep silent” (Kushner, 1996, p. 14). It is just that he is not very impressed by the ideological options that the reformers are offering: “What have you to offer in its place? Market Incentives? American Cheeseburgers? Watered-down Bukharinite stopgap makeshift Capitalism! NEPmen!” (p. 14). So, what on the surface may look like a stubborn, irrational rigidity may actually reflect commitment to the only ideological option that the individual finds reasonably satisfying. Although it is certainly ironic to depict a Bolshevik talking as if he is a customer shopping for the best available ideological product, this scenario has an intriguing resemblance to the rational choice model of ideological selection that Gries, M€ uller, and Jost (this issue) present in the target article. Their model takes seriously the familiar metaphor of a “marketplace of ideas” and combines the tools of rational choice modeling from economics with insights from theory and research on motivated social cognition to provide ","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"101 - 106"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49630918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Commentary on Gries, Muller and Jost’s “The Market for Belief Systems: A Formal Model of Ideological Choice”","authors":"R. McDermott","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065137","url":null,"abstract":"In the wake of increasing political polarization in the American body politic, and the rise of populist and authoritarian leaders more generally around the world, there has been a great deal of renewed attention to the nature and function of political ideology. Particularly in light of the recent insurrection in the U.S. Capitol on January 6th, 2021, and the precipitating and ensuing public debate surrounding the big lie espoused by many Republicans arguing that Trump won the 2020 election, political pundits and academics are increasingly asking how we can make politics less polarized and conflictual. The subtext in much of this discussion revolves around how best to persuade people to change their ideology to allow the possibility for greater political and social compromise. Into this fraught public and academic debate, Greis et al. offer a formalized model of ideological choice drawing on methods from economics in an effort to increase our understanding of how people decide which ideologies are best suited to their psychological and consumption needs, couched in terms of both supply and demand. This approach strives to combine psychological factors as well as economic principles to create a cohesive model of choice. In this way, Greis et al. explicitly approach the problem of how people select an ideology as a problem of decision making under conditions of uncertainty. This draws upon, and expands, earlier theoretical and empirical work by Jost and colleagues (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jost, van der Linden, Panagopoulos, & Hardin, 2018) that explored the effects of uncertainty on the development of conservative political beliefs in particular. There is much to applaud about this paper. As with any formal model, the challenge, of course, lies in the empirical accuracy of the assumptions posited. These challenges, to employ the authors’ categories, fall into both demand and supply side categories. What is noteworthy in the current model is not so much what is included as what is left out. Notably, much of this model seems readily applicable to the recent Trump phenomena, but it remains unclear how well it generalizes beyond seeking to explain the nature of his support. Finally, it is worth considering at least one obvious addition, if not alternative, to the nature of ideological choice that derives from the critical nature of community for both physical and emotional survival. This consideration can be incorporated in light of a different weighting for multi attribute choice. This brief commentary proceeds along these lines.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"117 - 122"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45288771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}