Psychological Inquiry最新文献

{"title":"Costs and Benefits of a Market-Based Model of Ideological Choice: Responding to Consumers and Critics","authors":"J. Jost, Tom Gries, Veronika Müller","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065135","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In a target article, we introduced a formal decision-making model of ideological choice to understand how individuals choose among alternatives in electoral contexts in which multiple parties and candidates compete to address voters’ material and psychological needs. In this rejoinder we respond to very thoughtful comments by Eibach; McDermott; Zmigrod; Molnar & Loewenstein, and Osborne, Satherley & Sibley. We also seek to correct a number of misrepresentations of the current state of knowledge in political psychology based on a few of the commentaries, especially that of Costello, Clark, and Tetlock. Finally, we revisit thorny questions of rationality and irrationality in the market for belief systems.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"123 - 137"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43228231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"COVID-19 pneumonia as a risk factor for recurrent pneumothorax.","authors":"Oscar Jolobe","doi":"10.7861/clinmed.Let.22.2.3","DOIUrl":"10.7861/clinmed.Let.22.2.3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"9 1","pages":"188-189"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88368189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mental Computations of Ideological Choice and Conviction: The Utility of Integrating Psycho-Economics and Bayesian Models of Belief","authors":"Leor Zmigrod","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065134","url":null,"abstract":"A quick scan of the political landscape reveals that people differ in the ideologies they embrace and advocate. Why do individuals prefer certain ideologies over others? A formal analysis of psychological needs and consumption desires suggests that it is possible to compute the subjective utility of selecting one ideology over another, as though it were a purchasing decision. Given resources, constraints, and available options, individuals can rationally choose the ideology that best matches or resonates with their interests. It is a compelling framework that can take into account how diverse ideologies satisfy people’s diverse and multidimensional psychological and material needs. This psycho-economic model is ambitious and informative, and I will argue that it can be even more encompassing and enlightening if it is expanded to incorporate two critical components of ideological cognition: (1) the nature of ideological conviction and extremism and (2) the dynamic, probabilistic mental computations that underlie belief formation, preservation, and change. Firstly, I will argue that a formal model of ideological choice cannot escape the question of the strength of ideological commitment. In other words, we need to ask not only about which ideologies individuals choose but also about how strongly they adhere to these ideologies once those are chosen. An analysis of ideological choice needs to be accompanied by an analysis of ideological conviction. Secondly, in order to build a robust sense of the rationality behind ideological thinking, it is useful to incorporate principles of uncertainty and probability-based belief updating into the formal model of ideological worldviews. Bayesian models highlight how human brains seek to build predictive models of the world by updating their beliefs and preferences in ways that are proportional to their prior expectations and sensory experiences. Consequently, incorporating Bayesian principles into the formal model of ideological choice will provide a more wholistic understanding of what happens when a mind enters the market for belief systems – and why a mind can, at times, purchase toxic doses of the ideologies that sellers and entrepreneurs offer on display.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"107 - 116"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41625571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Personal Agency and Social Support: Substitutes of Complements?","authors":"Ayelet Fishbach","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037999","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037999","url":null,"abstract":"In their target article, Milyavsky et al. (this issue) make a strong case for the substitutability between personal agency and social support. Across various domains, they find that perceived personal agency decreases the reliance on social support and perceived social support decreases the perceptions of personal agency. In my own research, I observed a similar substitutability between personal and social control; for example, the presence of external controls such as parental supervision undermined self-control in pursuing academic goals (Fishbach & Trope, 2005). Furthermore, research on balancing (Dhar & Simonson, 1999; Fishbach, Zhang, & Koo, 2009) and licensing (Monin & Miller, 2001) often observed substitutability among the means to a goal. It is clear that personal agency and social support can be, and often are, substitutional means for goal achievement. This commentary starts where the target article ends— when (if ever) should we expect complementarity instead of substitutability between two means to achieving a goal? Milyavsky et al. (this issue) offer a boundary condition: agency and assistance should not undermine each other if one of them also serves as a means to another goal. Yet, I ask, when does perceiving one (agency or support) make it more likely that the person will also turn to the other? For example, when learning a new skill (such as playing tennis or speaking Yiddish), is it possible that the perception of social support makes people more confident in their personal ability, or that perceived ability increases the chances that the person will also seek assistance? Possibly, to master these skills, it is insufficient to rely on one means only. The learner would benefit from multiple routes or, alternatively, from a backup plan (i.e., if one means fails, they can rely on the other). The notion that personal agency and social support could at times complement each other is consistent with a key tenet of Goal System Theory: Equifinal means, while often imposing redundancy (“all roads lead to Rome”), also increase confidence (the traveler is pretty confident she will make it to Rome, one way or another). Thus, while the advantage of multifinal means to a goal is that they maximize attainment (“feeding two birds with one scone”), their disadvantage is that these means could undermine (“dilute”) the perceived instrumentality of each means to the goal. And while the advantage of equifinal means is that they increase confidence, the person feels that a goal is within reach; the disadvantage is that they can be substitutable. Many (but not all the) times, pursuing one of these means will trigger disengagement with the other.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"42 - 45"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59940269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Personal and Social Means Can Be (But Need Not Be) Opposing: The Case of Social Class","authors":"Paul K. Piff, Pia Dietze, Rudy M. Ceballos","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037996","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037996","url":null,"abstract":"Since humans have inhabited social groups, people have grappled with when to rely on others or get by on their own. In many ways, navigating this trade-off reflects one of the central conundrums of living: When should we be agentic versus turn to others for support, and what are the psychological and interpersonal ramifications of these decisions? The target article of Milyavsky et al. (this issue) offers a powerful answer to these questions. Their theory is grounded in the notion that self-reliance and social support represent alternative means of goal pursuit. The stronger the individual’s sense of personal agency, Milyavsky et al. (this issue) reason, the less likely they are to seek social assistance and the more likely they are to devalue social relationships. By contrast, the more individuals rely on social support, the weaker their motivation to be agentic, the lesser their tendency to focus on and prioritize the self, and the more attentive they become to others. There is much to like about what Milyavsky et al. (this issue) lay out. Their theory is compelling, first and foremost, in its parsimony; treating selfand other-reliance as hydraulic, dueling motivations is appealing and straightforward. Second, their theory is impressive in its explanatory range: Milyavsky et al. (this issue) marshal a varied assortment of empirical evidence across a sweeping array of domains to substantiate their claims. Third, we learn their theory is distinct from and provides value above other related theorizing, most notably on the contrast between agency and communion. Finally, their theory is empirically generative by outlining a range of open and interesting questions that should set the stage for a robust scientific inquiry into compensatory modes of goal pursuit for years to come. The notion that personal means and social means of goal pursuit represent dueling ends of a motivational continuum finds parallels in other psychological literatures. In research on social attribution, for example, dispositional or individual explanations for social behavior are frequently treated as––and empirically found to be––hydraulically related to situational or environmental explanations. As dispositional explanations (e.g., laziness) for a particular individual outcome (e.g., poverty) increase, situational explanations (e.g., structural unfairness) for that same outcome tend to decrease, and vice versa (Hunt & Bullock, 2016; Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009; Piff et al., 2020). Similarly, the basic dynamic that selfand other-reliance are inversely related can be observed across myriad social contexts, including in research on the psychological ramifications of social class (e.g., Dietze & Knowles, 2016, 2021; Piff, 2014; Piff, Kraus, Côt e, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010, Piff, Kraus, & Keltner, 2018). At the same time––and as is the case with select findings in attribution research showing that dispositional and individual explanations are not always inversely related but can e","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"30 - 34"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42054300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"People Who Need People","authors":"A. Duckworth","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037995","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037995","url":null,"abstract":"For years, my husband Jason and I would pack the kids into the car and set off for a monthly visit to my father-in-law’s house. The 45-minute route was the same every time. From experience, I knew when we exited the highway that we had 20minutes to go. When we passed the cow pasture, we were almost there. But to this day, I cannot tell you how to get there, and without GPS I would not be able to navigate there by myself. Why not? Because my Jason always did the driving. Milyavsky et al. (this issue) argue that when a goal can be accomplished by either personal or social means, more of one results in less of the other when “no alternative goals attainable by only one of the two contrasting means are active” (p. X). In other words, the more you accomplish the goal yourself, the less you rely on others to accomplish it, and vice versa. See Figure 1. For instance, the more Jason navigated to his dad’s house, the less I took responsibility for that task. In a goal hierarchy framework, my driving and Jason’s driving would be called equifinal—substitutable means to the same end. And in the simple scenario Milyavsky et al. (this issue) consider, there are no other goals competing for attention—no alternative goals, for instance, toward which Jason or I might devote effort. The logic of Milyavsky et al.’s (this issue) so-called “hydraulic relations” model (p. 1) is watertight. The inverse relations they describe should emerge in the closed, simple system I prefer calling the ceteris paribus scenario. When all other conditions remain constant, if Jason always drives me to my father-in-law’s, why would I ever offer to do it or learn how? And if instead I preferred taking the wheel, why would I ever ask for his assistance? And yet the ceteris paribus scenario is, I think, the exception rather than the rule. More often, we are animated by a much more complex system of dynamic, interactive goals and means. I call this more complicated and common scenario mutatis mutandis, meaning “things being changed that have to be changed.” As shown in Figure 2, in life there are four complications that contribute to a positive relationship between personal agency and social assistance: (a) personal agency can increase our desire to ask for assistance from others; (b) social support can increase personal agency; (c) sometimes what is required to reach a goal is the synergistic combination of both personal action and the assistance of other people; and (d) when other people help you solve a problem, your personal agency can be applied to an alternative goal that, like the original goal, advances a superordinate goal.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"26 - 29"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42463652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Can We Get Social Assistance Without Losing Agency? Engaging in Market Relationships as an Alternative to Searching for Help from Others","authors":"Agata Gąsiorowska, T. Zaleskiewicz","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037998","url":null,"abstract":"Commentary to Milyavsky, M., Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M., Chernikova, M., Ellenberg, M., & Pierro, A. (2022). People Who Need People (and Some Who Think They Don’t): On Compensatory Personal and Social Means of Goal Pursuit. Psychological Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/huyb4","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"38 - 41"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48028752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Agency and Assistance Are Compensatory When They Are Perceived as Substitutable Means: A Response to Commentaries","authors":"Maxim Milyavsky, Marina Chernikova","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2038009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2038009","url":null,"abstract":"We are grateful to the commentators for their insightful commentaries. Most of the commentators praised our theory highly and agreed with its basic tenets. They also drew our attention to additional data that supports our theory. Yet, some commentators pointed to data that seems to be at odds with our theory. In what follows, we will set out more clearly the main propositions of the Agency Assistance Model, discuss the new supporting data that we’ve become aware of, and try to clarify the apparent contradictions between our theory and some evidence indicated by the commentators. The starting point of our theory is the idea that human cognition is goal-driven, and that the same goal can be pursued by different means. We tried to explain the relationship between the individual and society from this point of view. To achieve goals, individuals can rely either on their own means or on the means of others. The principle of substitutability of means from Goal Systems Theory describes the relationship between equifinal means as compensatory (Kruglanski et al., 2002; Kruglanski, Chernikova, Babush, Dugas, & Schumpe, 2015). Based on this principle, we derive two hypotheses regarding the relationship between individual and social means. Hypothesis 1 (H1) states that the higher the effectiveness of personal means to achieve the goal(s) (i.e., personal agency), the more an individual can rely on himself to achieve the goal(s), and the higher will be his valuation of the self; as a result, the less s/he needs to rely on others to achieve the goal(s), which accordingly reduces their value in his/her eyes. Analogously, Hypothesis 2 (H2) states that the higher the perceived effectiveness of social means for achieving the goal(s) (i.e., social assistance), the more an individual can rely on social means and the higher will become their worth in his/her eyes; as a result, the less s/he needs to rely on his/her personal means and the lower will be their valuation of the self.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"58 - 64"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41753110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Agency and Assistance in Transactive Goal Systems","authors":"Gráinne M. Fitzsimons","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037997","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037997","url":null,"abstract":"In their article, “People Who Need People (and Some Who Think They Don’t): On Compensatory Personal and Social Means of Goal Pursuit,” Milyavsky et al. (this issue) put forward an elegant model of the interconnection of personal and social means in the process of attaining important goals. The postulates and hypotheses are consistent with several strains of theory and research across a diverse set of literatures, and the integration is creative and generative. In my commentary, I discuss how the Agency-Assistance Model (AAM) would predict behavior within a close relationship or transactive goal system. I thus attempt to consider the intersection of AAM with my own research and thinking on these issues as I have characterized them (with my colleagues Eli Finkel and Michelle van Dellen) in our work on Transactive Goal Dynamics (TGD) theory.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"35 - 37"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49096240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Case for Social Support as Social Assistance: When Social Means to Personal Goal Pursuit Enhance Agency","authors":"G. McMillan, M. Milyavskaya","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2038001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2038001","url":null,"abstract":"the Milyavsky et al. (this describe a theoretical model on the compensatory nature between personal agency and social assistance as means to attain goals. They review evidence for the assertions that (1) higher personal agency reduces the motivation to use social assistance during goal pursuit, and (2) increased reliance on social assistance decreases motivation for, and sense of, personal agency. They assert that they have applied a general analysis to a broad range of sources of agency and assistance that enable individual goal pursuit, whether those goals are con-crete or abstract. The agency-assistance model is an ambitious attempt to reconcile several disparate social psychology literatures and form a cohesive explanation for the apparent compensatory nature of personal and social means to goal pursuit. Milyavsky et al. that their model achieves par-simony and they have certainly attempted to explain a large amount of data with few assumptions. However, in doing so, they have failed to account for several theoretical per-spectives with well-established explanatory power.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"46 - 53"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43554318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}