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Cyclical Inequality in the Cost of Living and Implications for Monetary Policy 生活成本的周期性不平等及其对货币政策的影响
IF 1.8 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2026-07-29 Epub Date: 2026-01-11 DOI: 10.1111/iere.70053
Ting Lan, Lerong Li, Minghao Li
{"title":"Cyclical Inequality in the Cost of Living and Implications for Monetary Policy","authors":"Ting Lan,&nbsp;Lerong Li,&nbsp;Minghao Li","doi":"10.1111/iere.70053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70053","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper documents that households with higher marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) consume goods with more flexible prices. Consequently, they face more cyclical and volatile inflation, and experience higher inflation following expansionary monetary policy shocks. We embed this MPC-price stickiness relationship into a tractable multi-sector two-agent New Keynesian (TANK) model and show that it dampens monetary policy effectiveness by about 15% relative to a homogeneous-basket benchmark. Introducing heterogeneous consumption baskets also generates an inefficient flexible-price equilibrium, leading to a novel trade-off between stabilization and redistribution, which alters the optimal monetary policy prescription.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 3","pages":"839-874"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamic Mode Decompositions and Vector Autoregressions 动态模式分解与向量自回归
IF 1.8 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2026-07-29 Epub Date: 2026-03-20 DOI: 10.1111/iere.70068
Thomas J. Sargent, Yatheesan J. Selvakumar, Ziyue Yang
{"title":"Dynamic Mode Decompositions and Vector Autoregressions","authors":"Thomas J. Sargent,&nbsp;Yatheesan J. Selvakumar,&nbsp;Ziyue Yang","doi":"10.1111/iere.70068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70068","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We establish connections between dynamic mode decompositions (DMDs), vector autoregressions, and linear state-space models, showing that DMD provides a computationally efficient, SVD-based estimator of low-rank first-order VAR projection coefficients in high-dimensional settings. When the measurement matrix has full column rank, the recovered nonzero eigenvalues coincide with those of the underlying state transition matrix. We apply DMD to a 100-household heterogeneous-agent economy with complete markets and Gorman aggregation. From high-dimensional household income and consumption panels, DMD recovers latent aggregate dynamics, and cross-sectional loadings reveal the sharing rule governing redistribution, demonstrating DMD's capacity to extract economically meaningful structure from microeconomic panels.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 3","pages":"1069-1087"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Recovering Preferences in College Assignment Problems Under Strategic and Constrained Reports 策略约束报告下高校分配问题偏好的恢复
IF 1.8 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2026-07-29 Epub Date: 2026-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/iere.70047
Allan Hernandez-Chanto
{"title":"Recovering Preferences in College Assignment Problems Under Strategic and Constrained Reports","authors":"Allan Hernandez-Chanto","doi":"10.1111/iere.70047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70047","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Many countries around the world use centralized admission systems to assign thousands of students to university programs every year. However, the impact of admission policy changes on students' welfare remains largely unknown. To address this, we propose a novel methodology that recovers students' true preferences in a mechanism where students hold private information and face constraints on the number of options they can submit as preferences. This methodology involves two steps: first, the nonparametric recovery of ordinal preferences using a revealed preference approach based on a concatenation algorithm; and, second, the recovery of cardinal preferences using either a Gibbs sampler estimator or a calibration method. Applying our methodology to administrative data from the University of Costa Rica, we evaluate counterfactual policies and suggest two alternate mechanisms based on an ascending auction and competitive equilibrium prices.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 3","pages":"819-838"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Legacy of Policy Inaction in Climate-Growth Models 气候增长模型中政策不作为的遗留问题
IF 1.8 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2026-07-29 Epub Date: 2026-02-04 DOI: 10.1111/iere.70058
Thomas Steger, Timo Trimborn
{"title":"The Legacy of Policy Inaction in Climate-Growth Models","authors":"Thomas Steger,&nbsp;Timo Trimborn","doi":"10.1111/iere.70058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70058","url":null,"abstract":"<p>To better understand the structure and core mechanisms of a broad class of climate-growth models, we study a simplified version of the dynamic integrated model of climate and the economy (DICE) through the lens of growth theory. We analytically show that this model features a continuum of saddle-point stable steady states. Initial conditions of stock variables, which are notoriously difficult to calibrate, matter for long-run economic and climate outcomes. However, we also demonstrate that a misspecified initial stock of capital has a significantly smaller impact than a misspecified initial CO<sub>2</sub> stock. These insights have important implications for the consequences of delayed climate policy implementation and the optimal carbon tax. Using a calibrated version of the model, solved numerically for the big transition, we show that postponing optimal climate policy raises both peak temperature and the steady-state temperature. The findings extend to a large set of analytical and numerical integrated assessment models. The simple DICE, augmented by the finite amplitude impulse-response (FAIR) carbon cycle model, exhibits a continuum of steady states over time horizons spanning several centuries. Peak and long-run temperatures depend on initial conditions, a result that is also confirmed for DICE-2023. We further show that the social cost of carbon to GDP ratio is largely constant despite transitional dynamics; however, its level depends on the timing of optimal policy implementation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 3","pages":"915-935"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.70058","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Flexible Contract, Flexible Morale? Microcredit Design and Repayment Discipline 灵活的合同，灵活的士气？小额信贷设计和还款原则
IF 1.8 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2026-07-29 Epub Date: 2026-01-28 DOI: 10.1111/iere.70052
Kristina Czura, Anett John, Lisa Spantig
{"title":"Flexible Contract, Flexible Morale? Microcredit Design and Repayment Discipline","authors":"Kristina Czura,&nbsp;Anett John,&nbsp;Lisa Spantig","doi":"10.1111/iere.70052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70052","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Flexible repayment benefits borrowers, but practitioners fear increased moral hazard. Investigating their concerns requires disentangling repayment choices from repayment capacity, which is typically infeasible in field studies. We use a lab-in-the-field experiment with 645 microcredit borrowers to cleanly identify the effect of repayment flexibility on moral hazard. We also quantify social pressure. Payoff maximization predicts low repayment in our rigid benchmark contract, and increased repayment with flexibility. Results suggest the opposite: Repayment in the rigid contract is high, and drops substantially under flexible repayment. Social pressure decreases. Our results are consistent with a strong social norm for repayment, which is weakened by introducing flexibility. Norms, which may be inculcated by the lender, may help explain several recent puzzles in microfinance research, including high and equal repayment rates across individual- and joint-liability contracts, and excessive peer pressure. Importantly, norm-driven behavior may erode with the introduction of flexibility.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 3","pages":"893-913"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.70052","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148616282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Platform Liability and Innovation 平台责任与创新
IF 1.8 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2026-07-29 Epub Date: 2025-12-05 DOI: 10.1111/iere.70045
Doh-Shin Jeon, Yassine Lefouili, Leonardo Madio
{"title":"Platform Liability and Innovation","authors":"Doh-Shin Jeon,&nbsp;Yassine Lefouili,&nbsp;Leonardo Madio","doi":"10.1111/iere.70045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70045","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We study a platform's incentives to remove IP-infringing products and the effects of holding the platform liable for such infringements on innovation and welfare. We first show that platform liability can lead to either higher or lower commission rates, depending on how screening affects transaction volume. We then show that liability may spur or hinder innovation, depending on the intensity of cross-group network externalities, which determines participation elasticities on each side. If platform liability lowers innovation, all market participants—the platform, innovators, imitators, and buyers—are worse off. We also provide a sufficient condition for platform liability to raise welfare.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 3","pages":"763-778"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamics of High-Growth Young Firms and the Role of Venture Capitalists 高增长年轻公司的动态和风险资本家的作用
IF 1.8 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2026-07-29 Epub Date: 2025-12-15 DOI: 10.1111/iere.70048
Yoshiki Ando
{"title":"Dynamics of High-Growth Young Firms and the Role of Venture Capitalists","authors":"Yoshiki Ando","doi":"10.1111/iere.70048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70048","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Motivated by the substantial growth and upfront investments of venture capital (VC)-backed firms observed in administrative US Census data, this study develops a life-cycle firm dynamics model. In the model, startups choose the source of financing from VC, angel investors, or banks, depending on their growth potential, and invest in innovation. The calibrated model explains the life-cycle dynamics of firms with different sources of financing and suggests that venture capitalists' managerial advice accounts for around 22% of the growth in VC-backed firms. A counterfactual economy without VC financing would experience an aggregate consumption loss of around 0.46%.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 3","pages":"779-798"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.70048","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal Selling Mechanisms With Endogenous Seller Outside Offers 具有内生性外卖者的最优销售机制
IF 1.8 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2026-07-29 Epub Date: 2026-01-19 DOI: 10.1111/iere.70056
Xiaogang Che, Tong Li, Jingfeng Lu, Xiaoyong Zheng
{"title":"Optimal Selling Mechanisms With Endogenous Seller Outside Offers","authors":"Xiaogang Che,&nbsp;Tong Li,&nbsp;Jingfeng Lu,&nbsp;Xiaoyong Zheng","doi":"10.1111/iere.70056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70056","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine a two-stage selling mechanism design problem, where the buyer makes her report and the seller endogenously decides his effort (hidden investment) to generate a possibly better outside offer. The optimal mechanism shows that the seller's effort depends on the reported value of the buyer; a higher value lowers the seller's incentive to invest in the outside offer. After the price of the outside offer is realized, if the buyer's virtual value is less than the price, the seller takes the outside offer, and a termination fee equal to the virtual value is paid to the buyer.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 3","pages":"875-891"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.70056","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Miners' Reward Elasticity and Stability of Competing Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies 竞争的工作量证明加密货币的矿工奖励弹性和稳定性
IF 1.8 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2026-07-29 Epub Date: 2026-02-05 DOI: 10.1111/iere.70060
Kohei Kawaguchi, Junpei Komiyama, Shunya Noda
{"title":"Miners' Reward Elasticity and Stability of Competing Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies","authors":"Kohei Kawaguchi,&nbsp;Junpei Komiyama,&nbsp;Shunya Noda","doi":"10.1111/iere.70060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70060","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Proof-of-Work cryptocurrencies employ miners to sustain the system through algorithmic reward adjustments. We develop a stochastic model of the multicurrency mining and identify conditions for stable transaction speeds. Bitcoin's algorithm requires hash supply elasticity <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mo>&lt;</mo>\u0000 <annotation>$&lt;$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>1 for stability, while ASERT remains stable for any elasticity and can be interpreted as a form of stochastic gradient descent. Interactions with other currencies can relax Bitcoin's stability requirements. Using a halving event, we estimate miners' hash supply elasticity and conduct counterfactual simulations. Our findings reveal Bitcoin's heavy reliance on low hash supply elasticity and interactions with smaller cryptocurrencies, urging an algorithm upgrade for stability.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 3","pages":"957-976"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.70060","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Should Platforms be Held Liable for Defective Third-Party Goods? 平台是否应对第三方瑕疵商品负责？
IF 1.8 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2026-07-29 Epub Date: 2026-01-07 DOI: 10.1111/iere.70051
Yusuke Zennyo
{"title":"Should Platforms be Held Liable for Defective Third-Party Goods?","authors":"Yusuke Zennyo","doi":"10.1111/iere.70051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70051","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper develops a model of platform liability for ex post compensation of consumer harm caused by third-party sellers. A platform chooses how liability is shared with sellers, but assumes no liability because it reduces sellers' safety investments. Mandated platform liability can increase or decrease consumer surplus: it is more likely to be beneficial when the platform has weak market power or faces competition, but less so when it sells first-party goods or third-party sellers are judgment-proof. When the platform invests in screening judgment-proof sellers, liability regulation encourages investment, increasing welfare gains. Regulations targeting only incumbents may deter platform entry.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 3","pages":"799-817"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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