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INFORMATION DESIGN IN ALLOCATION WITH COSTLY VERIFICATION 配置信息设计，验证成本高
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-01-22 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12754
Yi-Chun Chen, Gaoji Hu, Xiangqian Yang
{"title":"INFORMATION DESIGN IN ALLOCATION WITH COSTLY VERIFICATION","authors":"Yi-Chun Chen,&nbsp;Gaoji Hu,&nbsp;Xiangqian Yang","doi":"10.1111/iere.12754","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12754","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study information design in a single-agent allocation problem with costly verification, where the principal has a positive reservation value. The agent learns privately a signal about the principal's allocation value, drawn from a distribution controlled by an information designer. Given the signal distribution, the principal designs a mechanism to maximize her net value. We show that the agent-optimal information pools high values at a signal just worth verification, whereas the principal-optimal information features full disclosure. Moreover, any agent-optimal information is principal-worst, despite their partially aligned interests and the absence of transfers.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 3","pages":"1267-1285"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145228107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
SELF-FULFILLING BUSINESS CYCLES WITH PRODUCTION NETWORKS 具有生产网络的自我实现的商业周期
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-01-16 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12752
Feng Dong, Fei Zhou
{"title":"SELF-FULFILLING BUSINESS CYCLES WITH PRODUCTION NETWORKS","authors":"Feng Dong,&nbsp;Fei Zhou","doi":"10.1111/iere.12752","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12752","url":null,"abstract":"<p>What is the role of production networks in inducing self-fulfilling business cycles? We construct a multisector business cycle model that features both input–output linkages and credit constraints. Our theoretical framework demonstrates that a single aggregate financial multiplier is sufficient to characterize equilibrium determinacy, which hinges on the network structure. By quantitatively assessing the possibility of indeterminate equilibria in the United States from 2000 to 2020, we discover that the economy was prone to self-fulfilling fluctuations in the period of pre-2007.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 3","pages":"1175-1206"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145228222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND THE GREAT LABOR REALLOCATION 贸易自由化与劳动力大再分配
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-01-08 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12751
Yuan Zi
{"title":"TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND THE GREAT LABOR REALLOCATION","authors":"Yuan Zi","doi":"10.1111/iere.12751","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12751","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I examine how migration frictions shape the effects of trade policy by analyzing the impact of tariff reductions on labor allocation in China and the role of hukou-based migration frictions. Trade liberalization induces significant labor reallocation, greater in regions with lower hukou frictions. Quantitatively, trade liberalization increases China's welfare by 0.72%. Abolishing the hukou system directly improves welfare by 1.75% but reduces gains from tariff reductions by 18% and amplifies negative distributional effects. In the process, I develop a novel measure of hukou-related migration frictions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 2","pages":"933-963"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143950174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
DO WORKERS BENEFIT FROM WAGE TRANSPARENCY RULES? 工人们从工资透明规则中受益了吗？
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-12-20 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12750
Oliver Gürtler, Lennart Struth
{"title":"DO WORKERS BENEFIT FROM WAGE TRANSPARENCY RULES?","authors":"Oliver Gürtler,&nbsp;Lennart Struth","doi":"10.1111/iere.12750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12750","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Wage transparency rules arguably enable workers better to assess their contribution to firm value, allowing them to make wage demands that more accurately reflect their value for the employing firm. This article contains a formal analysis of transparency rules and their effects on wages and the payoffs of the targeted workers. We find that these rules induce firms to behave strategically with the aim of manipulating the information workers receive. We identify a large class of rules that yield an identical equilibrium outcome. For productivity distributions with decreasing (increasing) hazard rate, transparency rules increase (potentially decrease) workers' payoffs.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 3","pages":"1099-1128"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.12750","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145228230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
ON THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION MANIPULATION IN DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS 论信息操纵对民主选举的影响
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-11-22 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12749
Andreas Grunewald, Andreas Klümper, Matthias Kräkel
{"title":"ON THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION MANIPULATION IN DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS","authors":"Andreas Grunewald,&nbsp;Andreas Klümper,&nbsp;Matthias Kräkel","doi":"10.1111/iere.12749","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12749","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article studies information manipulation during a democratic election. In our model, candidates manipulate public signals about their welfare impact, and a fraction of the electorate naively ignores manipulation. We derive three main findings. First, information manipulation is detrimental to candidate selection and aggravates the dispersion of political attitudes. Second, both educating voters and creating institutions to eliminate false information may involve a trade-off between improving candidate selection and aggravating the dispersion of political attitudes. Third, if and only if the share of naive voters is sufficiently large, information manipulation and the dispersion of political attitudes are mutually reinforcing.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 3","pages":"1043-1077"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145228070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
UNDERSTANDING THE GREAT RECESSION THROUGH THE BANKING SECTOR 通过银行业了解大衰退
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-11-22 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12747
Toshiaki Ogawa
{"title":"UNDERSTANDING THE GREAT RECESSION THROUGH THE BANKING SECTOR","authors":"Toshiaki Ogawa","doi":"10.1111/iere.12747","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12747","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I develop a general equilibrium model to explore heterogeneous bank liquidity management. Smaller banks, driven by stronger precautionary motives, tend to accumulate capital and liquidity buffers, rendering them less susceptible to liquidity risk than larger banks. Whereas negative productivity shocks affect all banks' loans similarly, liquidity shocks result in lending responses that vary by bank size. Mapping the model to panel data, I argue that initially, liquidity shocks were the primary driver of the Great Recession, followed by negative demand shocks that accounted for approximately 60% of the recession's greatest fall in aggregate loans.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 1","pages":"331-361"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143396974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY AND PRIVACY: A RANDOMIZED SURVEY EXPERIMENT 央行数字货币与隐私：一项随机调查实验
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12746
Syngjoo Choi, Bongseop Kim, Young Sik Kim, Ohik Kwon
{"title":"CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY AND PRIVACY: A RANDOMIZED SURVEY EXPERIMENT","authors":"Syngjoo Choi,&nbsp;Bongseop Kim,&nbsp;Young Sik Kim,&nbsp;Ohik Kwon","doi":"10.1111/iere.12746","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12746","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Privacy protection is among the key features to consider in the design of central bank digital currency (CBDC). Using a nationally representative sample of over 3,500 participants, we conduct a randomized online survey experiment to examine how the willingness to use CBDC as a means of payment varies with the degree of privacy protection and information provision on the privacy benefits of using CBDC. We find that both factors significantly increase participants’ willingness to use CBDC by up to 64% when purchasing privacy-sensitive products. Our findings provide useful insights regarding the design and the public's adoption of CBDC.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 2","pages":"823-847"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143950326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
LAST BUT NOT LEAST: LAGGARD FIRMS, TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION, AND ITS STRUCTURAL AND POLICY DETERMINANTS 最后但并非最不重要的是：落后企业、技术扩散及其结构和政策决定因素
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-11-19 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12748
Giuseppe Berlingieri, Sara Calligaris, Chiara Criscuolo, Rudy Verlhac
{"title":"LAST BUT NOT LEAST: LAGGARD FIRMS, TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION, AND ITS STRUCTURAL AND POLICY DETERMINANTS","authors":"Giuseppe Berlingieri,&nbsp;Sara Calligaris,&nbsp;Chiara Criscuolo,&nbsp;Rudy Verlhac","doi":"10.1111/iere.12748","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12748","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using a unique microaggregated data set on firm-level productivity in 13 countries from 1995 to 2014, this article provides new evidence on technology- and knowledge-diffusion barriers for laggard firms. We show that, although the least productive firms benefit from a catch-up effect, their speed of catchup is lower in digital- and skill-intensive industries. This is especially true in countries with high skill mismatch, high financing frictions, and low absorptive capacity. These barriers to diffusion, combined with the rising importance of tacit knowledge and intangibles, could help explain the productivity growth slowdown observed in the last decades.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 2","pages":"595-627"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.12748","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143950260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
MANDATORY INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS FOR UNEMPLOYED JOB SEEKERS: A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED FIELD EXPERIMENT IN GERMANY 失业求职者的强制性融入协议：德国的随机对照实地试验
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-11-15 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12745
Gerard J. van den Berg, Barbara Hofmann, Gesine Stephan, Arne Uhlendorff
{"title":"MANDATORY INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS FOR UNEMPLOYED JOB SEEKERS: A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED FIELD EXPERIMENT IN GERMANY","authors":"Gerard J. van den Berg,&nbsp;Barbara Hofmann,&nbsp;Gesine Stephan,&nbsp;Arne Uhlendorff","doi":"10.1111/iere.12745","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12745","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Integration agreements (IAs) are contracts between the employment agency and the unemployed, nudging the latter to comply with rules on search behavior. We designed and implemented a randomized controlled trial involving thousands of newly unemployed workers, randomizing at the individual level both the timing of the IA and whether it is announced in advance. Administrative records provide outcomes. Novel theoretical and methodological insights provide tools to detect anticipation and suggest estimation by individual baseline employability. The positive effect on entering employment is driven by individuals with adverse prospects. For them, early IA increase reemployment within a year from 53% to 61%.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 1","pages":"79-105"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.12745","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143397206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
BANKING AND BANKING REFORMS IN CHINA IN A MODEL OF COSTLY STATE VERIFICATION 中国的银行业和银行业改革是一种代价高昂的国家核查模式
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-11-09 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12744
Jie Luo, Cheng Wang
{"title":"BANKING AND BANKING REFORMS IN CHINA IN A MODEL OF COSTLY STATE VERIFICATION","authors":"Jie Luo,&nbsp;Cheng Wang","doi":"10.1111/iere.12744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12744","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We present a macro view of China's financial system where a monopolistic banking sector coexists endogenously with bonds and private loans. In equilibrium smaller firms raise finance from private lending, larger firms through bank loans, and the largest by issuing bonds. The model predicts that expanding credit supply increases bank loans but reduces bond finance and private lending, in absolute terms and relative to total credit. In addition, removing the interest rate ceiling on bank lending—a recent reform in China—induces larger loans and higher lending rates, lowering the share of bank loans in total credit. Empirical evidence is presented to support these predictions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 2","pages":"849-882"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143950077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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