匹配市场中的非标准选择

IF 1.5 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-09-13 DOI:10.1111/iere.12734

Gian Caspari, Manshu Khanna

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们探讨了设计能够适应非标准选择行为的匹配机制的可能性。我们确定了参与者选择行为的必要条件和充分条件，以确保存在稳定且激励相容的机制。我们的研究结果表明，功能完善的匹配市场可以设计成充分容纳大量选择行为，包括与偏好最大化相一致的标准行为。为了说明我们的结果在实践中的意义，我们展示了对一个常用匹配机制的简单修改就能使其适应非标准选择行为。

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NONSTANDARD CHOICE IN MATCHING MARKETS

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate nonstandard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive‐compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well‐functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a plethora of choice behaviors, including the standard behavior consistent with preference maximization. To illustrate the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism enables it to accommodate nonstandard choice behavior.

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来源期刊

International Economic Review ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The International Economic Review was established in 1960 to provide a forum for modern quantitative economics. From its inception, the journal has tried to stimulate economic research around the world by publishing cutting edge papers in many areas of economics, including econometrics, economic theory, macro, and applied economics.