{"title":"ON THE OPTIMALITY OF DIFFERENTIAL ASSET TAXATION","authors":"Thomas Phelan","doi":"10.1111/iere.12753","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12753","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article, I study the optimality of differential asset taxation in an environment with entrepreneurs and workers in which output is stochastic and entrepreneurs can misreport profits and abscond with capital. I show that a stationary efficient allocation may be implemented as an equilibrium with endogenous collateral constraints, transfers to newborns, and linear taxes on profits, investment, and interest. Furthermore, these taxes differ from one another and serve distinct purposes. The profits tax shares risk and depends solely on the severity of the misreporting friction, whereas the remaining instruments determine the efficient mean and variance of entrepreneurs' consumption growth.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 1","pages":"53-78"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143397385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"UNDERSTANDING THE GREAT RECESSION THROUGH THE BANKING SECTOR","authors":"Toshiaki Ogawa","doi":"10.1111/iere.12747","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12747","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I develop a general equilibrium model to explore heterogeneous bank liquidity management. Smaller banks, driven by stronger precautionary motives, tend to accumulate capital and liquidity buffers, rendering them less susceptible to liquidity risk than larger banks. Whereas negative productivity shocks affect all banks' loans similarly, liquidity shocks result in lending responses that vary by bank size. Mapping the model to panel data, I argue that initially, liquidity shocks were the primary driver of the Great Recession, followed by negative demand shocks that accounted for approximately 60% of the recession's greatest fall in aggregate loans.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 1","pages":"331-361"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143396974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gerard J. van den Berg, Barbara Hofmann, Gesine Stephan, Arne Uhlendorff
{"title":"MANDATORY INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS FOR UNEMPLOYED JOB SEEKERS: A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED FIELD EXPERIMENT IN GERMANY","authors":"Gerard J. van den Berg, Barbara Hofmann, Gesine Stephan, Arne Uhlendorff","doi":"10.1111/iere.12745","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12745","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Integration agreements (IAs) are contracts between the employment agency and the unemployed, nudging the latter to comply with rules on search behavior. We designed and implemented a randomized controlled trial involving thousands of newly unemployed workers, randomizing at the individual level both the timing of the IA and whether it is announced in advance. Administrative records provide outcomes. Novel theoretical and methodological insights provide tools to detect anticipation and suggest estimation by individual baseline employability. The positive effect on entering employment is driven by individuals with adverse prospects. For them, early IA increase reemployment within a year from 53% to 61%.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 1","pages":"79-105"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.12745","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143397206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"PRODUCTIVE ROBOTS AND INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS","authors":"Chrystalla Kapetaniou, Christopher A. Pissarides","doi":"10.1111/iere.12738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12738","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a model with robots, automatable and nonautomatable production, we study robot-labor substitutions and show how they are influenced by a country's “innovation system.” Substitution depends on demand and production elasticities, the country's innovation capabilities, and openness. Making use of World Economic Forum data, we estimate the relationship for 13 countries and find that countries with poor innovation capabilities substitute robots for workers much more than countries with richer innovation capabilities, which might complement them. Innovation capabilities play a bigger role in the high-tech electronics sector than in other manufacturing and play a limited role in nonmanufacturing.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 1","pages":"25-52"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.12738","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143396825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"IDEAL DEFAULT FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES EFFICIENTLY","authors":"Nejat Anbarci, Gorkem Celik","doi":"10.1111/iere.12737","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12737","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study arbitration mechanisms where two parties to the dispute have single-peaked preferences over outcomes, represented by concave utility functions. The most preferred outcome of each party is her private information. By participating in an arbitration mechanism, the parties forfeit the default outcome, which is set without consideration of private preferences. We show that the ideal default outcome for efficient dispute resolution maximizes the sum of the reservation payoffs of the most difficult agent types to persuade to participate in the mechanism. This result is contrary to the conventional wisdom that an unattractive default could force the parties to agree.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 1","pages":"201-221"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.12737","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143396771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"INTERNATIONAL SPILLOVERS OF QUALITY REGULATIONS","authors":"Luca Macedoni, Ariel Weinberger","doi":"10.1111/iere.12736","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12736","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article investigates the international spillover effects of nondiscriminatory product regulations, for example, quality standards, in a multicountry general equilibrium framework with firm heterogeneity. In the presence of variable markups, when regulations are applied as a fixed cost consistent with stylized facts, they generate a positive spillover on the rest of the world as they induce entry of high-quality firms and improve the terms of trade of the nonimposing countries. The benefits of such regulations are not fully realized under noncooperative policy settings, rationalizing international cooperation. We estimate our model to quantify the effects of regulations on various welfare-relevant outcomes.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 1","pages":"453-484"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143396701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"2023 KLEIN LECTURE—CAPITAL AND WAGES","authors":"Daron Acemoglu","doi":"10.1111/iere.12733","DOIUrl":"10.1111/iere.12733","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Does capital accumulation increase labor demand and wages? Neoclassical production functions, where capital and labor are q-complements, ensure that the answer is yes, so long as labor markets are competitive. This result critically depends on the assumption that capital accumulation does not change the technologies being developed and used. I adapt the theory of endogenous technological change to investigate this question when technology also responds to capital accumulation. I show that there are strong parallels between the relationship between capital and wages and existing results on the conditions under which equilibrium factor demands are upward-sloping (e.g., Acemoglu, <i>Econometrica</i> 75(5) (2007), 1371–410). Extending this framework, I provide intuitive conditions and simple examples where a greater capital stock leads to lower wages, because it triggers more automation. I then offer an endogenous growth model with a menu of technologies where equilibrium involves choices over both the extent of automation and the rate of growth of labor-augmenting productivity. In this framework, capital accumulation and technological change in the long run are associated with wage growth, but an increase in the saving rate increases the extent of automation, and initially reduces the wage rate and can subsequently depress its long-run growth rate.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 1","pages":"3-24"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.12733","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142260038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}