{"title":"What Determines State Heterogeneity in Response to U.S. Tariff Changes?","authors":"Ana Maria Santacreu, Michael Sposi, Jing Zhang","doi":"10.1111/iere.70081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70081","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We develop a structural framework to identify the sources of cross-state heterogeneity in response to U.S. tariff changes. A unilateral 25-percentage-point U.S. tariff increase across sectors induces consumption changes ranging from −0.8% in Oregon to 2.3% in Montana. This variation stems from the interaction between states' internal comparative advantage and the nation's external comparative advantage. Factor mobility lowers aggregate consumption and reshapes the cross-state impacts by shifting resources toward more distorted states and sectors. Consequently, preferred tariff changes vary systematically across states, necessitating transfers to align regional policy incentives. Foreign retaliation reduces aggregate gains while perpetuating cross-state variation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 4","pages":"1351-1379"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149099543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Entry and Welfare in General Equilibrium With Heterogeneous Firms and Endogenous Markups","authors":"Kyle Bagwell, Seung Hoon Lee","doi":"10.1111/iere.70079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70079","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We analyze market entry efficiency in single- and two-sector closed-economy Melitz–Ottaviano (MO) models without an outside good. Comparing market and second-best outcomes, we find that market entry is efficient in the single-sector model. This efficiency also holds in a symmetric two-sector setting. When sectors have asymmetric demand and the level of asymmetry is sufficiently small, the market yields excessive entry into the “high-demand” sector. This inefficiency arises from the presence of an additional aggregator in MO preferences.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 4","pages":"1423-1447"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149100087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Interaction Between Credit and Labor Market Frictions","authors":"Yulia Moiseeva","doi":"10.1111/iere.70071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70071","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I study a novel two-way feedback between credit and labor market frictions. Running from credit to labor markets, amplitude in capital demand caused by collateral constraints spills over onto labor demand due to the complementarity of capital and labor; and, furthermore, credit frictions raise effective financial hiring costs, prompting firms to delay hiring in recessions. Running back from labor to credit markets, search frictions imply that wages move less than one-to-one with productivity; this induces greater volatility of net worth, via the wage bill, which then spills over onto capital demand. Together, these considerably amplify labor and capital market dynamics.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 4","pages":"1309-1330"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.70071","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149099590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Gender Criteria Gap in Evaluation: Role of Perceived Intentions and Outcomes","authors":"Nisvan Erkal, Lata Gangadharan, Boon Han Koh","doi":"10.1111/iere.70078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70078","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate whether different criteria are used in evaluating male and female leaders when outcomes are determined by unobservable choices and luck. Evaluators form beliefs about leaders’ choices (perceived intentions) and make discretionary payments. We find that while payments to male leaders are determined by both outcomes and perceived intentions, those to female leaders are determined by outcomes only. We label this new source of gender bias as the <i>gender criteria gap</i>. Our findings imply that high outcomes are necessary for women to get bonuses, but men can receive bonuses for low outcomes if evaluators hold them in high regard.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 4","pages":"1331-1349"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.70078","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149100347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Decentralization of Liquor Policies in Texas During the Post-Prohibition Era","authors":"Andrew Arnold, Holger Sieg","doi":"10.1111/iere.70075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70075","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the decentralization of liquor policies in Texas during the Post-Prohibition era using newly collected historical legislative roll call data. By combining these data with local referendum vote shares, we analyze both legislators' and constituents' preferences on liquor policy. We develop a probabilistic voting model incorporating spillovers and peer effects. Results reveal substantial heterogeneity in preferences among voters, reflecting differing attitudes toward alcohol regulation. Spillover effects are significant, yet the model predicts notable gains from decentralization. Finally, we link legislators' policy preferences to alcohol consumption data and compare model-based welfare estimates with traditional consumption-based measures.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 4","pages":"1245-1279"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.70075","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149100707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Demand Theory of the Price Level","authors":"Marcus Hagedorn","doi":"10.1111/iere.70064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70064","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Heterogeneous agent incomplete markets models offer a new perspective on price and inflation determination. In contrast to complete markets, the price level is determined from the asset-market clearing condition. Fiscal and monetary policy then jointly and uniquely determine the finite steady-state price level and the inflation rate, including in a steady state in which the nominal interest rate is constant. Fiscal policy can determine the long-run inflation rate for a fiscal rule which sets the growth rate of nominal government debt, whereas both fiscal and monetary policy determine the long-run inflation rate under different tax rules.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 4","pages":"1095-1117"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149100622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to “Quantifying the Macroeconomic Impact of Credit Expansions”","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/iere.70065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70065","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Boar, Corina, Kjetil Storesletten, Matthew Knowles, and Yicheng Wang. 2025. “Quantifying the macroeconomic impact of credit expansions.” <i>International Economic Review</i> 66, no. 5:1913–1928.</p><p>In the article cited above, the sequence of authors was incorrect and it was alphabetically sorted by first names, and it should be alphabetically sorted by last names. That is, the correct order of authors should be:</p><p>Corina Boar; Matthew Knowles; Kjetil Storesletten; Yicheng Wang.</p><p>We apologize for this error.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.70065","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Signaling Vision: Knowing When to Quit","authors":"Junichiro Ishida, Wing Suen","doi":"10.1111/iere.70066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70066","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study a signaling game where agents signal their type by choosing when to quit pursuing an uncertain project. High types observe news about project quality and quit when bad news arrives. Low types who do not observe any news may mimic high types by quitting continuously over a phase of time. The reputation dynamics may exhibit nonmonotonicity with respect to quitting time. Our analysis offers a unifying explanation for how and when both early and late quitting can enhance reputation and suggests novel welfare and policy implications.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 3","pages":"997-1013"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.70066","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"To Grandmother's House We Go: Informal Childcare and Female Labor Mobility","authors":"Garrett Anstreicher, Joanna Venator","doi":"10.1111/iere.70067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70067","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We document how childcare costs and the location of extended family influence the labor supply and mobility of US women. Women return to their home locations immediately before fertility events, suggesting that informal childcare needs may motivate home migration. Women who live near their parents have lower child earnings penalties. We then build a model of labor supply and migration to assess the impacts of childcare subsidies. Childcare subsidies increase earnings and mobility among US women and ignoring migration can understate the welfare benefits of these policies, especially for college-educated women and those whose parents' locations have poor amenities.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 3","pages":"1043-1068"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.70067","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nonlinearities With Deanchored Inflation Expectations","authors":"Stefano Fasani, Mirela Miescu, Lorenza Rossi","doi":"10.1111/iere.70063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70063","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using a nonlinear VAR, we examine the asymmetric effects of shocks to long-run inflation expectations. Negative shocks, which temporarily lower long-run inflation expectations, have a stronger and more persistent impact on output, investment, and firm entry compared to positive shocks. We provide a novel theoretical explanation, demonstrating how these shocks influence the second-order components of the model, shaping firms' “wait-and-see” behavior—particularly along both the intensive and extensive margins of the investment channel.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"67 3","pages":"977-996"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}