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A Simple Quantile Regression Model Linking Micro Outcomes to Macro Covariates 链接微观结果与宏观协变量的简单分位数回归模型
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-03-19 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12765
Xiaohong Chen, Gaosheng Ju, Qi Li
{"title":"A Simple Quantile Regression Model Linking Micro Outcomes to Macro Covariates","authors":"Xiaohong Chen,&nbsp;Gaosheng Ju,&nbsp;Qi Li","doi":"10.1111/iere.12765","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12765","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper introduces a new location-scale quantile regression model aimed at examining the effects of macroeconomic variables on the distribution of microeconomic outcomes using repeated cross-sectional data. The model can be converted into an equivalent mean regression, enabling quantile coefficient estimation through least squares. This transformation improves computational efficiency, simplifies statistical inference for large data sets, and maintains robustness against model misspecification. We establish the asymptotic properties of the estimator and investigate several extensions. Our applications demonstrate that stock returns and household large-scale expenditure growth rates respond differently across quantiles to expansionary monetary shocks and macroeconomic conditions, respectively.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 3","pages":"1341-1362"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145228105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Growth with Deadly Spillovers 具有致命溢出效应的增长
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-03-18 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12761
Pietro F. Peretto, Simone Valente
{"title":"Growth with Deadly Spillovers","authors":"Pietro F. Peretto,&nbsp;Simone Valente","doi":"10.1111/iere.12761","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12761","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Pollution causes premature deaths but plays almost no role in macroeconomic analysis. To fill this gap, we build a tractable model of innovation-led economic growth and endogenous fertility in which production generates deadly spillovers, that is, emissions that increase mortality. Such spillovers affect income growth, population size, and welfare. They also create steady states that would not exist otherwise. Emission taxes increase population size and may even raise long-run growth if they reduce mortality. Subsidies to primary production have opposite effects and may push resource-rich economies toward economic and demographic implosion. Cross-country regressions support hypotheses and predictions of the model.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 3","pages":"1129-1152"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145228102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
PREDICTIVE DENSITY COMBINATION USING BAYESIAN MACHINE LEARNING 使用贝叶斯机器学习的预测密度组合
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-02-27 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12759
Tony Chernis, Niko Hauzenberger, Florian Huber, Gary Koop, James Mitchell
{"title":"PREDICTIVE DENSITY COMBINATION USING BAYESIAN MACHINE LEARNING","authors":"Tony Chernis,&nbsp;Niko Hauzenberger,&nbsp;Florian Huber,&nbsp;Gary Koop,&nbsp;James Mitchell","doi":"10.1111/iere.12759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12759","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Based on agent opinion analysis theory, Bayesian predictive synthesis (BPS) is a framework for combining predictive distributions in the face of model uncertainty. In this article, we generalize existing parametric implementations of BPS by showing how to combine competing probabilistic forecasts using interpretable Bayesian tree-based machine learning methods. We demonstrate the advantages of our approach—in terms of improved forecast accuracy and interpretability—via two macroeconomic forecasting applications. The first uses density forecasts for GDP growth from the euro area's Survey of Professional Forecasters. The second combines density forecasts of U.S. inflation produced by many simple regression models.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 3","pages":"1287-1315"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.12759","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145227978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
TAXATION OF TOP INCOMES AND TAX AVOIDANCE 对高收入者征税和避税
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-02-17 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12758
Alessandro Di Nola, Georgi Kocharkov, Almuth Scholl, Anna-Mariia Tkhir, Haomin Wang
{"title":"TAXATION OF TOP INCOMES AND TAX AVOIDANCE","authors":"Alessandro Di Nola,&nbsp;Georgi Kocharkov,&nbsp;Almuth Scholl,&nbsp;Anna-Mariia Tkhir,&nbsp;Haomin Wang","doi":"10.1111/iere.12758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12758","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the aggregate and distributional effects of raising the top marginal income tax rate in the presence of entrepreneurial tax avoidance. In a model with heterogeneous agents and occupational choice, entrepreneurs can avoid taxes by choosing the legal form of business organization and shifting income across tax bases. Applied to the U.S. economy, we find that tax avoidance weakens the distortionary effects of higher income taxes at the top but makes them ineffective at lowering inequality. Eliminating tax avoidance by an equal tax treatment of entrepreneurs across all legal forms substantially increases tax revenue, aggregate output, and welfare.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 3","pages":"983-1018"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.12758","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145228028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
POLITICAL BRINKMANSHIP AND COMPROMISE 政治边缘政策和妥协
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-02-17 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12760
Helios Herrera, Antonin Macé, Matías Núñez
{"title":"POLITICAL BRINKMANSHIP AND COMPROMISE","authors":"Helios Herrera,&nbsp;Antonin Macé,&nbsp;Matías Núñez","doi":"10.1111/iere.12760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12760","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study how do-or-die threats ending negotiations affect gridlock and welfare when two opposing parties bargain. Failure to agree on a deal in any period implies a continuation of the negotiation. However, under brinkmanship, agreement failure in any period may precipitate a crisis with a small chance. In equilibrium, such brinkmanship threats improve the probability of an agreement, but also increase the risk of crisis. Brinkmanship reduces welfare when one might think it is most needed: severe gridlock. In this case, despite this global welfare loss, a party has incentives to use brinkmanship strategically to obtain a favorable bargaining position.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 3","pages":"1317-1339"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145228027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
ISSUE INFORMATION - JIP 发行信息 - JIP
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-02-12 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12713
{"title":"ISSUE INFORMATION - JIP","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/iere.12713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12713","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 1","pages":"1-2"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.12713","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143397120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW—2024 REFEREES 国际经济评论》--2024 年 参考资料
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-02-12 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12757
{"title":"THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW—2024 REFEREES","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/iere.12757","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12757","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 1","pages":"485-488"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143396790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
OPTIMAL REDISTRIBUTION AND EDUCATION SIGNALING 最优再分配与教育信号
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12756
Spencer Bastani, Tomer Blumkin, Luca Micheletto
{"title":"OPTIMAL REDISTRIBUTION AND EDUCATION SIGNALING","authors":"Spencer Bastani,&nbsp;Tomer Blumkin,&nbsp;Luca Micheletto","doi":"10.1111/iere.12756","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12756","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We develop a theory of optimal income and education taxation under asymmetric information between firms and workers. Our results show that a max–min optimal tax code can achieve predistribution by pooling wages across ability levels, conditional on income. We identify conditions under which the optimal solution leads to pooling or separating equilibria, highlighting bidirectional incentive constraints. Implementation requires nonlinear income taxes coupled with education subsidies or mandates. Predistribution is only feasible when income taxes are complemented by policies that restrict signaling opportunities. Our framework provides new insights into reducing wage inequality through optimal tax policy and labor market information management.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 3","pages":"1239-1265"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/iere.12756","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145228122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL SOVEREIGN DEBT 国内和外部主权债务
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-02-02 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12755
Paola Di Casola, Spyridon Sichlimiris
{"title":"DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL SOVEREIGN DEBT","authors":"Paola Di Casola,&nbsp;Spyridon Sichlimiris","doi":"10.1111/iere.12755","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12755","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We develop a model that features costly market segmentation and financial repression to link domestic and external sovereign debt with default. In a financially repressed economy, a government that exploits its market power in the domestic economy can also increase its external debt capacity, owing to a novel, additional endogenous cost of default. A government forfeits the gains from trading in segmented debt markets when it defaults. Among other empirical regularities, our model can account for the heterogeneity in sovereign debt levels of nonadvanced economies, based on their level of financial development.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 3","pages":"1207-1238"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145228048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
ON THE OPTIMALITY OF DIFFERENTIAL ASSET TAXATION 论资产差别化征税的最优性
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-01-30 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12753
Thomas Phelan
{"title":"ON THE OPTIMALITY OF DIFFERENTIAL ASSET TAXATION","authors":"Thomas Phelan","doi":"10.1111/iere.12753","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12753","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article, I study the optimality of differential asset taxation in an environment with entrepreneurs and workers in which output is stochastic and entrepreneurs can misreport profits and abscond with capital. I show that a stationary efficient allocation may be implemented as an equilibrium with endogenous collateral constraints, transfers to newborns, and linear taxes on profits, investment, and interest. Furthermore, these taxes differ from one another and serve distinct purposes. The profits tax shares risk and depends solely on the severity of the misreporting friction, whereas the remaining instruments determine the efficient mean and variance of entrepreneurs' consumption growth.</p>","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"66 1","pages":"53-78"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143397385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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