{"title":"The impact of unions on compensation consultants and CEO pay","authors":"Vikram Nanda, Takeshi Nishikawa, Andrew Prevost","doi":"10.1111/fima.12472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12472","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Research on executive compensation finds unions to be associated with lower executive compensation, particularly incentive pay, while other work documents the role of compensation consultants in facilitating stronger CEO incentives and pay. We propose and test the implications of a simple theoretical framework that integrates these empirical findings. We find empirical support for our model's prediction that in environments less favorable to union organization (e.g., right-to-work states), firms with higher unionization rates strategically engage consultants to counter union influence, place greater value on their advice as gauged by consultant fees, and offer managers greater equity incentives opposed by unions. On the other hand, in strongly prolabor environments, unions are more successful at curtailing consultant use and have greater influence on the level of pay and incentives.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"54 1","pages":"89-122"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143582070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Zero-beta risks and required returns: ESG and CAPM","authors":"David Johnstone, Andrew Grant","doi":"10.1111/fima.12475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12475","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We ask how idiosyncratic zero-beta risks (e.g., the risk of litigation or R&D failing) affect the firm's cost of capital under capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Surprisingly, perhaps, CAPM theory reveals that adding an idiosyncratic risk to the firm's payoff distribution will usually although not necessarily increase the firm's cost of capital. Lintner's famous original CAPM expositions revealed that the firm's CAPM cost of capital is a function of the ratio of the covariance of its cash payoff with the market to its payoff mean. Lintner proved that an idiosyncratic risk that affects the firm's payoff covariance <i>per unit of mean</i> is“priced” in the sense that it necessarily alters the firm's CAPM discount rate. We explain and clarify Lintner's argument using elementary CAPM equations and numerical examples.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"54 1","pages":"33-52"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fima.12475","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143581990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are investor-paid credit ratings superior?","authors":"Nan Qin, Lei Zhou","doi":"10.1111/fima.12476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12476","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We conduct pairwise comparisons of corporate bond ratings between three issuer-paid credit rating agencies (CRAs) and one investor-paid CRA regarding rating standard, accuracy, stability, and market impact. We find that neither compensation model results in more stringent or accurate ratings. While issuer-paid S&P ratings are more stringent and accurate than investor-paid Egan-Jones ratings (EJR), issuer-paid Fitch ratings are less stringent and have similar or lower accuracy compared to EJR ratings. In contrast, investor- and issuer-paid ratings exhibit different rating change behaviors. EJR updates its ratings more frequently with fewer multinotch downgrades but also has a higher likelihood of rating reversals, while rating change behaviors are similar among the three issuer-paid CRAs. Finally, issuer-paid rating changes trigger stronger market responses.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"54 1","pages":"53-87"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143581991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does common institutional ownership mitigate hold-up problems along the supply chain?","authors":"Yongning Deng, Jing Li, Qilin Peng, Wentao Yao","doi":"10.1111/fima.12473","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12473","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We show that common institutional ownership (CIO) along the supply chain mitigates hold-up problems faced by supplier–customer relationships resulting from incomplete contracts. Suppliers make more relationship-specific investments (RSIs) measured by R&D and patent filings toward their customers that share common institutional investors. Such effect is stronger as the CIO network between a supplier and customer pair becomes wider and deeper. We establish causality by exploiting exogenous shocks to CIO using a broad sample of mergers between financial institutions and further find the CIO effects on suppliers’ innovation specificity are stronger for those who ex ante face severer hold-up concerns. Lastly, we provide evidence that CIO involvement increases the combined valuations of supply chain pairs (mainly for customers). Our work sheds light on the hold-up mitigation effect of CIO on firms’ decision to make RSIs along the supply chain.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"54 1","pages":"3-31"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fima.12473","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142268144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Eliezer M. Fich, Viktoriya Lantushenko, Clemens Sialm
{"title":"Institutional trading around M&A announcements","authors":"Eliezer M. Fich, Viktoriya Lantushenko, Clemens Sialm","doi":"10.1111/fima.12469","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12469","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We contrast the investment strategies of hedge funds and mutual funds around mergers and acquisitions (M&A). We find that hedge funds, on average, increase their holdings of soon-to-be takeover targets by 7.5% during the quarter before M&A announcements. Conversely, mutual funds, on average, reduce their equity holdings in impending targets by 3.0% over the same time period. The reduction in M&A holdings by mutual funds is less pronounced for more actively managed funds. Our results suggest that hedge funds enjoy superior access to private information or possess superior ability to process public information related to M&A transactions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"53 4","pages":"643-680"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142180108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disagreement exploitation and the cross-section of hedge fund performance","authors":"Gady Jacoby, Shi Li, Nanying Lin, Yan Yang","doi":"10.1111/fima.12471","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12471","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines the role of market disagreement in explaining the cross-section of hedge fund performance. In a market where disagreement fluctuates, skilled arbitrageurs may employ trading strategies to exploit the mispricing caused by disagreement and short-sale constraints. Skilled hedge funds with high sensitivity to disagreement can take advantage of mispricing in high-disagreement periods to improve their performance. We show that hedge funds with a high disagreement beta tend to possess skill in exploiting disagreement and, as such, they can earn higher cross-sectional returns compared to other hedge funds lacking this skill. Existing risk factors and a tradable disagreement factor do not fully explain the difference in hedge fund performance between those with high and low disagreement betas. Further evidence shows that experienced hedge funds and hedge funds that charge a high incentive fee are likely to have high disagreement betas. Our empirical findings are robust in using various disagreement measures and methodologies to estimate disagreement beta.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"53 4","pages":"681-713"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142180109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Market leverage, debt heterogeneity, and equity returns","authors":"Moonsoo Kang, Seungho Baek","doi":"10.1111/fima.12470","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12470","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We explore the effect of debt heterogeneity on the cross-sectional relationship between market leverage and equity returns. Specifically, we discover that firms with high debt heterogeneity exhibit a stronger, positive association between leverage and equity returns. Any alternative economic rationale cannot explain this anomaly. We also find that leverage interacts with debt heterogeneity, making firms with heterogeneous debt structure more financially distressed or constrained. Therefore, this analysis suggests that leverage exerts more pronounced effect on equity returns among firms with heterogeneous debt composition because those firms experience higher financial distress or constraint due to the compounding interaction effect with leverage.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"53 4","pages":"715-747"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142180110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ashrafee T. Hossain, Abdullah-Al Masum, Mostafa M. Hasan, Donghui Li, Jian Xu
{"title":"The disclosure perspective of firm-specific political risk measure from conference calls","authors":"Ashrafee T. Hossain, Abdullah-Al Masum, Mostafa M. Hasan, Donghui Li, Jian Xu","doi":"10.1111/fima.12468","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12468","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Hassan et al. (2019) quantified firm-specific political risk during corporate conference calls. We argue that this metric captures voluntary risk disclosure by firms rather than just their level of political risk. Studying the impact of political risk disclosure (PRD) on stock price crash risk (SPCR) allows us to test how well their score captures firm-specific risk or disclosure. Consistent with our disclosure perspective, we document that PRD significantly reduces SPCR. Our cross-sectional analyses further indicate that the negative effect of PRD on SPCR is more pronounced for firms with poor monitoring and governance and those with more opaque information environments.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"53 4","pages":"749-793"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141530342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Credit risk correlation and the cost of bank loans","authors":"Siamak Javadi, Theophilus Osah","doi":"10.1111/fima.12467","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12467","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using several approaches to compute firms’ credit risk correlation, we provide robust empirical evidence that lenders charge higher loan spreads to borrowers with higher credit risk correlation. Consistent with the theoretical literature, we find that the credit risk correlation effect is concentrated in investment-grade firms, driven by tightening lending conditions, and more pronounced for firms with higher rollover risk. We also show that banks whose borrowers have higher average credit risk correlation, have greater default risk themselves. Overall, our results indicate that banks view credit risk correlation as an important risk factor.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"53 4","pages":"795-832"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141512267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Anomalies, option volume, and disagreement","authors":"Allaudeen Hameed, Byounghyun (BH) Jeon","doi":"10.1111/fima.12466","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12466","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We document robust amplification of stock market anomaly returns associated with elevated option trading volume driven by disagreement trades. Consistent with the correction of mispricing associated with biased beliefs, anomaly returns are higher when disagreement option volume is high prior to earnings announcements. Additionally, we demonstrate that disagreement-based option volume is negatively related to future stock returns among stocks that are overpriced based on anomaly characteristics. Our findings also concentrate in stocks that are also difficult to short, emphasizing the combined impact of investor bias and shorting costs. Leveraging the staggered adoption of eXtensible Business Reporting Language, we establish a plausibly identified link between investor disagreement and short-horizon mispricing in stocks.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"53 3","pages":"579-603"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141530341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}