{"title":"Temperature trend and corporate cash holdings","authors":"Dimitrios Gounopoulos, Yu Zhang","doi":"10.1111/fima.12451","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12451","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the causal impact of climate uncertainty on companies’ cash holdings using local temperature trends. We find a notable increase in cash reserves among companies in response to rising climate-related risks. We also identify two significant channels through which climate uncertainty influences firms’ cash management: heightened environmental enforcement risk and increased physical risk. Furthermore, we observe that the positive effect of temperature trends on cash holdings is more pronounced for financially constrained firms and those with a lower level of environmental protection awareness. External financing through equity and debt issuance, as well as cost reduction strategies involving research and development and selling, general, and administrative activities, represent viable avenues for firms to bolster their cash reserves. However, financially constrained firms are less inclined to build up cash reserves through debt financing. Our findings underscore the precautionary nature of corporate cash policies and shed light on how temperature fluctuations can significantly shape corporate behavior.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"53 3","pages":"471-499"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fima.12451","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140297966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Unraveling the impact of female CEOs on corporate bond markets","authors":"Jasmine Yur-Austin, Ran Zhao, Lu Zhu","doi":"10.1111/fima.12449","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12449","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Little is known about how executive gender shapes the inherent conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders. Using a sample of almost 100,000 unique bond-year observations, this study investigates how the appointment of female chief executive officers (CEOs) lowers the default outlook. Our evidence indicates that bond yield and bond volatility are significantly lower after a female takes the helm at a firm. This executive gender effect remains highly statistically and economically significant across various robustness checks and after addressing endogeneity concerns. Female CEOs lower the default risk component of the bond yield but have no material impact on the liquidity component. Subsample analysis substantiates the conditional effect of female CEOs on bond yield and bond volatility. Our evidence indicates that female CEOs’ risk-averse attributes pass through the credit risk and information asymmetry channels.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"53 2","pages":"391-423"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140075018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Currency flotation and dividend policies: Evidence from China's central parity reform","authors":"Yilin Luo, Chenkai Ni, James Thewissen","doi":"10.1111/fima.12448","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12448","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Exploiting the 2015 central parity reform in China, we examine whether and how currency flotation affects corporate payout policies. The reform shifted China's currency regime from a crawling peg to the US dollar to partial flotation, significantly increasing its currency risk. We find that firms with high foreign currency exposures reduced their cash dividends postreform relative to firms with low foreign currency exposures. The dividend reduction is more pronounced for firms with less financial hedging or less financial flexibility before the reform. Firms display asymmetrical responses to foreign exchange gains versus losses. Specifically, while firms cut cash dividends when experiencing foreign exchange losses, they do not increase cash dividends when obtaining foreign exchange gains. A falsification test shows no changes in firms’ stock dividends that do not involve cash flows. Overall, our study shows that currency flotation, through increasing currency risks, dampens firms’ cash dividends.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"53 1","pages":"145-174"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139870045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ivan E. Brick, Yuzi Chen, Jun-Koo Kang, Jin-Mo Kim
{"title":"Does hedge fund managers’ industry experience matter for hedge fund activism?","authors":"Ivan E. Brick, Yuzi Chen, Jun-Koo Kang, Jin-Mo Kim","doi":"10.1111/fima.12446","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12446","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study whether fund managers’ industry experience is an important source of value creation in hedge fund activism. We find that the targets of industry-expert fund managers realize higher activism announcement returns and better operating performance, particularly when fund managers’ industry expertise is more valuable for targets. These targets also engage in more focused acquisition and divestiture activities in industries where fund managers have experience, allocate more employees to these industries, and cut investments more in the postacquisition period. The superior performance of targets of industry-expert fund managers is robust to controlling for the endogeneity concern and the attrition bias.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"53 1","pages":"59-97"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fima.12446","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139583309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The sensitivity of risk premiums to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution","authors":"Zhiting Wu","doi":"10.1111/fima.12447","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12447","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper incorporates reference-dependent preferences into a consumption-based asset pricing model featuring Epstein–Zin utility. Three relevant results emerge from this extension. First, agents prefer the late resolution of uncertainty in recursive utility. Second, the late resolution of uncertainty helps replicate the downward-sloping term structure of market excess return. Third, the intertemporal substitution elasticity is more sensitive to asset prices through increasing precautionary saving motivations. A closed-form solution for the proposed model largely explains (i) high, volatile, and countercyclical equity premiums; (ii) low risk-free rates; and (iii) the downward-sloping term structure of equity premiums and variance ratios.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"53 2","pages":"353-390"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139601154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Academic publishing behavior and pay across business fields","authors":"Jon A. Garfinkel, Mosab Hammoudeh, James Weston","doi":"10.1111/fima.12445","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12445","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Academic finance faculty earn a premium relative to other business school faculty. We show that the rewards to publishing outside of the top journals (<i>JF</i>, <i>JFE</i>, <i>RFS</i>) are significantly lower in finance relative to a broader set of journals in other business school fields. Revealed preferences from a journal submission survey suggest these incentives influence behavior. We estimate a lower unconditional probability of a top publication in finance, which raises its marginal value, leading to higher compensation. The opportunity cost of academic finance versus industry is also larger relative to other departments. Our results complement a number of recent studies on the rise of finance industry wages and suggest a novel channel that raises the production costs of finance-educated workers.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"53 1","pages":"31-58"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139517049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Financial debt contracting and managerial agency problems","authors":"Björn Imbierowicz, Daniel Streitz","doi":"10.1111/fima.12444","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12444","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper analyzes if lenders resolve managerial agency problems in loan contracts using sweep covenants. Sweeps require a (partial) prepayment when triggered and are included in many contracts. Exploiting exogenous reductions in analyst coverage due to brokerage house mergers and closures, we find that increased borrower opacity significantly increases sweep use. The effect is strongest for borrowers with higher levels of managerial entrenchment and if lenders hold both debt and equity in the firm. Overall, our results suggest that lenders implement sweep covenants to mitigate managerial agency problems by limiting contingencies of wealth expropriation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"53 1","pages":"99-118"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fima.12444","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139501668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mutual fund performance and manager assets: The negative effect of outside holdings","authors":"Richard Evans, Javier Gil-Bazo, Marc Lipson","doi":"10.1111/fima.12443","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12443","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We explore the relation between fund performance and the assets managed by the fund's managers that are <i>outside</i> the fund. Controlling for fund size, we find a negative relation between performance and the size of fund managers’ outside holdings, the number of other funds managed by a fund's managers, and the number of distinct fund categories managed by a fund's managers. This effect is driven by holdings that do not overlap with those held within the fund, and the effect's economic magnitude, while less than that of fund size, is comparable to that of fund family size and twice that of turnover. Endogeneity is addressed using fund mergers and recursive demeaning. Results suggest that manager responsibilities outside a fund significantly impact performance and that limited attention plays a role.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"53 1","pages":"3-29"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fima.12443","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139412158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Minority state ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the Chinese stock market crash in 2015","authors":"Xiumei Liu, Fangbo Si, Chenxin Xie, Lu Xie","doi":"10.1111/fima.12442","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12442","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the effect of minority state ownership on firm performance using the Chinese stock market crash in 2015. We find that treatment firms with minority state ownership accumulated from governmental purchases of equities experience significant reductions in operating performance. The negative impact is more severe in firms with higher riskiness and firms with less powerful large shareholders. We also find that treatment firms’ risk decreases and their employment increases after minority state shareholders step in, providing supportive evidence on the government's motives of reducing risk and preventing mass layoffs. Further tests reveal the channels through which minority state ownership impedes investment efficiency, productivity, and innovation. The negative impact diminishes when government institutions divest their shares in a timely manner. Overall, our results suggest there are unintended negative consequences of minority state ownership arising from the governmental rescue package in a market crisis.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"53 2","pages":"291-325"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138972120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Share repurchases on trial: Large-sample evidence on share price performance, executive compensation, and corporate investment","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/fima.12440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12440","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The corresponding author's name is Nicholas Guest, and their e-mail address is nguest@cornell.edu.</p>\u0000<p>Volume 52, Issue 1, 19–40, article first published online 02 February 2023</p>\u0000<p>In the article, Figure 1, Figure 2, and Table 1 need to be updated. The correct figures and table should read as follows:</p>\u0000<figure><picture>\u0000<source media=\"(min-width: 1650px)\" srcset=\"/cms/asset/a8f5914d-3a97-4792-9871-351dfb83c468/fima12440-fig-0001-m.jpg\"/><img alt=\"Details are in the caption following the image\" data-lg-src=\"/cms/asset/a8f5914d-3a97-4792-9871-351dfb83c468/fima12440-fig-0001-m.jpg\" loading=\"lazy\" src=\"/cms/asset/7d485d0a-7445-48aa-8e90-6d68772c2cde/fima12440-fig-0001-m.png\" title=\"Details are in the caption following the image\"/></picture><figcaption>\u0000<div><strong>FIGURE 1</strong><div>Open in figure viewer<i aria-hidden=\"true\"></i><span>PowerPoint</span></div>\u0000</div>\u0000<div>Aggregate payouts. The top panel of this figure shows aggregate US corporate dividend and repurchase payouts ($ in billions) from 1988 to 2020. The bottom panel is inflation-adjusted using the Consumer Price Index, with 2015 taken as the reference point.</div>\u0000</figcaption>\u0000</figure>\u0000<figure><picture>\u0000<source media=\"(min-width: 1650px)\" srcset=\"/cms/asset/f2d41421-44a8-4ad2-a079-e137947af74f/fima12440-fig-0002-m.jpg\"/><img alt=\"Details are in the caption following the image\" data-lg-src=\"/cms/asset/f2d41421-44a8-4ad2-a079-e137947af74f/fima12440-fig-0002-m.jpg\" loading=\"lazy\" src=\"/cms/asset/4d5987dc-ee5f-4544-8a34-e913e9d5079f/fima12440-fig-0002-m.png\" title=\"Details are in the caption following the image\"/></picture><figcaption>\u0000<div><strong>FIGURE 2</strong><div>Open in figure viewer<i aria-hidden=\"true\"></i><span>PowerPoint</span></div>\u0000</div>\u0000<div>Payout-to-price ratios. This figure shows average payout-to-price ratios across repurchase portfolios from 1988 to 2020. The “Positive Repurchase” portfolio includes all firms with positive repurchase amounts, and the “All Firms” portfolio includes all firms. The “Small Positive Repurchase” and “Large Positive Repurchase” portfolios are the result of splitting the firms with positive amounts of repurchases based on the median (i.e., below median, and above median) for the year. The “Infrequent Repurchase” and “Frequent Repurchase” portfolios are the result of splitting the firms with positive amounts of repurchases based on whether they repurchase during one or two quarters (i.e., infrequently) or three or four quarters (i.e., frequently) of the year.</div>\u0000</figcaption>\u0000</figure>\u0000<div>\u0000<header><span>TABLE 1. </span>Aggregate payouts</header>\u0000<div tabindex=\"0\">\u0000<table>\u0000<thead>\u0000<tr>\u0000<th colspan=\"7\">Panel A: Nominal values</th>\u0000</tr>\u0000<tr>\u0000<td></td>\u0000<th colspan=\"2\" style=\"top: 40.5px;\">Dividends</th>\u0000<th colspan=\"2\" style=\"top: 40.5px;\">Repurchases</th>\u0000<th colspan=\"2\" style=\"top: 40.5px;\">Market cap</th>\u0000</tr>\u0000<tr>\u0000<th style=\"top: 80.5px;\">Year</th>\u0000<th style=\"top: 80.5px;\"># of firms</th>\u0000<th style=\"top: 80.5px;\">Aggregat","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2023-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138581224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}