{"title":"Rating labels and style investing: Evidence from Moody's rating recalibration","authors":"Xinyuan Tao, Chunchi Wu","doi":"10.1111/fima.12348","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12348","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper investigates the role of style investing in comovement and return predictability. Using Moody's rating recalibration event to isolate the style effect, we find that changes in rating labels have powerful effects on comovement of municipal bond returns, trading activity, and volatility. Volatility-based comovement adds to the return comovement. Rating style investing induces return predictability and affects return formation, which interacts with investor sentiment. Shifts in the rating label drive these results through correlated trading activities, and the effects are reinforced by behavioral biases and trading frictions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"50 4","pages":"1047-1084"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12348","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46319800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Defined benefit pension de-risking and corporate risk-taking","authors":"Brian Silverstein","doi":"10.1111/fima.12346","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12346","url":null,"abstract":"<p>U.S. corporate sponsors of defined benefit (DB) pension plans in recent years have been de-risking by paying premiums to transfer their pension plan assets and liabilities to the balance sheets of third-party insurers. The passage of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) in 2012 provided the pension funding relief necessary to make de-risking a mainstream corporate activity. This study provides the first empirical analysis of plan and firm factors that cause a firm to de-risk its DB pension plans. We find a positive association between de-risking and aggregate corporate risk-taking. The results also show that de-risking, on average, has a stronger effect on corporate financing policy than investment policy, leading to an increase in credit risk reflected in a firm's credit rating and cost of debt. Also, we present suggestive evidence that the reallocation of pension risk increases firm idiosyncratic risk and excess returns.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"50 4","pages":"1085-1111"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12346","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44638770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Short selling, agency, and corporate investment","authors":"Mahdi Nezafat, Tao Shen, Qinghai Wang","doi":"10.1111/fima.12343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12343","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article, we examine corporate investment decisions in a model with short selling. We show that high short-selling activities can cause firms to overinvest and that the agency problems between managers and shareholders drive this overinvestment. Empirically, we find that short interest is positively associated with subsequent corporate investment and that the effect of short-selling activities on investment is stronger when the sensitivity of chief executive officer compensation to stock price performance is greater. The results are not explained by short-sale constraints or firm overvaluation. Additionally, short-selling-induced corporate investments can partly explain the negative relation between both short interest and corporate investment with subsequent stock returns.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"50 3","pages":"775-804"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12343","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"109172466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Working hard for long-distance relationships: Geographic proximity and relationship-specific investments","authors":"Kershen Huang, Chenguang Shang, Chi Zhang","doi":"10.1111/fima.12338","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12338","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Suppliers that are farther away from their customers make more relationship-specific investments (RSI). This association is more pronounced when it is less costly for the customer to switch to alternative suppliers and when the supplier operates in relatively opaque information environments. Using the introduction of new airline routes as an exogenous shock to the distance between supply chain partners, we show that the relation between supplier RSI and distance may be causal. We also provide evidence that suppliers with larger RSI are better able to maintain long-distance business relationships and are associated with higher firm value. These findings suggest an important dimension of supplier commitment: Suppliers use RSI as a signal of their willingness to fulfill on-going implicit claims.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"50 4","pages":"985-1011"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12338","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44520758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The expected investment growth premium","authors":"Jun Li, Huijun Wang, Jianfeng Yu","doi":"10.1111/fima.12340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12340","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose a novel measure of investment plans, namely expected investment growth (EIG), and find stocks with high EIG outperform stocks with low EIG by 17% per annum. This premium can be generated in a neoclassical model with the investment plan friction, in which a firm's expected returns increases with its planned investment due to an embedded leverage effect. We provide empirical evidence on the interaction of the cash flow effect and discount rate effect in driving this EIG premium. Our findings highlight the investment plan friction as an important economic channel to understand the cross-sectional risk premium.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"50 4","pages":"905-933"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12340","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"109172287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The role of P2P platforms in enhancing financial inclusion in the United States: An analysis of peer-to-peer lending across the rural–urban divide","authors":"Pankaj Kumar Maskara, Emre Kuvvet, Gengxuan Chen","doi":"10.1111/fima.12341","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12341","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we examine the role of peer-to-peer (P2P) platforms in enhancing financial inclusion from the borrowers’ point of view across the rural–urban dimension. We show that when number of bank branches decrease in a rural community, the P2P loan requests increase if there is at least one bank branch in the community allowing people to participate in the P2P market. We also find that the number of P2P loan requests from urban areas is higher when such areas have fewer pawnshops per capita. Our results suggest that P2P enhances financial inclusion of those lacking traditional institutions in rural communities and offers an alternative to those with fewer fringe banks in urban communities.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"50 3","pages":"747-774"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12341","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49647459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The dark side of shareholder litigation: Evidence from corporate takeovers","authors":"Yongqiang Chu, Yijia (Eddie) Zhao","doi":"10.1111/fima.12342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12342","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Exploiting staggered adoption of the universal demand (UD) laws by 23 states between 1989 and 2005 that makes filing shareholder derivative litigations more difficult, we show that reduced litigation threats improve corporate takeover efficiency. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that acquirers experience higher announcement returns and better postmerger operating performance after the UD laws. Further analysis suggests that acquirers make suboptimal merger decisions to avoid litigation. Taken together, we show that litigation risk can distort managers’ incentives and destroy value ex ante.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"50 3","pages":"845-873"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12342","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"109172953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On a stakeholder model of corporate governance","authors":"Jonathan M. Karpoff","doi":"10.1111/fima.12344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12344","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Rationales for a stakeholder model of corporate governance are based on enlightened self-interest, moral imperative, and/or externalities. Of these, the externalities rationale holds the most promise to justify a stakeholder focus. Recent evidence, however, indicates that the benefits of a stakeholder focus are limited because the social costs of many corporate activities already are internalized. Potential benefits also must be weighed against the costs, which include increased potential for conflict, waste, and managerial self-dealing. I conclude by advocating for the traditional governance model based on shareholder interests, with allowance for managers to deviate from this model in limited circumstances when the external impacts on other stakeholders are large. To constrain managerial opportunism, such deviations should be defended with a new type of double bottom line reporting, which augments traditional financial reporting with a statement of the social benefits of any deviations from shareholder value maximization.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"50 2","pages":"321-343"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12344","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"109172954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do managers provide misleading earnings forecasts before stock repurchases?","authors":"Amrita S. Nain, Anand M. Vijh","doi":"10.1111/fima.12339","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12339","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We question previous evidence that managers mislead investors into selling their stock for artificially lowered prices by releasing overly negative earnings forecasts before stock repurchases. We rely on forecast errors (forecast minus actual earnings) and show that these are insignificantly different between repurchase and matching firms. Our tests are powerful at detecting small differences and yet, across multiple subsamples, we find no statistical difference in forecast errors of repurchase and matching firms. Prior evidence of managerial misleading relied on the negative stock market reaction to management forecasts. We show that this negative reaction is observed only in the subsample where board authorization of repurchase follows management forecast. When board authorization precedes forecast, market reaction to management forecasts for repurchase firms is somewhat higher than that for matching firms. Our evidence suggests that managers are not misleading but exploiting low market prices to the advantage of their long-term shareholders.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"50 4","pages":"1013-1046"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12339","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49412552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Blockchain speculation or value creation? Evidence from corporate investments","authors":"Don M. Autore, Nicholas Clarke, Danling Jiang","doi":"10.1111/fima.12336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12336","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many corporate executives believe blockchain technology is broadly scalable and will achieve mainstream adoption, yet there is little evidence of significant shareholder value creation associated with corporate adoption of blockchain technology. We collect a broad sample of firms that invest in blockchain technology and examine the stock price reaction to the “first” public revelation of this news. Initial reactions average close to +13% and are followed by reversals over the next 3 months. However, we report a striking difference based on the credibility of the investment. Blockchain investments that are at an advanced stage or are confirmed in subsequent financial statements are associated with higher initial reactions and little or no reversal. The results suggest that credible corporate strategies involving blockchain technology are viewed favorably by investors.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"50 3","pages":"727-746"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2020-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12336","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"109167553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}