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How much for a haircut? Illiquidity, secondary markets, and the value of private equity 理一次发要多少钱?流动性不足、二级市场和私募股权的价值
IF 2.8 3区 经济学
Financial Management Pub Date : 2021-07-28 DOI: 10.1111/fima.12375
Nicolas P. B. Bollen, Berk A. Sensoy
{"title":"How much for a haircut? Illiquidity, secondary markets, and the value of private equity","authors":"Nicolas P. B. Bollen,&nbsp;Berk A. Sensoy","doi":"10.1111/fima.12375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12375","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Limited partners (LPs) of private equity funds commit to invest with extreme levels of illiquidity and significant uncertainty regarding the timing of capital flows, often exacerbated by the LPs’ spending requirements and portfolio rebalancing needs. Secondary markets have emerged that alleviate some of the associated cost. This paper develops a valuation model incorporating these institutional features. Model-implied breakeven returns match empirically observed average fund returns for moderately risk-tolerant LPs with private equity allocations up to 40%. In contrast, when earning average returns in private equity, highly risk-averse LPs optimally allocate only a few percent to the asset class.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"51 2","pages":"501-538"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12375","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91880844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Presidential power and stock returns 总统权力和股票回报
IF 2.8 3区 经济学
Financial Management Pub Date : 2021-07-20 DOI: 10.1111/fima.12374
Youngsoo Kim, Jung Chul Park
{"title":"Presidential power and stock returns","authors":"Youngsoo Kim,&nbsp;Jung Chul Park","doi":"10.1111/fima.12374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12374","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent studies highlight the positive effect of political connections on firm performance and stock returns. This paper shows that the positive effect of political connections on stock returns becomes substantially weaker in the weak presidency period, defined as the last 2 years before presidential party change or period of low job approval ratings. We consider two hypotheses—political interconnectedness and political risk—and find that both hypotheses are important in explaining the weak presidency effect on stock returns, political benefits, and research and development and capital expenditure. There is a trade-off between direct political investment and passive political alignment. Firms with direct political investment tend to hedge political risk so that they can run their real side investment on their own schedule. Consistent with this story, we find that the weak presidency effect is more pronounced for small firms that lack the resources for direct political investment.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"51 2","pages":"455-499"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12374","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91936632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Industry tournament incentives and corporate hedging policies 行业竞赛激励和企业对冲政策
IF 2.8 3区 经济学
Financial Management Pub Date : 2021-07-14 DOI: 10.1111/fima.12373
Gunratan Lonare, Ahmet Nart, Ahmet M. Tuncez
{"title":"Industry tournament incentives and corporate hedging policies","authors":"Gunratan Lonare,&nbsp;Ahmet Nart,&nbsp;Ahmet M. Tuncez","doi":"10.1111/fima.12373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12373","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines how a tournament among CEOs to progress within the CEO labor market influences their corporate hedging policies. We employ a textual analysis of 10-Ks to generate corporate hedging proxies, finding that the likelihood and intensity of hedging grow as the CEO labor market tournament prizes increase. We also explore the mitigating impact of corporate hedging on the adverse effects of risk-inducing industry tournament incentives (ITIs) on the cost of debt and stock price crash risk, noting that these could be possible reasons behind the relation. Additionally, we observe that the relationship between ITIs and corporate hedging is less pronounced for firms that demonstrate more financial distress and for firms whose CEOs are the founders of the company or are of retirement age. We identify a causal relation between ITIs and corporate hedging using an instrumental variable approach and an exogenous shock sourced from changes in the enforceability of noncompetition agreements across states.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"51 2","pages":"399-453"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12373","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91886776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A hidden hand in corporate lobbying 公司游说的幕后黑手
IF 2.8 3区 经济学
Financial Management Pub Date : 2021-07-07 DOI: 10.1111/fima.12371
Anqi Jiao
{"title":"A hidden hand in corporate lobbying","authors":"Anqi Jiao","doi":"10.1111/fima.12371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12371","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I investigate the role of institutional investors in firms’ lobbying activities. Firms with greater lobbying institutional ownership lobby more. Using a novel dataset with lobbying information on congressional bills, I show that institutional investors support portfolio firms by lobbying together on same bills. Bills lobbied by institutional investors are more likely to become laws and the passage of such bills leads to greater abnormal returns. Additional evidence suggests that institutional investors protect firms’ private political information by voting against shareholder proposals requesting additional lobbying disclosure. The findings have an important economic implication: financial institutions provide a helping hand in firms’ external governance related to law and politics.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"51 2","pages":"357-397"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12371","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91809321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Trademark and IPO underpricing 商标和IPO定价过低
IF 2.8 3区 经济学
Financial Management Pub Date : 2021-06-25 DOI: 10.1111/fima.12369
Bin Yang, Tao Yuan
{"title":"Trademark and IPO underpricing","authors":"Bin Yang,&nbsp;Tao Yuan","doi":"10.1111/fima.12369","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12369","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Although trademarks are mentioned in many firms’ initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses, their influences on the IPO valuation process are underexplored. This paper studies the relationship between a firm's pre-IPO trademarks and its IPO underpricing. Using 4457 US IPOs during the period 1980–2018, we find that firms with a larger number of trademarks prior to the IPO date experience significantly less IPO underpricing. We employ a quasi-natural experiment brought about by the 1996 Federal Trademark Dilution Act and an instrumental variable approach to establish causality. Our findings suggest that trademarks help reduce information asymmetry among various IPO participants, leading to less underpriced IPOs.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"51 1","pages":"271-296"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12369","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91871807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
The influence of learning and bargaining on CEO–chair duality: Evidence from firms that pass the baton 学习和谈判对CEO-主席双重性的影响：来自传递接力棒的公司的证据
IF 2.8 3区 经济学
Financial Management Pub Date : 2021-06-24 DOI: 10.1111/fima.12370
Narayanan Jayaraman, Vikram Nanda, Harley E. Ryan Jr.
{"title":"The influence of learning and bargaining on CEO–chair duality: Evidence from firms that pass the baton","authors":"Narayanan Jayaraman,&nbsp;Vikram Nanda,&nbsp;Harley E. Ryan Jr.","doi":"10.1111/fima.12370","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12370","url":null,"abstract":"Correspondence VikramNandaUniversity ofTexas atDallas, Richardson, Texas,USA. Email: vikraam.nanda@utdallas.edu Abstract Some firms combine CEO and board chair positions after observing CEO performance. We propose that this approach, known as “passing the baton” (PTB), enables the board to learn about the ability and suitability of the CEO before awarding additional title of board chair. Consistent with learning, idiosyncratic stock-return volatility declines following the CEO–chair combination. The market responds positively (Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) = 1.31%) to early promotions, suggesting that early promotions reveal directors’ private information about CEO quality. Compared to a matched benchmark, we observe no decline in firm’s accounting performance in subsequent years. Although match-adjusted stock returns begin to decline 2 years after combination in homogeneous industries, there is no stockreturn decline in heterogeneous industries where learning is more important. The evidence reveals the potential for entrenchment over time, but we find no evidence to suggest that CEO–chair combinations in PTB firms result from agency problems. Our results underscore the importance of balancing both learning and agency problems in corporate governance.","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"51 1","pages":"297-350"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12370","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44550430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Ultimate ownership and bank competition 最终所有权和银行竞争
IF 2.8 3区 经济学
Financial Management Pub Date : 2021-06-15 DOI: 10.1111/fima.12368
José Azar, Sahil Raina, Martin Schmalz
{"title":"Ultimate ownership and bank competition","authors":"José Azar,&nbsp;Sahil Raina,&nbsp;Martin Schmalz","doi":"10.1111/fima.12368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12368","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We document substantial time-series and cross-sectional variation in branch-level deposit account interest rates, maintenance fees, and fee thresholds, and examine whether variation in bank concentration helps explain variation in these prices. Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) alone is not correlated with any of the outcome variables. A “generalized HHI” (GHHI) capturing both common ownership (the degree to which banks are commonly owned by the same investors) and cross-ownership (the extent to which banks own shares in each other), is strongly correlated with all prices, even when we limit cross-sectional variation in bank ownership to only that predicted by the growth of index funds.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"51 1","pages":"227-269"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12368","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91838194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Director diversity and inclusion: At the table but in the game? 导演多样性和包容性:在桌子上，但在游戏中?
IF 2.8 3区 经济学
Financial Management Pub Date : 2021-06-03 DOI: 10.1111/fima.12366
Nemmara K. Chidambaran, Yun Liu, Nagpurnanand Prabhala
{"title":"Director diversity and inclusion: At the table but in the game?","authors":"Nemmara K. Chidambaran,&nbsp;Yun Liu,&nbsp;Nagpurnanand Prabhala","doi":"10.1111/fima.12366","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12366","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The issue of the <i>presence</i> of diverse directors on boards has attracted considerable attention among policymakers, practitioners, and academics. There is relatively less attention to the <i>inclusion</i> of diverse directors, or their onward trajectory after appointment. We study two outcomes related to inclusion—the retention of directors and their promotion to board leadership positions. Although gender is a key focus of many diversity discussions, we find significant inclusion results on skill diversity and nongender diversity dimensions. Retention and promotion are “less” likely for age- and ethnicity-diverse directors but both outcomes are more likely for skill-diverse directors.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"51 1","pages":"193-225"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12366","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41411446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Powerful independent directors 强大的独立董事
IF 2.8 3区 经济学
Financial Management Pub Date : 2021-05-25 DOI: 10.1111/fima.12365
Kathy Fogel, Liping Ma, Randall Morck
{"title":"Powerful independent directors","authors":"Kathy Fogel,&nbsp;Liping Ma,&nbsp;Randall Morck","doi":"10.1111/fima.12365","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12365","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Shareholder valuations are economically and statistically positively correlated with independent director power, gauged by a composite of social network power centrality measures. Powerful independent directors’ sudden deaths reduce shareholder value significantly; other independent directors’ deaths do not, consistent with powerful independent directors increasing firm valuations. Further tests associate more powerful independent directors with less value-destroying mergers and acquisitions, less free cash flow retention, more CEO accountability, and less earnings management. We interpret these findings as more powerful independent directors better detecting and countering CEO missteps because of better access to information, greater credibility in challenging errant top managers, or both.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"50 4","pages":"935-983"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12365","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"109175800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Economic forecasts, anchoring bias, and stock returns 经济预测、锚定偏差和股票回报
IF 2.8 3区 经济学
Financial Management Pub Date : 2021-05-21 DOI: 10.1111/fima.12355
Gene Birz, Sandip Dutta, Han Yu
{"title":"Economic forecasts, anchoring bias, and stock returns","authors":"Gene Birz,&nbsp;Sandip Dutta,&nbsp;Han Yu","doi":"10.1111/fima.12355","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fima.12355","url":null,"abstract":"<p>By utilizing survey forecasts of macroeconomic statistics, we find that market participants’ expectations are not rational as they exhibit an anchoring bias. The forecasts systematically underpredict macroeconomic statistics and the forecast errors are predicted by past macroeconomic announcements. Most importantly, we find that the stock market does not see through this bias, that is, we find statistically significant stock price effects of “anticipated” components of macroeconomic announcements. Investors overweight the importance of historical information and do not make sufficient adjustments after the arrival of new information.</p>","PeriodicalId":48123,"journal":{"name":"Financial Management","volume":"51 1","pages":"169-191"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fima.12355","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48481220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
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