产业中心性:弱联系、产业属性与管理契约

IF 2.9 3区 经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Rasha Ashraf, Nishant Dass, Vikram Nanda
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引用次数: 2

摘要

行业间贸易关系网络中的中心性为行业的经济属性和行业中普遍存在的管理激励合同提供了新的见解。更多的“中心”产业与大量的产业进行贸易,这意味着众多但相对较弱的产业间联系。产业间联系的薄弱表明,特定关系投资(RSI)将不那么重要,产出将相对更商品化。正如预测的那样,中央工业企业缺乏创新,面临更大的竞争,并且具有更低的特殊风险。此外,核心行业的首席执行官薪酬较低,激励措施也较弱。在更核心的行业,赛事激励也更弱。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Industry centrality: Weak ties, industry attributes, and managerial contracting

Centrality in the network of interindustry trade relationships provides novel insights into an industry's economic attributes and managerial incentive contracts prevalent in the industry. More “central” industries trade with a large number of industries, implying numerous but relatively weaker interindustry ties. Weakness of interindustry ties suggests that relationship-specific investment (RSI) will be less important and output will be relatively more commoditized in central industries. As predicted, central industry firms are less innovative, face greater competition, and have lower idiosyncratic risk. Further, CEOs in central industries receive lower pay and weaker incentives. Tournament incentives are also weaker in more central industries.

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来源期刊
Financial Management
Financial Management BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
27
期刊介绍: Financial Management (FM) serves both academics and practitioners concerned with the financial management of nonfinancial businesses, financial institutions, and public or private not-for-profit organizations.
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