Control risk premium: Dual-class shares, family ownership, and minority investor returns

IF 2.9 3区 经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Ronald Anderson, Ezgi Ottolenghi, David Reeb, Pavel Savor
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Despite exhibiting significant valuation discounts, dual-class shares surged from 1% of initial public offerings in 1980 to nearly half in recent years. This study investigates the potential harm of such structures by examining the identity and returns of minority shareholders. We find that sophisticated investors predominantly hold low-voting shares. Furthermore, outside shareholders earn a positive risk premium rather than suffering low returns, consistent with the hypothesis that market prices compensate for the risk associated with dual-class structures. Our analysis reveals that such structures are confounded with family control, which is present in 89% of dual-class firms in the Russell 3000. Interestingly, single-class firms with family shareholders also enjoy positive abnormal returns, implying minority shareholders care more about the presence of a controlling shareholder than a specific voting structure. This research contributes to the ongoing debate on restricting dual-class structures by highlighting the complex relationship between ownership, control, and shareholder returns.

控制风险溢价:双重股权、家族所有权和少数投资者回报
尽管出现了明显的估值折扣,但双层股权结构的股票在首次公开发行(ipo)中的比例从1980年的1%飙升至近年来的近一半。本研究通过考察中小股东的身份和回报来调查这种结构的潜在危害。我们发现,老练的投资者主要持有低投票权的股票。此外,外部股东获得了正的风险溢价,而不是遭受低回报,这与市场价格补偿与双层股权结构相关的风险的假设是一致的。我们的分析表明,这种结构与家族控制相混淆,罗素3000指数中89%的双重股权结构公司都存在家族控制。有趣的是,拥有家族股东的单一类别公司也享有正的异常回报,这意味着小股东更关心控股股东的存在,而不是特定的投票结构。本研究通过强调所有权、控制权和股东回报之间的复杂关系,为限制双重股权结构的持续辩论做出了贡献。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Financial Management
Financial Management BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
27
期刊介绍: Financial Management (FM) serves both academics and practitioners concerned with the financial management of nonfinancial businesses, financial institutions, and public or private not-for-profit organizations.
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