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An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities 具有相互依赖的价值和外部性的分配问题
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-12-14 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01538-5
Tatiana Daddario, Richard P. McLean, Andrew Postlewaite
{"title":"An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities","authors":"Tatiana Daddario, Richard P. McLean, Andrew Postlewaite","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01538-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01538-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we take a mechanism design approach to optimal assignment problems with asymmetrically informed buyers. In addition, the surplus generated by an assignment of a buyer to a seller may be adversely affected by externalities generated by other assignments. The problem is complicated by several factors. Buyers know their own valuations and externality costs but do not know this same information for other buyers. Buyers also receive private signals correlated with the state and, consequently, the implementation problem exhibits interdependent valuations. This precludes a naive application of the VCG mechanism and to overcome this interdependency problem, we construct a two-stage mechanism. In the first stage, we exploit correlation in the firms signals about the state to induce truthful reporting of observed signals. Given that buyers are honest in stage 1, we then use a VCG-like mechanism in stage 2 that induces honest reporting of valuation and externality functions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138630152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Environmental quality along the process of economic growth: a theoretical reappraisal 经济增长过程中的环境质量:一个理论再评价
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-18 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01520-1
Maxime Menuet, Alexandru Minea, Patrick Villieu, Anastasios Xepapadeas
{"title":"Environmental quality along the process of economic growth: a theoretical reappraisal","authors":"Maxime Menuet, Alexandru Minea, Patrick Villieu, Anastasios Xepapadeas","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01520-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01520-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies the dual interaction between economic growth and environmental quality in an endogenous growth model. We exhibit multiple equilibria and complex local and global dynamics, resulting in potential indeterminacy, hysteresis effects, or long-lasting growth and environmental cycles. From a policy perspective, we reveal that changes in the environmental policy should be handled with care, as they may generate aggregate instability or condemn the economy to an environmental poverty trap associated with a possible irreversibility of environmental degradation. Lastly, our analysis provides a reassessment of pollution taxes, which are found to improve long-run economic growth when the model is well-determined, but reduce it in the presence of indeterminacy.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"49 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138525705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Achieving the maximum size for exchange problems with dichotomous preferences 实现具有二分类偏好的交换问题的最大规模
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-17 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01536-7
Yan Long
{"title":"Achieving the maximum size for exchange problems with dichotomous preferences","authors":"Yan Long","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01536-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01536-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider an exchange problem with dichotomous preferences, and agents endowed with acceptable (unacceptable) objects can exchange their endowments with other acceptable (unacceptable) objects in order to achieve the “maximum size” of the problem, that is, the maximum number of agents who obtain acceptable objects. We observe that the priority mechanisms appeared in the literature before are not fully incentive-compatible—agents may pretend that their endowments are acceptable to themselves to get better results. We construct a new class of mechanisms called “endowment-respecting priority mechanisms” to solve this problem. Our mechanisms are dominant strategy incentive-compatible, individually rational, and always achieve the maximum size.</p>","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138525670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The economic impact of lockdown and bounded treatment capability for an epidemic without vaccine 封锁和有限的治疗能力对无疫苗流行病的经济影响
3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-10 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01531-y
Konstantin Kogan, Fouad El Ouardighi, Avi Herbon
{"title":"The economic impact of lockdown and bounded treatment capability for an epidemic without vaccine","authors":"Konstantin Kogan, Fouad El Ouardighi, Avi Herbon","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01531-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01531-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"109 7","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135138277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal allocations in growth models with private information 私有信息下增长模型的最优配置
3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-06 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01527-8
Tom Krebs, Martin Scheffel
{"title":"Optimal allocations in growth models with private information","authors":"Tom Krebs, Martin Scheffel","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01527-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01527-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper considers a class of growth models with idiosyncratic human capital risk and private information about individual effort choices (moral hazard). Households are infinitely-lived and have preferences that allow for a time-additive expected utility representation with a one-period utility function that is additive over consumption and effort as well as logarithmic over consumption. Human capital investment is risky due to idiosyncratic shocks that follow a Markov process with transition probabilities that depend on effort choices. The production process is represented by an aggregate production function that uses physical capital and human capital as input factors. We show that constrained optimal allocations are simple in the sense that individual effort levels and individual consumption growth rates are history-independent. Further, constrained optimal allocations are the solutions to a recursive social planner problem that is simple in the sense that exogenous shocks are the only state variables. We also show that constrained optimal allocations can be decentralized as competitive equilibrium allocations of a market economy with a simple tax- and transfer scheme. Finally, it is always optimal to subsidize human capital investment in the market economy.","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135584252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Static and dynamic inefficiencies in an optimizing model of epidemics 流行病优化模型中的静态和动态低效率
3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-06 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01533-w
Pietro Garibaldi, Espen R. Moen, Christopher A. Pissarides
{"title":"Static and dynamic inefficiencies in an optimizing model of epidemics","authors":"Pietro Garibaldi, Espen R. Moen, Christopher A. Pissarides","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01533-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01533-w","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Several externalities arise when agents shield optimally to avoid infection during an epidemic. We classify externalities into static and dynamic and compare the decentralized and optimal solutions when agents derive utility from social interaction. For low infection costs agents shield too little; for high costs they shield too much because of a “rat race to shield”: they delay social action until other agents contract the disease and society reaches herd immunity. Other externalities drive more wedges between the private and social outcomes. The expectation of a fully effective vaccine that ends the disease faster changes results, reversing excessive shielding.","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"26 63","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135545822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Entrepreneurship and misallocation in production network economies 生产网络经济中的企业家精神与错配
3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-04 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01535-8
Tiago Cavalcanti, Angelo Mendes, Pierluca Pannella
{"title":"Entrepreneurship and misallocation in production network economies","authors":"Tiago Cavalcanti, Angelo Mendes, Pierluca Pannella","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01535-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01535-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper investigates how sectoral linkages amplify or diminish misallocation at the intensive and extensive margins. Our analysis is based on a multisector general equilibrium model with input–output linkages, heterogeneous entrepreneurial abilities, and endogenous occupational choice. Distortions affect the intensive use of production inputs and they also impact the agents’ occupational decisions, misallocating the mass and type of entrepreneurs in different sectors of production. When the most distorted sectors are upstream (downstream), input–output linkages amplify (diminish) the loss from entreprenurial misallocation. We calibrate the model to the US and quantify the output losses from sectoral corporate taxes, decomposing the role of networks and the extensive margin decisions. We find that sectoral linkages quadruple the loss from the misallocation of entrepreneurs. We study an entry subsidy program, showing that it should target those sectors whose marginal entrepreneurs suffer larger profit losses, even if they are not necessarily the most distorted.","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"6 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135774257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Diversification and information in contests 竞赛中的多样化和信息化
3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-03 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01532-x
Jorge Lemus, Emil Temnyalov
{"title":"Diversification and information in contests","authors":"Jorge Lemus, Emil Temnyalov","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01532-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01532-x","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study contests with technological uncertainty, where contestants can invest in different technologies of uncertain value. The principal, who is also uncertain about the value of the technologies, can disclose an informative yet noisy public signal about the merit of each technology. The signal can focus contestants’ investments into more promising technologies or increase diversification. We characterize the principal’s optimal disclosure of information about the technologies, which depends on the value of diversification, the informativeness of available signals, and the ex-ante beliefs of the likelihood of success for each technology. We also find that under some conditions offering larger prizes or having more contestants decreases the extent of information disclosure.","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"46 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135819848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Epictetusian rationality Epictetusian理性
3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-10-31 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01530-z
Gregory Ponthiere
{"title":"Epictetusian rationality","authors":"Gregory Ponthiere","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01530-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01530-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"4 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135869349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Allocation rules of indivisible prizes in team contests 团体赛中不可分奖品的分配规则
3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-10-30 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01534-9
Hideo Konishi, Nicolas Sahuguet, Benoît S. Y. Crutzen
{"title":"Allocation rules of indivisible prizes in team contests","authors":"Hideo Konishi, Nicolas Sahuguet, Benoît S. Y. Crutzen","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01534-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01534-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136103958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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