Static and dynamic inefficiencies in an optimizing model of epidemics

IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Pietro Garibaldi, Espen R. Moen, Christopher A. Pissarides
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract Several externalities arise when agents shield optimally to avoid infection during an epidemic. We classify externalities into static and dynamic and compare the decentralized and optimal solutions when agents derive utility from social interaction. For low infection costs agents shield too little; for high costs they shield too much because of a “rat race to shield”: they delay social action until other agents contract the disease and society reaches herd immunity. Other externalities drive more wedges between the private and social outcomes. The expectation of a fully effective vaccine that ends the disease faster changes results, reversing excessive shielding.
流行病优化模型中的静态和动态低效率
当病原体在流行病期间最佳地屏蔽以避免感染时,会产生一些外部性。我们将外部性分为静态外部性和动态外部性,并比较了代理从社会互动中获得效用时的分散解决方案和最优解决方案。为了降低感染成本,药物保护的太少;由于“激烈的保护竞争”,他们的保护成本过高:他们推迟了社会行动,直到其他代理人感染疾病,社会达到群体免疫。其他外部性在私人和社会结果之间造成了更多的分歧。人们期望一种完全有效的疫苗能更快地结束疾病,这改变了结果,扭转了过度屏蔽的局面。
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来源期刊
Economic Theory
Economic Theory ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
23.10%
发文量
68
期刊介绍: The purpose of Economic Theory is to provide an outlet for research - in all areas of economics based on rigorous theoretical reasoning, and - on specific topics in mathematics which is motivated by the analysis of economic problems. Economic Theory''s scope encompasses - but is not limited to - the following fields. - classical and modern equilibrium theory - cooperative and non-cooperative game theory - macroeconomics - social choice and welfare - uncertainty and information, intertemporal economics (including dynamical systems) - public economics - international and developmental economics - financial economics, money and banking - industrial organization Economic Theory also publishes surveys if they clearly picture the basic ideas at work in some areas, the essential technical apparatus which is used and the central questions which remain open. The development of a productive dialectic between stylized facts and abstract formulations requires that economic relevance be at the forefront. Thus, correct, and innovative, mathematical analysis is not enough; it must be motivated by - and contribute to - the understanding of substantive economic problems. Officially cited as: Econ Theory
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