{"title":"Achieving the maximum size for exchange problems with dichotomous preferences","authors":"Yan Long","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01536-7","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider an exchange problem with dichotomous preferences, and agents endowed with acceptable (unacceptable) objects can exchange their endowments with other acceptable (unacceptable) objects in order to achieve the “maximum size” of the problem, that is, the maximum number of agents who obtain acceptable objects. We observe that the priority mechanisms appeared in the literature before are not fully incentive-compatible—agents may pretend that their endowments are acceptable to themselves to get better results. We construct a new class of mechanisms called “endowment-respecting priority mechanisms” to solve this problem. Our mechanisms are dominant strategy incentive-compatible, individually rational, and always achieve the maximum size.</p>","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economic Theory","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01536-7","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We consider an exchange problem with dichotomous preferences, and agents endowed with acceptable (unacceptable) objects can exchange their endowments with other acceptable (unacceptable) objects in order to achieve the “maximum size” of the problem, that is, the maximum number of agents who obtain acceptable objects. We observe that the priority mechanisms appeared in the literature before are not fully incentive-compatible—agents may pretend that their endowments are acceptable to themselves to get better results. We construct a new class of mechanisms called “endowment-respecting priority mechanisms” to solve this problem. Our mechanisms are dominant strategy incentive-compatible, individually rational, and always achieve the maximum size.
期刊介绍：
The purpose of Economic Theory is to provide an outlet for research - in all areas of economics based on rigorous theoretical reasoning, and
- on specific topics in mathematics which is motivated by the analysis of economic problems. Economic Theory''s scope encompasses - but is not limited to - the following fields. - classical and modern equilibrium theory
- cooperative and non-cooperative game theory
- macroeconomics
- social choice and welfare
- uncertainty and information, intertemporal economics (including dynamical systems)
- public economics
- international and developmental economics
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- industrial organization Economic Theory also publishes surveys if they clearly picture the basic ideas at work in some areas, the essential technical apparatus which is used and the central questions which remain open. The development of a productive dialectic between stylized facts and abstract formulations requires that economic relevance be at the forefront. Thus, correct, and innovative, mathematical analysis is not enough; it must be motivated by - and contribute to - the understanding of substantive economic problems.
Officially cited as: Econ Theory
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