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Vertical contracting between a vertically integrated firm and a downstream rival 垂直整合企业与下游竞争对手之间的垂直合同
3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-10-25 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01529-6
Frago Kourandi, Ioannis N. Pinopoulos
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引用次数: 0
Ambiguity and partial Bayesian updating 歧义和部分贝叶斯更新
3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-10-21 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01528-7
Matthew Kovach
{"title":"Ambiguity and partial Bayesian updating","authors":"Matthew Kovach","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01528-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01528-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"13 9","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135463658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Demand operators and the Dutta–Kar rule for minimum cost spanning tree problems 最小代价生成树问题的需求算子和Dutta-Kar规则
3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-10-17 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01526-9
Changyong Han, Bawoo Kim, Youngsub Chun
{"title":"Demand operators and the Dutta–Kar rule for minimum cost spanning tree problems","authors":"Changyong Han, Bawoo Kim, Youngsub Chun","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01526-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01526-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"210 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136032720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamic preference foundations of expected exponentially-discounted utility 期望指数折现效用的动态偏好基础
3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-10-06 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01523-y
Craig S. Webb
{"title":"Dynamic preference foundations of expected exponentially-discounted utility","authors":"Craig S. Webb","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01523-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01523-y","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Expected exponentially-discounted utility (EEDU) is the standard model of choice over risk and time in economics. This paper considers the dynamic preference foundations of EEDU in the timed risks framework. We first provide dynamic preference foundations for a time-invariant expected utility representation. The new axioms for this are called foregone-risk independence and strong time invariance. This class of dynamic preferences includes EEDU as a special case. If foregone-risk independence is strengthened to a new condition called conditional consistency, then an EEDU representation results. Alternative approaches for extending exponential discounting axioms to risk are considered, resulting in five new preference foundations of EEDU.","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134944270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Unbeatable strategies 无与伦比的策略
3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-09-22 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01521-0
Rabah Amir, Igor V. Evstigneev, Valeriya Potapova
{"title":"Unbeatable strategies","authors":"Rabah Amir, Igor V. Evstigneev, Valeriya Potapova","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01521-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01521-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136059984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Solving multidimensional screening problems using a generalized single crossing property 利用广义单交叉性质求解多维筛选问题
3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-09-21 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01519-8
William Dodds
{"title":"Solving multidimensional screening problems using a generalized single crossing property","authors":"William Dodds","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01519-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01519-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"2015 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136153768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Marginal pricing equilibrium with externalities in Riesz spaces Riesz空间中具有外部性的边际定价均衡
3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-09-21 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01524-x
Jean-Marc Bonnisseau, Matías Fuentes
{"title":"Marginal pricing equilibrium with externalities in Riesz spaces","authors":"Jean-Marc Bonnisseau, Matías Fuentes","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01524-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01524-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136153633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Signaling through entry in auctions with sequential and costly participation 通过连续而昂贵的参与拍卖来发出信号
3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-09-21 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01518-9
Jeongwoo Lee, Jaeok Park
{"title":"Signaling through entry in auctions with sequential and costly participation","authors":"Jeongwoo Lee, Jaeok Park","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01518-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01518-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136153761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Revealed statistical consumer theory 揭示的统计消费者理论
3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-09-16 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01513-0
Pawel Dziewulski, Roy Allen, John Rehbeck
{"title":"Revealed statistical consumer theory","authors":"Pawel Dziewulski, Roy Allen, John Rehbeck","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01513-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01513-0","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We provide a microfoundation to use aggregates (e.g. mean purchases) to evaluate consumer choice data. We study statistical consumer theory where an individual maximizes a preference over distributions of bundles when constrained by a statistic of the distribution (e.g. mean expenditure). We show statistical consumer theory is observationally equivalent to an individual whose preferences depend only on the statistic of the distribution. This means that despite working with distributions, the empirical content of the model only depends on a finite-dimensional statistic. This approach generalizes random quasilinear utility with random income and mean-variance preferences.","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135304604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Persuasion with ambiguous receiver preferences 具有模糊接收者偏好的说服
3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-09-14 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01522-z
Eitan Sapiro-Gheiler
{"title":"Persuasion with ambiguous receiver preferences","authors":"Eitan Sapiro-Gheiler","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01522-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01522-z","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I describe a Bayesian persuasion problem where Receiver has a private type representing a cutoff for choosing Sender’s preferred action, and Sender has maxmin preferences over all Receiver type distributions with known mean and bounds. This problem can be represented as a zero-sum game where Sender chooses a distribution of posterior mean beliefs that is a mean-preserving contraction of the prior over states, and an adversarial Nature chooses a Receiver type distribution with the known mean; the player with the higher realization from their chosen distribution wins. I formalize the connection between maxmin persuasion and similar games used to model political spending, all-pay auctions, and competitive persuasion. In both a standard binary-state setting and a new continuous-state setting, Sender optimally linearizes the prior distribution over states to create a distribution of posterior means that is uniform on a known interval with an atom at the lower bound of its support.","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135488740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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