{"title":"Digital highways and firm turnover","authors":"Carlo Cambini, Lorien Sabatino","doi":"10.1111/jems.12522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12522","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the impact of ultra-broadband (UBB) internet connections on firm entry and exit dynamics. These connections are based on optical fiber cables that link telecommunication operators to final users, allowing a significantly higher performance compared with traditional copper-line networks. We leverage on a unique comprehensive dataset collecting municipality-level information on broadband diffusion and firm turnover in Italy for the period of 2012–2019. Our empirical strategy exploits the staggered roll-out of UBB, starting from 2015. Our identification strategy is based on an instrumental variable approach that exploits plausibly exogenous variation in the physical and geographical peculiarities of the telecommunication infrastructure. Results suggest that UBB increases firm exit, particularly for small firms. On the contrary, firm entry rises only in digital intensive sectors and in the most developed geographical areas. Our findings have important implications for the ongoing debate around the massive investments in high-speed digital infrastructures, as they argue against the conventional idea that business activities equally benefit from last-generation broadband technologies.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50142454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Artificial intelligence adoption and system-wide change","authors":"Ajay Agrawal, Joshua S. Gans, Avi Goldfarb","doi":"10.1111/jems.12521","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12521","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Analyses of artificial intelligence (AI) adoption focus on its adoption at the individual task level. What has received significantly less attention is how AI adoption is shaped by the fact that organizations are composed of many interacting tasks. AI adoption may, therefore, require system-wide change, which is both a constraint and an opportunity. We provide the first formal analysis where multiple tasks may be part of an interdependent system. We find that reliance on AI, a prediction tool, increases decision variation, which, in turn, raises challenges if decisions across the organization interact. Reducing inter-dependencies between decisions softens that impact and can facilitate AI adoption. However, it does this at the expense of synergies. By contrast, when there are mechanisms for inter-decision coordination, AI adoption is enhanced when there are more inter-dependencies. Consequently, we show that there are important cases where AI adoption will be enhanced when it can be adopted beyond tasks but as part of a designed organizational system.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12521","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122894279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The optimality of public–private partnerships under financial and fiscal constraints","authors":"Marco Buso, Luciano Greco","doi":"10.1111/jems.12520","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12520","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The government may delegate two sequential tasks (e.g., building and operating an infrastructure) to the same or different agents (i.e., partnership vs. sequential contracts). Agents are risk-neutral but face financial constraints, whereas the government's contractual capacity may be limited by the renegotiation-proofness and fiscal constraints. By relying on history-dependent incentives, the partnership contract corrects moral hazard more effectively than sequential contracts. Thus, it is socially preferred unless bundling different tasks deteriorates the agent's financial conditions. Our results shed new light on the role of firms' financial and government's fiscal conditions in driving the cost–benefit analysis of public–private partnerships.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12520","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50136454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The impact of artificial intelligence design on pricing","authors":"John Asker, Chaim Fershtman, Ariel Pakes","doi":"10.1111/jems.12516","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12516","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The behavior of artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms is shaped by how they learn about their environment. We compare the prices generated by AIs that use different learning protocols when there is market interaction. Asynchronous learning occurs when the AI only learns about the return from the action it took. Synchronous learning occurs when the AI conducts counterfactuals to learn about the returns it would have earned had it taken an alternative action. The two lead to markedly different market prices. When future profits are not given positive weight by the AI, (perfect) synchronous updating leads to competitive pricing, while asynchronous can lead to pricing close to monopoly levels. We investigate how this result varies when either counterfactuals can only be calculated imperfectly and/or when the AI places a weight on future profits. Lastly, we investigate performance differences between offline and online play.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122119944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Spatial competition with demand uncertainty: A laboratory experiment","authors":"Aurélie Bonein, Stéphane Turolla","doi":"10.1111/jems.12517","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12517","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Motivated by recent research on product differentiation, we conduct laboratory experiments to study how demand uncertainty influences firms' incentives to differentiate. We ground our experiment on a discrete version of the standard location-then-price game introduced by Hotelling (1929), and we consider different levels of demand uncertainty. We first derive the game equilibrium assuming risk-neutral firms, and obtain the standard prediction that a high level of demand uncertainty generates more differentiation. Second, we extend the analysis to consider non-risk neutral firms and markets with asymmetric risk profiles. We show that the game equilibrium can differ substantially according to the attitude to risk. Third, we compare our predictions with the experimental data and find that demand uncertainty acts as a differentiation force in the context of both symmetric markets composed of risk-neutral or risk-lover subjects and asymmetric markets. We find support also for the agglomeration effect arising from demand uncertainty for sufficiently risk-averse subjects. Overall, these results might explain the opposite product differentiation strategies frequently observed in markets with fast-evolving tastes (i.e., minimum or maximum differentiation). Finally, the data confirm that subjects differentiate to relax price competition and provide evidence of a strong positive relationship between differentiation and prices.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50121964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How firms compete when they set identical prices: Nonprice strategies in the Indian biscuit industry","authors":"Gianluca Antonecchia, Ajay Bhaskarabhatla","doi":"10.1111/jems.12518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12518","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How do firms compete when all firms in an industry set identical prices? Using Nielsen data on India's biscuit manufacturers, we document productivity-based competition on nonprice strategies under industry-wide uniform pricing. Products with one standard deviation higher quantity-based productivity contain, on average, 13% more quantity per pack for the same price. Productivity also positively correlates with promotions on pack size, availability, and variety. A higher price (per pack size) sensitivity in rural markets combined with industry-wide uniform pricing imposes a greater burden on rural consumers. Additional analyses show that firms can reduce this burden by selling different pack sizes in urban and rural areas.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12518","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50148038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kohei Kawaguchi, Naomi Kodama, Hiroshi Kumanomido, Mari Tanaka
{"title":"Using managers' expectations for ex-ante policy evaluation: Evidence from the COVID-19 crisis","authors":"Kohei Kawaguchi, Naomi Kodama, Hiroshi Kumanomido, Mari Tanaka","doi":"10.1111/jems.12515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12515","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Evaluation of the impacts of government policies during an economic crisis is often delayed until the outcomes are realized. Policies can be better guided if they can be evaluated amid a crisis, before the realization of outcomes. This study examines whether survey data on the expectations of small business managers can help evaluate two high-stake subsidies for firms amid the COVID-19 crisis in Japan, namely, Subsidy Program for Sustaining Businesses (SPSB) and Employment Adjustment Subsidy (EAS). We evaluate the accuracy of managers' expectations, estimate the impact of subsidies on the expected firm survival, and compare it with the estimated impact on realized survival. We find that the managers' expectations on their future sales, survival rate, and the possibility of receiving these subsidies predict the realized outcomes, although they were highly pessimistic about their survival rates. We find that the estimated impacts of the SPSB on the expected survival rates have the same sign as the estimated impact on the realized survival rates, but the size is more than twice because of the pessimism on survival. The estimated impacts of the EAS are both insignificant. Therefore, although its impact may be overestimated, managers' expectations are useful for selecting an effective policy.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12515","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50148037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inferno: A guide to field experiments in online display advertising","authors":"Garrett A. Johnson","doi":"10.1111/jems.12513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12513","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Online display advertising is a hostile medium for field experiments. Display-ad effects are tiny and necessitate large-scale experiments. The experimenter has limited control because ad exposure is jointly determined by advertisers, users, algorithms, and market competition. As such, online display ads provide useful lessons for experimenters at the frontier of digital research more generally. Display-ad experiments place renewed focus on old topics like statistical power and compliance as well as on newer issues like identity fragmentation, experimental spillovers, and incrementality optimization. In this guide, I review these challenges, best practices, and new developments.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50142121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Platforms and the transformation of the content industries","authors":"Luis Aguiar, Imke Reimers, Joel Waldfogel","doi":"10.1111/jems.12519","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12519","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper discusses how digitization and the associated emergence of distribution platforms have affected product discovery, as well as new opportunities, in the content industries. First, we describe the traditional ways in which content creators reached consumers, as well as how platforms have transformed the product discovery process. Second, we present the promise and challenges of the information aggregation role that platforms perform, with discussions of both the positive effects of platform-collected product ratings, as well as the prevalence and implications of misleading information. Third, we describe the promise and challenges arising from platform curation and product recommendations, with a focus on the measurements of platform power as well as possible biases in platform product recommendations. Finally, we discuss how platforms may affect which sorts of products are produced in the first place.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12519","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123892227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Marc Bourreau, Rafael C. de M. Ferraz, Yann Ménière
{"title":"Licensing standard-essential patents with costly enforcement","authors":"Marc Bourreau, Rafael C. de M. Ferraz, Yann Ménière","doi":"10.1111/jems.12514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12514","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the interaction between the holder of a standard-essential patent (SEP) and two downstream firms using the patented technology to design standard-compliant products. The SEP holder approaches the downstream firms simultaneously in the shadow of patent litigation and is subject to fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licensing requirements. We show that the patent holder faces a litigation credibility constraint and a license acceptability constraint when setting its licensing terms. For patents of intermediate strength, there is no royalty that allows the patent holder to reconcile these constraints. Consequently, it cannot license its technology and must go to court against infringers. We show that the availability of an injunction improves the patent holder's ability to license its technology, but it tends to inflate the royalty rate for implementers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50127940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}