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Journal of Consciousness Studies最新文献

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Planta Sapiens: Unmasking Plant Intelligence by Paco Calvo and Natalie Lawrence 帕科-卡尔沃和娜塔莉-劳伦斯合著的《植物智人：揭开植物智慧的面纱》（Planta Sapiens: Unmasking Plant Intelligence
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.1.227
Uziel Awret
{"title":"Planta Sapiens: Unmasking Plant Intelligence by Paco Calvo and Natalie Lawrence","authors":"Uziel Awret","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.1.227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.1.227","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139891023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Simple, Testable Mind–Body Solution? 简单、可测试的心身解决方案？
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.1.051
Mostyn Jones
{"title":"A Simple, Testable Mind–Body Solution?","authors":"Mostyn Jones","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.1.051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.1.051","url":null,"abstract":"Neuroelectrical panpsychism (NP) offers a clear, simple, testable mind–body solution. It says that everything is at least minimally conscious, and electrical activity across separate neurons creates a unified, intelligent mind. NP draws on recent experimental evidence to address\u0000 the easy problem of specifying the mind's neural correlates. These correlates are neuroelectrical activities that, for example, generate our different qualia, unite them to form perceptions and emotions, and help guide brain operations. NP also addresses the hard problem of why minds accompany\u0000 these neural correlates. Here, the real nature of matter-energy (beyond how it appears to sense organs) is consciousness that occupies space, exerts forces, and unites neuroelectrically to form minds. This doesn't reduce consciousness to observable neural activities, nor posit any radically\u0000 different entities. NP also deals with panpsychism's combination problem by explaining how the mind's subject and experiences arise by electrically combining simple experiences in brains.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139871445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The 'No-Supervenience' Theorem and its Implications for Theories of Consciousness 无超验 "定理及其对意识理论的启示
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.1.138
Catherine M. Reason
{"title":"The 'No-Supervenience' Theorem and its Implications for Theories of Consciousness","authors":"Catherine M. Reason","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.1.138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.1.138","url":null,"abstract":"The 'no-supervenience' theorem (Reason, 2019; Reason and Shah, 2021) is a proof that no fully self-aware system can entirely supervene on any objectively observable system. I here present a simple, non-technical summary of the proof and demonstrate its implications for four separate\u0000 theories of consciousness: the 'property dualism' theory of David Chalmers; the 'reflexive monism' of Max Velmans; Galen Strawson's 'realistic monism'; and the 'illusionism' of Keith Frankish. It is shown that all are ruled out in their current form by the no-supervenience theorem, except\u0000 for Chalmers' theory, which I show requires humans to behave irrationally.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139814513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Measuring Phenomenal Consciousness in Delirium: The New Black 测量谵妄中的现象意识：新的黑色
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.1.031
E. Eeles, Andrew Teodorczuk, N. Dissanayaka
{"title":"Measuring Phenomenal Consciousness in Delirium: The New Black","authors":"E. Eeles, Andrew Teodorczuk, N. Dissanayaka","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.1.031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.1.031","url":null,"abstract":"Delirium has conventionally been considered a disorder of consciousness, but this remains a relatively unexamined precept. First, a review of the role of consciousness disruption in delirium is revised from an historical and diagnostic perspective. Second, consciousness measurement\u0000 in routine assessment of delirium is considered. Conscious levels, comprising alertness and arousal, are most commonly used but are not representative of the multidimensionality of consciousness. Third, a justification for the exploration of phenomenal consciousness is presented. Three candidate\u0000 dimensions of phenomenal consciousness are identified as the pre-reflective state, phenomenal experience, and reflective thought. Finally, the clinical implications of a deeper understanding of delirium through measurement of phenomenal consciousness is considered.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139815775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Panexperientialism and Radical Emergence 潘恩经验主义与激进崛起
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.1.149
William S. Robinson
{"title":"Panexperientialism and Radical Emergence","authors":"William S. Robinson","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.1.149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.1.149","url":null,"abstract":"Panexperientialists hold that experience is a fundamental feature of our universe, and that their view avoids radical emergence by providing an intelligible ground for our human experiences. This paper argues that they face a radical emergence problem of their own, and that they can\u0000 avoid radical emergence only by adopting a strategy that can also be used by dualists (whose view they reject). It also argues that panexperientialists must either hold that all experiential properties they regard as simple must have been actually instantiated since the earliest days of our\u0000 universe, or accept radical emergence, or avoid radical emergence by a strategy that can also be adopted by dualists.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139827534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Measuring Phenomenal Consciousness in Delirium: The New Black 测量谵妄中的现象意识：新的黑色
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.1.031
E. Eeles, Andrew Teodorczuk, N. Dissanayaka
{"title":"Measuring Phenomenal Consciousness in Delirium: The New Black","authors":"E. Eeles, Andrew Teodorczuk, N. Dissanayaka","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.1.031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.1.031","url":null,"abstract":"Delirium has conventionally been considered a disorder of consciousness, but this remains a relatively unexamined precept. First, a review of the role of consciousness disruption in delirium is revised from an historical and diagnostic perspective. Second, consciousness measurement\u0000 in routine assessment of delirium is considered. Conscious levels, comprising alertness and arousal, are most commonly used but are not representative of the multidimensionality of consciousness. Third, a justification for the exploration of phenomenal consciousness is presented. Three candidate\u0000 dimensions of phenomenal consciousness are identified as the pre-reflective state, phenomenal experience, and reflective thought. Finally, the clinical implications of a deeper understanding of delirium through measurement of phenomenal consciousness is considered.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139875611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Introspection in Emotion Research: Challenges and Insights 情感研究中的自省：挑战与启示
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.1.076
Leiszle Lapping-Carr, Alek E. Krumm, Cody Kaneshiro, C. Heavey
{"title":"Introspection in Emotion Research: Challenges and Insights","authors":"Leiszle Lapping-Carr, Alek E. Krumm, Cody Kaneshiro, C. Heavey","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.1.076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.1.076","url":null,"abstract":"Introspection, or looking inward to observe one's experience, is inherent in many methods used to study feelings, the experiential component of emotion. Challenges of introspection make faithful, high-fidelity descriptions of feelings difficult to attain. A method that (1) cleaves to\u0000 a specific moment, (2) cleaves to pristine inner experience, (3) brackets presuppositions, and (4) utilizes an iterative process may be particularly well suited to this task. We review some contemporary introspective methods from the perspective of these four methodological constraints, finding\u0000 that Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) addresses the constraints most fully. We present DES findings on feelings to highlight the unique contributions careful introspective methods make to emotion science. High-fidelity descriptions of feelings are necessary for a complete understanding\u0000 of emotion.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139816150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Seeking the Neural Correlates of Awakening 寻找觉醒的神经相关性
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.1.173
Julien Tempone-Wiltshire
{"title":"Seeking the Neural Correlates of Awakening","authors":"Julien Tempone-Wiltshire","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.1.173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.1.173","url":null,"abstract":"Contemplative scholarship has recently reoriented attention towards the neuroscientific study of the soteriological ambition of Buddhist practice, 'awakening'. This article evaluates the project of seeking neural correlates for awakening. Key definitional and operational issues are\u0000 identified demonstrating that: the nature of awakening is highly contested both within and across Buddhist traditions; the meaning of awakening is both context- and concept-dependent; and awakening may be non-conceptual and ineffable. It is demonstrated that operationalized secular conceptions\u0000 of awakening, divorced from soteriological and cultural factors, have little relationship to traditional Buddhist construct(s) of awakening. This article identifies methodological issues for secular conceptions of awakening concerning introspection and neuroimaging yet demonstrates also the\u0000 value of recent advancements in empirical first-person phenomenology for attenuating introspective bias. Overall, it is contended that significant problems arise when decontextualizing awakening and placing it within a scientific naturalistic framework. Careful attention to the definitional,\u0000 operational, and methodological neuroscientific obstacles identified herein is required in the responsible approach to the investigation of awakening states.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139818471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Planta Sapiens: Unmasking Plant Intelligence by Paco Calvo and Natalie Lawrence 帕科-卡尔沃和娜塔莉-劳伦斯合著的《植物智人：揭开植物智慧的面纱》（Planta Sapiens: Unmasking Plant Intelligence
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.1.227
Uziel Awret
{"title":"Planta Sapiens: Unmasking Plant Intelligence by Paco Calvo and Natalie Lawrence","authors":"Uziel Awret","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.1.227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.1.227","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139831235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What Self in Self-Organization? Engaging Varela's Epistemology for the Co-embodied Self 自我组织中的什么自我？参与瓦雷拉的共生自我认识论
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2023-12-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.11.080
Miriam Kyselo
{"title":"What Self in Self-Organization? Engaging Varela's Epistemology for the Co-embodied Self","authors":"Miriam Kyselo","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.11.080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.11.080","url":null,"abstract":"I focus on an early article by Francisco Varela, 'Not One, Not Two' (1976), to argue that his non-dualistic epistemology entails a paradigm shift towards a fundamentally co-embodied, and thus social, view of self. Varela argued that the mind–body duality could be resolved by understanding\u0000 the mind as embodied. Both Varela and Evan Thompson have later elaborated on this and suggested an enactive, essentially embodied view of the self in terms of selforganized, organismic autonomy. I will argue that the enactive view of the self remains ambiguous with regards to the role of social\u0000 interactions: are they constitutive for the minimal self-organization of the self or do they only play a shaping, secondary factor? I rely on Varela's epistemology in 'Not One, Not Two' to support my argument that the minimal self-organizational network that is the human self entails both\u0000 individual bodily and joint co-embodied processes so that the self is already and constitutively social.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138609356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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