Intentional Feelings, Practical Agency, and Normative Commitments

IF 1.6 4区 心理学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Mary Carman
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

A dominant approach to conceptualizing a role for emotions in practical agency has been to focus on a relation between emotions and reasons, whereby emotions are claimed to track reason-giving considerations via their intentional content. Yet, if we reflect on the phenomenology of emotional consciousness and take seriously a growing consensus that emotions involve intentional feelings then, I argue, such a reason-tracking approach at best only provides part of the story and at worst is fundamentally misguided. This does not mean that emotion has no role in practical agency, however. I tentatively propose that the normative category of commitments offers a promising alternative for thinking about the role of emotions in practical agency, an alternative that has the potential to do justice to intentional feelings while avoiding the problems of a reason-tracking approach.
意向感、实践代理和规范承诺
概念化情绪在实践能动性中的作用的一种主要方法是关注情绪和原因之间的关系,通过这种关系,情绪被声称通过其有意的内容来跟踪理性给予的考虑。然而,如果我们反思情绪意识的现象学,并认真对待情绪涉及有意感受这一日益增长的共识,那么,我认为,这种原因追踪方法充其量只是提供了故事的一部分,最坏的情况是从根本上被误导了。然而,这并不意味着情感在实际代理中没有作用。我暂时建议,规范性承诺类别为思考情感在实际代理中的作用提供了一个很有前途的替代方案,这种替代方案有可能公正对待有意的感受,同时避免原因跟踪方法的问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
14.30%
发文量
58
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