个人意向性与情绪体验的理解

IF 1.6 4区 心理学 0 PHILOSOPHY
S. Arnaud, Kathryn Pendoley
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们应该如何解释情感的定性方面呢?强意向性为这种解释提供了一个有希望的途径。根据强意向性理论,精神状态的现象学完全由该状态的意向性内容决定。鉴于许多关于情感的观点都认为情感的意向性和现象学是密切相关的,这使得强意向性成为一条特别有前途的道路。然而,强烈的意向性很少为情感辩护,我们认为,在它存在的地方,它无法解释。本文提出了一种新的关于情感的强意向性解释形式。我们称之为个人意向性。根据这一观点,情绪的质的特征完全由情绪的意向性内容决定。根据一个人的关心和关注,以及一个人的其他精神状态,这些内容在个体之间和个体内部都是不同的。我们评估它与意识理论的兼容性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Personal Intentionalism and the Understanding of Emotion Experience
How should we seek to account for the qualitative aspect of emotion? Strong intentionalism presents one promising avenue for such an account. According to strong intentionalism, the phenomenology of a mental state is entirely determined by that state's intentional content. Given that many views of the emotions have it that the intentionality and phenomenology of the emotions are very closely related, this makes strong intentionalism an especially promising route. However, strong intentionalism has rarely been defended for emotions and, we argue, where it has, it has failed to be explanatory. This paper proposes a new explanatory form of strong intentionalism about emotion. We call it personal intentionalism. According to this view, the qualitative features of emotion are fully determined by the emotion's intentional content. This content varies inter- and intraindividually, according to one's cares and concerns, as well as one's other mental states. We assess its compatibility with theories of consciousness.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
14.30%
发文量
58
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