ERKENNTNISPub Date : 2023-11-06DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00750-y
Henrik Rydéhn
{"title":"Opaque Grounding and Grounding Reductionism","authors":"Henrik Rydéhn","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00750-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00750-y","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article aims to contribute to the largely neglected issue of whether metaphysical grounding – the relation of one fact’s obtaining in virtue of the obtaining of some other (or others) – can be given a reductive account. I introduce the notion of metaphysically opaque grounding , a form of grounding which constitutes a less metaphysically intimate connection than in standard cases. I then argue that certain important and interesting views in metaphysics are committed to there being cases of opaque grounding and demonstrate that four representative accounts of grounding available in the literature are unable to accommodate such cases. This is argued to constitute a problem for those accounts that is likely to extend to other possible reductive accounts of grounding that employ the popular strategy of explaining grounding in terms of other hyperintensional phenomena. Unless the reductionist is willing to opt for some sophisticated modalist account, the possibility of opaque grounding cases thus provides indirect support for primitivism about grounding, a view that has previously been widely embraced but rarely supported by argument.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135679138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERKENNTNISPub Date : 2023-10-28DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00743-x
Sebastian Schmidt
{"title":"Correction: Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence","authors":"Sebastian Schmidt","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00743-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00743-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"198 10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136159304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERKENNTNISPub Date : 2023-10-13DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00715-1
Tim Henning
{"title":"Wissenschaftsfreiheit, Moralische Kritik und die Kosten des Irrtums","authors":"Tim Henning","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00715-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00715-1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article attempts to do justice to two conflicting positions in current public debates. On the one hand, it defends a strong version of scientific freedom, according to which science should be free, not only from external obstacles and pressures but also from criticism that is based on reasons “of the wrong kind.” The only admissible criterion in debates about scientific claims, I argue, is whether there is sufficient evidence for their truth. Furthermore, I accept the anti-moralistic view that (non-)conformity with moral ideals is never itself evidence. On the other hand, the article nevertheless argues that there is a possibility of legitimate moral criticism of moral claims. This argument relies on the popular (if controversial) idea that there is pragmatic encroachment – specifically, the idea that the standard of sufficiency for evidence is in part determined by pragmatic factors like the costs of error. This opens up the door for a certain type of legitimate moral criticism. For the costs that determine a standard of sufficiency for epistemic justification can also plausibly count as morally significant. There is thus a con-contingent connection between epistemic and moral defects of certain scientific claims. The resulting view is applied to concrete debates, most importantly about race, genetics and IQ.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135918510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERKENNTNISPub Date : 2023-10-13DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00742-y
Michael Klenk, Ibo van de Poel
{"title":"Not a Good Fix: Constitutivism on Value Change and Disagreement","authors":"Michael Klenk, Ibo van de Poel","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00742-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00742-y","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We examine whether Thomsonian constitutivism, a metaethical view that analyses value in terms of ‘goodness-fixing kinds,’ i.e. kinds that themselves set the standards for being a good instance of the respective kind, offers a satisfactory explanation of value change and disagreement. While value disagreement has long been considered an important explanandum, we introduce value change as a closely related but distinct phenomenon of metaethical interest. We argue that constitutivism fails to explain both phenomena because of its commitment to goodness-fixing kinds. Constitutivism explains away disagreement and at best explains the emergence of new values, not genuine change. Therefore, Thomsonian constitutivism is not a good fix for realist problems with explaining value disagreement, and value change.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135918792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERKENNTNISPub Date : 2023-10-13DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00746-8
Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz
{"title":"The Value of Evidence and Ratificationism","authors":"Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00746-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00746-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In sequential decision problems, an act of learning cost-free evidence might be symptomatic, in the sense that performing this act itself provides evidence about states of the world it does nothing to causally promote. It is well known that orthodox causal decision theory, like its main rival evidential decision theory, may sanction such acts as rationally impermissible. This paper shows that, under plausible assumptions, a minimal version of ratificationist causal decision theory, known as principled ratificationism, fares better in this respect, for it never labels symptomatic acts of learning cost-free evidence as rationally impermissible.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135858015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERKENNTNISPub Date : 2023-10-13DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00741-z
Michal Masny
{"title":"Junk, Numerosity, and the Demands of Epistemic Consequentialism","authors":"Michal Masny","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00741-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00741-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135918810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERKENNTNISPub Date : 2023-10-10DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00733-z
Alexander W. Kocurek
{"title":"Verbal Disagreement and Semantic Plans","authors":"Alexander W. Kocurek","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00733-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00733-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136352421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERKENNTNISPub Date : 2023-09-02DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00740-0
R. De Clercq
{"title":"The Empty World as the Null Conjunction of States of Affairs","authors":"R. De Clercq","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00740-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00740-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73164273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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