IF 0.9 2区哲学

ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-11-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-024-00881-w

Anna Ichino, Ema Sullivan-Bissett

{"title":"Conspiracy Beliefs and Monothematic Delusions: A Case for De-pathologizing.","authors":"Anna Ichino, Ema Sullivan-Bissett","doi":"10.1007/s10670-024-00881-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-024-00881-w","url":null,"abstract":"Monothematic delusions and beliefs in conspiracy theories share some important features: they both typically have bizarre contents and are resistant to counterevidence. Yet conspiracy beliefs are generally taken to be a normal range phenomenon, whilst monothematic delusions are considered to involve doxastic pathology. In this paper, we argue that this difference in conceptualization is not warranted, and that, if we're right, the correct response is to de-pathologize monothematic delusions. We identify three reasons which could justify taking monothematic delusions to be pathological beliefs whilst not treating conspiracy beliefs in such terms. First, we consider what have been identified as initial provoking conditions in monothematic delusions (anomalous experience) and conspiracy beliefs (epistemic mistrust). Second, we consider the role of cognitive biases or deficits in these phenomena. Third, we consider the different roles played by testimony and one's social environment in the formation and maintenance of monothematic delusions and conspiracy beliefs. We argue that there are no grounds from any of these quarters for the different approaches taken with respect to the question of doxastic pathology. Our primary conclusion then is that monothematic delusions and conspiracy beliefs should be treated the same in this respect. Our secondary conclusion is that the correct way to do so is to de-pathologize monothematic delusions.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"91 1","pages":"285-310"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12775038/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145935493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Hilbert's Early Metatheory Revisited. 希尔伯特早期元理论重访。

IF 0.9 2区哲学

ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-05-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-025-00959-z

Eduardo N Giovannini, Georg Schiemer

引用次数: 0

Concept(s) of Health: Lifestyle at the Heart of Modern Health. 健康的概念：生活方式在现代健康的心脏。

IF 0.7 2区哲学

ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-025-00971-3

Kevin Reuter, Andrew J Latham, Somogy Varga

引用次数: 0

Psychiatry as Mind-shaping. 精神病学作为心智塑造。

IF 0.7 2区哲学

ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-12-16 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-024-00908-2

Jodie Louise Russell

{"title":"Psychiatry as Mind-shaping.","authors":"Jodie Louise Russell","doi":"10.1007/s10670-024-00908-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-024-00908-2","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that psychiatric researchers, clinicians, and the wider public actively regulate the minds of individuals with mental disorder through the prescriptive processes of mind-shaping (see Andrews in South J Philos 53:50-67, 2015a; Andrews in Philos Explor 18(2):282-296, 2015b; McGeer, in: Folk psychology re-assessed, Springer, Berlin, 2007; McGeer in Philos Explor 18:259-281, 2015; Mameli in Biol Philos 16(5):595-626, 2001; Zawidzki in Philos Explor 11(3):193-210, 2008; Zawidzki, in: Kiverstein (ed) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind, Taylor and Francis Group, London, 2016). Consequently, all those with a vested interest in the language of mental disorder should take a critical and dialogical approach in how concepts of psychopathology are developed, disseminated and used. Mind-shaping describes how our folk-psychological categorizations actively regulate the behaviour of those categorized. This is done through setting certain norms, which can be achieved through the application of folk-psychological concepts. I argue that psychiatry has embedded norms and goals in its activities that are non-epistemic in nature and these are not only bound up in disorder concepts, but also in the social roles that clinicians, researchers and patients play. In this way, psychiatry uses folk-psychological type tools for the social understanding of individuals with mental disorder, and the application of these tools also helps it meet these non-epistemic goals. Given this, I characterise psychiatry as partaking in mind-shaping. When we characterise psychiatry as mind-shaping, we are then able to explain occurrences of looping effects between disorder categories and individuals categorized (Haslam in J Psychopathol 22(1):4-9, 2016) and provide a theoretical basis for the occurrence of hermeneutical injustice in the field of mental health.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":" ","pages":"493-516"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7618489/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145783364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Forward-Looking Concept Functions and the Function/Accident Distinction. 前瞻性概念功能与功能/事故区分。

IF 0.7 2区哲学

ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-05-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-025-00957-1

Aneta Zuber

引用次数: 0

Epistemic Rationality Begins Unreflectively. 认识理性开始于非反思。

IF 0.7 2区哲学

ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-025-00977-x

Giacomo Melis, Kirsten H Blakey

引用次数: 0

Common Belief and Make-Believe. 共同信念与假装。

IF 0.9 2区哲学

ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-05-08 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-025-00947-3

Merel Semeijn

引用次数: 0

Neo-Russellian Abstractionism. Neo-Russellian抽象派艺术。

IF 0.9 2区哲学

ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-025-00970-4

Bahram Assadian

引用次数: 0

Hyperintensionality for Logics. 逻辑的高密集性。

IF 0.7 2区哲学

ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-025-01047-y

Maria Beatrice Buonaguidi

{"title":"Hyperintensionality for Logics.","authors":"Maria Beatrice Buonaguidi","doi":"10.1007/s10670-025-01047-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-025-01047-y","url":null,"abstract":"A logic is said to be hyperintensional when it admits connectives or operators creating hyperintensional contexts, i.e. sentential contexts not respecting the intersubstitutivity salva veritate of co-intensionals. Odintsov and Wansing (J Philos Logic 50(1):33-56, 2021) suggest a formal criterion for classifying a logic as hyperintensional based on whether its consequence relation is self-extensional. I argue that satisfaction of Odintsov and Wansing's criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient for characterising a logic as hyperintensional. Indeed, the criterion classifies as hyperintensional logics which are not meant to capture hyperintensional behaviour, and fails to classify as hyperintensional logics which admit some forms of hyperintensional behaviour. I suggest several possible criteria for a logic to count as hyperintensional, arguing that each of them corresponds to a different understanding of hyperintensionality for logics. Then, I weigh these criteria against a family of logics, which display different \"nuances\" of hyperintensional behaviour. Finally, I gesture towards a diagnosis of hyperintensionality for logics.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"91 7","pages":"3367-3398"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC13638694/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149116748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Revised Reward Theory of Desire. 修正的欲望奖励理论。

IF 0.9 2区哲学

ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-02-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-025-00932-w

Jeremy Pober

{"title":"The Revised Reward Theory of Desire.","authors":"Jeremy Pober","doi":"10.1007/s10670-025-00932-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-025-00932-w","url":null,"abstract":"I propose and articulate a novel theory of desire, called the Revised Reward Theory. As the name suggests, the theory is based-and expands-on Arpaly and Schroeder's (2014) Reward Theory of Desire. The initial Reward Theory identifies desires with states of the reward learning system such that for an organism to desire some P is for its reward system to treat P as a reward upon receipt. The Revised Reward Theory identifies desires with a different state of the same system, such that for an organism to desire some P is for its reward system to expect or predict that P will be rewarding (roughly) prior to receipt. The difference amounts to equating desires with what we ultimately find rewarding or satisfying versus those that underlie our motivations to obtain that which we take ourselves to desire. I argue that the structure of the reward system is incompatible with the original Reward Theory but compatible with the Revised Reward Theory. I demonstrate that this difference has important philosophical implications. I focus on moral responsibility and demonstrate Arpaly and Schroeder's argument, that addiction can mitigate moral responsibility, turns on this precise difference. Arpaly, Schroeder, and I all ascribe to a meta-theory called 'natural kindism' which identifies mental kinds with neurocognitive kinds. This discussion, in addition to defending a theory of desire, is intended to act as a proof of concept for natural kindism as offering a powerful framework for relating empirical results to philosophical issues.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"91 2","pages":"787-806"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12799666/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145991498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

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