ERKENNTNISPub Date : 2025-01-01Epub Date: 2023-09-04DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00730-2
Hein Duijf
{"title":"A Logical Study of Moral Responsibility.","authors":"Hein Duijf","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00730-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-023-00730-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper proposes a logical framework for studying the structure of moral responsibility for outcomes. The analysis incorporates two vital features: an agency condition and a negative condition of an alternative possibility. The logical language allows us to identify and disambiguate seven plausible criteria for moral responsibility. To accommodate interdependent decision contexts, the semantics are given in terms of so-called responsibility games. The logical framework enables us to classify the logical relations between these seven criteria for moral responsibility. Although all seven criteria are logically distinct, I also identify circumstances where the seven criteria locally reduce to only three.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"59 1","pages":"999-1040"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11923040/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79018154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERKENNTNISPub Date : 2025-01-01Epub Date: 2024-03-08DOI: 10.1007/s10670-024-00794-8
Neil Levy
{"title":"No Trespassing! Abandoning the Novice/Expert Problem.","authors":"Neil Levy","doi":"10.1007/s10670-024-00794-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-024-00794-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The novice/expert problem is the problem of knowing which apparent expert to trust. Following Alvin Goldman's lead, a number of philosophers have developed criteria that novices can use to distinguish more from less trustworthy experts. While the criteria the philosophers have identified are indeed useful in guiding expert choice, I argue, they can't do the work that Goldman and his successors want from them: avoid a kind of testimonial scepticism. We can't deploy them in the way needed to avoid such scepticism, because it would take genuine expertise to do so. I argue that attempts to deploy them in this sort of deep way involve a kind of transgression akin to, and at least as unreliable as, epistemic trespassing. We should give up trying to solve the novice/expert problem and instead promote better epistemic trust.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"90 5","pages":"2077-2094"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12103344/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144152406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERKENNTNISPub Date : 2025-01-01Epub Date: 2023-04-20DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00687-2
David H Glass
{"title":"Information and Explanatory Goodness.","authors":"David H Glass","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00687-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-023-00687-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>I propose a qualitative Bayesian account of explanatory goodness that is analogous to the Bayesian account of incremental confirmation. This is achieved by means of a complexity criterion according to which an explanation <i>h</i> is good if the reduction in the complexity of the explanandum <i>e</i> brought about by <i>h</i> (the explanatory gain) is greater than the additional complexity introduced by <i>h</i> in the context of <i>e</i> (the explanatory cost). To illustrate the account, I apply it in the context of ad hoc hypotheses.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"1 1","pages":"111-124"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11799113/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73197854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERKENNTNISPub Date : 2025-01-01Epub Date: 2023-09-07DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00739-7
Salim Hirèche, Niels Linnemann, Robert Michels
{"title":"Are All Laws of Nature Created Equal? Meta-laws Versus More Necessary Laws.","authors":"Salim Hirèche, Niels Linnemann, Robert Michels","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00739-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-023-00739-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Two approaches to elevating certain laws of nature over others have come to prominence recently. On the one hand, according to the <i>meta-laws</i> approach, there are meta-laws, laws which relate to laws as those laws relate to particular facts. On the other hand, according to the <i>modal</i>, or <i>non-absolutist</i>, approach, some laws are necessary in a stricter sense than others. Both approaches play an important role in current research, questioning the 'orthodoxy' represented by the leading philosophical theories of natural laws-Humeanism, the DTA view, dispositional essentialism and primitivism. This paper clarifies the relations between these two emerging approaches, as well as their applicability to physical laws and the status of the challenges they pose for standard theories of laws of nature. We first argue that, despite some significant similarities between the two approaches (especially in the context of Lange's counterfactual account of laws), they are in general distinct and largely independent of each other. Then, we argue that the support for meta-laws from physical theory and practice is more questionable than usually presented.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"8 1","pages":"1041-1059"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11922965/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77252311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERKENNTNISPub Date : 2024-01-01Epub Date: 2022-06-21DOI: 10.1007/s10670-022-00536-8
Feraz Azhar, Alan H Guth, Mohammad Hossein Namjoo
{"title":"A Bayesian View on the Dr. Evil Scenario.","authors":"Feraz Azhar, Alan H Guth, Mohammad Hossein Namjoo","doi":"10.1007/s10670-022-00536-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00536-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In <i>Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief</i>, Adam Elga proposes and defends a principle of indifference for self-locating beliefs: if an individual is confident that his world contains more than one individual who is in a state subjectively indistinguishable from his own, then he should assign equal credences to the hypotheses that he is any one of these individuals. Through a sequence of thought experiments, Elga in effect claims that he can derive the credence function that should apply in such situations, thus justifying his principle of indifference. Here we argue, using a Bayesian approach, that Elga's reasoning is circular: in analyzing the third of his thought experiments, he uses an assertion that is justifiable only if one assumes, from the start, the principle of indifference that he is attempting to justify. We agree with Elga that the assumption of equal credences is a very reasonable principle, in the absence of any reason to assign unequal credences, but we do not agree that the equality of credences can be so derived.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"89 1","pages":"355-366"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10827816/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139674055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERKENNTNISPub Date : 2023-12-21DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00764-6
Jacob Berger
{"title":"A Higher-Order Account of the Phenomenology of Particularity","authors":"Jacob Berger","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00764-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00764-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"38 24","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138948785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERKENNTNISPub Date : 2023-12-18DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00765-5
Tom Kaspers
{"title":"The Practical Bearings of Truth as Correspondence","authors":"Tom Kaspers","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00765-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00765-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":" 18","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138964323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERKENNTNISPub Date : 2023-12-15DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00756-6
Anders Nes
{"title":"Why are Actions but not Emotions Done Intentionally, if both are Reason-Responsive Embodied Processes?","authors":"Anders Nes","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00756-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00756-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"11 15","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138970554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERKENNTNISPub Date : 2023-12-14DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00762-8
William A. Sharp
{"title":"Spectral Reflectances and Commensurateness","authors":"William A. Sharp","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00762-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00762-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"21 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139002985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}