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Conceptual Engineering Should be Empirical. 概念工程应该是经验的。
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-02-11 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-025-00923-x
Ethan Landes
{"title":"Conceptual Engineering Should be Empirical.","authors":"Ethan Landes","doi":"10.1007/s10670-025-00923-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-025-00923-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Conceptual engineering is a philosophical method that aims to design and spread conceptual and linguistic devices to cause meaningful changes in the world. So far, however, conceptual engineers have struggled to successfully spread the conceptual and linguistic entities they have designed to their target communities. This paper argues that conceptual engineering is far more likely to succeed if it incorporates empirical data and empirical methods. Because the causal factors influencing the successful propagation of linguistic or conceptual devices are as complicated and interwoven as they are, proper empirical research will greatly boost the likelihood that propagation is successful. In arguing for the superiority of empirical conceptual engineering over armchair-based conceptual engineering, this paper proposes a framework for understanding the causal forces at play in propagation. This is a three-part framework between the label of a lexical item, the psychological states associated with the lexical item, and the worldly things associated with the lexical item. By understanding the way causal forces affecting propagation play out at these three levels, conceptual engineers can better conceptualize, study, and harness the different causal forces affecting the success of their conceptual engineering projects.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"91 2","pages":"875-895"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12799735/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145991512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Simpler Representational Ground. 更简单的表象基础。
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-10-17 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-024-00875-8
Julio De Rizzo
{"title":"Simpler Representational Ground.","authors":"Julio De Rizzo","doi":"10.1007/s10670-024-00875-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-024-00875-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A common way of clarifying the notion of ground is by way of examples from logic: thus a conjunction is grounded in both of its conjuncts; a disjunction in each of its true disjuncts; a double negation in its negatum; and so on. Developing a semantics that accommodates these logical examples in full generality turned out to be a difficult task. In this paper, I develop a novel approach that substitutes fusion for a more discerning relation of combination between states in the framework of truth-maker semantics.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"90 8","pages":"3809-3832"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12715033/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145806030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Emotions Represent Evaluative Properties Unconsciously. 情绪无意识地表现了可评估的属性。
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-10-16 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-024-00873-w
Constant Bonard
{"title":"Emotions Represent Evaluative Properties Unconsciously.","authors":"Constant Bonard","doi":"10.1007/s10670-024-00873-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-024-00873-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Drawing on affective sciences, I argue that normally elicited emotions involve a component-the appraisal process-that represents evaluative properties unconsciously. More specifically, I argue that, given a substantial agreement in affective sciences about what emotions are, given broadly shared definitions of representation, evaluative properties, and unconsciousness, given how appraisals are conceptualized by most (neuro)psychological theories of emotion, and given empirical evidence about affective states elicited by stimuli perceived unconsciously, we are led to conclude that normally elicited emotions involve a component that represents evaluative properties unconsciously. In the last section, I assess which philosophical theories of emotions are in contradiction with my conclusion, ask whether it implies that emotions represent evaluative properties consciously as well, and discuss how it relates to the debate on unconscious emotions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"90 8","pages":"3783-3808"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12714768/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145806062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Logical Study of Moral Responsibility. 道德责任的逻辑研究。
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2023-09-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00730-2
Hein Duijf
{"title":"A Logical Study of Moral Responsibility.","authors":"Hein Duijf","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00730-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-023-00730-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper proposes a logical framework for studying the structure of moral responsibility for outcomes. The analysis incorporates two vital features: an agency condition and a negative condition of an alternative possibility. The logical language allows us to identify and disambiguate seven plausible criteria for moral responsibility. To accommodate interdependent decision contexts, the semantics are given in terms of so-called responsibility games. The logical framework enables us to classify the logical relations between these seven criteria for moral responsibility. Although all seven criteria are logically distinct, I also identify circumstances where the seven criteria locally reduce to only three.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"59 1","pages":"999-1040"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11923040/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79018154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On Logical and Scientific Strength. 论逻辑和科学的力量。
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-08-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-024-00835-2
Luca Incurvati, Carlo Nicolai
{"title":"On Logical and Scientific Strength.","authors":"Luca Incurvati, Carlo Nicolai","doi":"10.1007/s10670-024-00835-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-024-00835-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The notion of strength has featured prominently in recent debates about abductivism in the epistemology of logic. Following Timothy Williamson and Gillian Russell, we distinguish between logical and scientific strength and discuss the limits of the characterizations they employ. We then suggest understanding logical strength in terms of interpretability strength and scientific strength as a special case of logical strength. We present applications of the resulting notions to comparisons between logics in the traditional sense and mathematical theories.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"90 7","pages":"3101-3123"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12423185/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145066156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Failure to Comprehend Determinism or Failure to Measure Comprehension? Methodological Issues in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will. 未能理解决定论还是未能衡量理解？自由意志实验哲学中的方法论问题。
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-08-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-024-00844-1
Florian Cova, Tristan Martinez
{"title":"Failure to Comprehend Determinism or Failure to Measure Comprehension? Methodological Issues in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will.","authors":"Florian Cova, Tristan Martinez","doi":"10.1007/s10670-024-00844-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-024-00844-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In the past 20 years, experimental philosophers have been investigating folk intuitions about the compatibility of determinism with free will and moral responsibility using vignettes depicting agents in deterministic universes. However, recent research suggests that participants massively fail to understand these vignettes. Moreover, it has also been proposed that these comprehension errors might even be systematic and thus unavoidable, threatening the project of probing folk intuitions about free will and determinism through vignettes. Through five studies, we suggest that past studies have overestimated participants' failure to understand vignettes depicting deterministic universes, mainly by relying on unreliable samples and by using non-validated measures. We also show that using new vignettes that take more time to better describe what determinism is substantially reduces comprehension errors and their impact on participants' intuitions. We conclude that, at least in the current state of the art, skepticism about the possibility to probe folk intuitions about the compatibility of determinism with free will and moral responsibility through the use of vignettes is premature.</p><p><strong>Supplementary information: </strong>The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10670-024-00844-1.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"90 7","pages":"3215-3253"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12423183/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145066164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
No Trespassing! Abandoning the Novice/Expert Problem. 严禁擅闯!放弃新手/专家问题。
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-03-08 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-024-00794-8
Neil Levy
{"title":"No Trespassing! Abandoning the Novice/Expert Problem.","authors":"Neil Levy","doi":"10.1007/s10670-024-00794-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-024-00794-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The novice/expert problem is the problem of knowing which apparent expert to trust. Following Alvin Goldman's lead, a number of philosophers have developed criteria that novices can use to distinguish more from less trustworthy experts. While the criteria the philosophers have identified are indeed useful in guiding expert choice, I argue, they can't do the work that Goldman and his successors want from them: avoid a kind of testimonial scepticism. We can't deploy them in the way needed to avoid such scepticism, because it would take genuine expertise to do so. I argue that attempts to deploy them in this sort of deep way involve a kind of transgression akin to, and at least as unreliable as, epistemic trespassing. We should give up trying to solve the novice/expert problem and instead promote better epistemic trust.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"90 5","pages":"2077-2094"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12103344/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144152406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the Non-identity Causal Theory of Spacetime from Causal Set Theory. 从因果集论论时空的非恒等因果论。
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-08-29 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-024-00836-1
Rasmus Jaksland, Niels Linnemann
{"title":"On the Non-identity Causal Theory of Spacetime from Causal Set Theory.","authors":"Rasmus Jaksland, Niels Linnemann","doi":"10.1007/s10670-024-00836-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-024-00836-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The aim to provide a causal theory of spacetime is not new. The overall program, however, was largely deemed unsuccessful, chiefly due to criticism voiced by Smart (Monist 53:385-395, 1969), Nerlich (Br J Philos Sci 33(4):361-388, 1982) and Earman (Synthese 24:74-86, 1972). Recently, Baron and Le Bihan (Noûs 58:202-224, 2023) have argued that developments in contemporary physics should make us reconsider this verdict. More precisely, they argue the emergence of spacetime from causal set theory (CST), where \"the metric structure of spacetime can be recovered from its causal structure\" (Baron and Le Bihan 2023, 2), \"suggests a very natural way to reformulate the causal theory of spacetime\" (ibid., 9)-an account which they end up dubbing the non-identity causal theory. This paper questions the success of Baron and Le Bihan's non-identity theory. It is shown that (1) the specific grounding Baron and Le Bihan propose for timelike and spacelike relations is not plausible even when charitably reconstructed; and (2) that a causal theory of spacetime based on general relativity is just as successful for establishing a non-identity theory as a theory based on CST. In short then, we argue that the causal theory of spacetime proposed by Baron and Le Bihan is supported just as well (or badly) by the physics that already took centre stage in the original discussions of the causal theory of spacetime.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"90 8","pages":"3425-3446"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12715042/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145806037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Connexive Exclusion. Connexive排斥。
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-08-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-024-00842-3
Yaroslav Shramko, Heinrich Wansing
{"title":"Connexive Exclusion.","authors":"Yaroslav Shramko, Heinrich Wansing","doi":"10.1007/s10670-024-00842-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-024-00842-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We present a logic which deals with connexive exclusion. Exclusion (also called \"co-implication\") is considered to be a propositional connective dual to the connective of implication. Similarly to implication, exclusion turns out to be non-connexive in both classical and intuitionistic logics, in the sense that it does not satisfy certain principles that express such connexivity. We formulate these principles for connexive exclusion, which are in some sense dual to the well-known Aristotle's and Boethius' theses for connexive implication. A logical system in a language containing exclusion and negation can be called a logic of connexive exclusion if and only if it obeys these principles, and, in addition, the connective of exclusion in it is asymmetric, thus being different from a simple mutual incompatibility of propositions. We will develop a certain approach to such a logic of connexive exclusion based on a semantic justification of the connective in question. Our paradigm logic of connexive implication will be the connexive logic <math><mi>C</mi></math> , and exactly like this logic the logic of connexive exclusion turns out to be contradictory though not trivial.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"90 8","pages":"3371-3402"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12714820/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145806119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information and Explanatory Goodness. 信息和解释性。
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2023-04-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00687-2
David H Glass
{"title":"Information and Explanatory Goodness.","authors":"David H Glass","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00687-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-023-00687-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>I propose a qualitative Bayesian account of explanatory goodness that is analogous to the Bayesian account of incremental confirmation. This is achieved by means of a complexity criterion according to which an explanation <i>h</i> is good if the reduction in the complexity of the explanandum <i>e</i> brought about by <i>h</i> (the explanatory gain) is greater than the additional complexity introduced by <i>h</i> in the context of <i>e</i> (the explanatory cost). To illustrate the account, I apply it in the context of ad hoc hypotheses.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"1 1","pages":"111-124"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11799113/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73197854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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