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Tests of Animal Consciousness are Tests of Machine Consciousness 动物意识测试就是机器意识测试
2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00753-9
Leonard Dung
{"title":"Tests of Animal Consciousness are Tests of Machine Consciousness","authors":"Leonard Dung","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00753-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00753-9","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract If a machine attains consciousness, how could we find out? In this paper, I make three related claims regarding positive tests of machine consciousness. All three claims center on the idea that an AI can be constructed “ad hoc”, that is, with the purpose of satisfying a particular test of consciousness while clearly not being conscious. First, a proposed test of machine consciousness can be legitimate, even if AI can be constructed ad hoc specifically to pass this test. This is underscored by the observation that many, if not all, putative tests of machine consciousness can be passed by non-conscious machines via ad hoc means. Second, we can identify ad hoc AI by taking inspiration from the notion of an ad hoc hypothesis in philosophy of science. Third, given the first and the second claim, the most reliable tests of animal consciousness turn out to be valid and useful positive tests of machine consciousness as well. If a non-ad hoc AI exhibits clusters of cognitive capacities facilitated by consciousness in humans which can be selectively switched off by masking and if it reproduces human behavior in suitably designed double dissociation tasks, we should treat the AI as conscious.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"53 14","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134991733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Degrees of Moral Status: The Problem of Relevance and the Need for a Threshold 道德地位的程度:相关性问题和门槛的需要
2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00737-9
David Wendler
{"title":"Degrees of Moral Status: The Problem of Relevance and the Need for a Threshold","authors":"David Wendler","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00737-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00737-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"73 19","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134901277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How to Do Empirical Political Philosophy: A Case Study of Miller’s Argument for Needs-Based Justice 如何做经验主义政治哲学:以米勒的需求正义论为例
2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00747-7
Thomas Pölzler
{"title":"How to Do Empirical Political Philosophy: A Case Study of Miller’s Argument for Needs-Based Justice","authors":"Thomas Pölzler","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00747-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00747-7","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In recent years an increasing number of political philosophers have begun to ground their arguments in empirical evidence. I investigate this novel approach by way of example. The object of my case study is David Miller’s renewed empirical argument for a needs-based principle of justice. First, I introduce Miller’s argument. Then I raise four worries about the application of his methodology that give rise to corresponding general recommendations for how to do empirical political philosophy. Proponents of this approach should take care to (1) check for inappropriately narrow (and broad) samples, (2) verify studies’ relevance for their empirical hypotheses, (3) adjust their confidence to the available empirical evidence, and (4) properly integrate their hypotheses into their philosophical theorizing.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"59 23","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134901372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Topic Transparency and Variable Sharing in Weak Relevant Logics 弱相关逻辑中的主题透明与变量共享
2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2023-11-11 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00748-6
Thomas Macaulay Ferguson, Shay Allen Logan
{"title":"Topic Transparency and Variable Sharing in Weak Relevant Logics","authors":"Thomas Macaulay Ferguson, Shay Allen Logan","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00748-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00748-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"19 9","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135043055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reproductive Work and Productive Fairness 生殖工作和生产公平
2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2023-11-11 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00718-y
Serena Olsaretti
{"title":"Reproductive Work and Productive Fairness","authors":"Serena Olsaretti","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00718-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00718-y","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In academic and public debates, defenders of the case for sharing the costs of children often claim that by having and rearing children parents produce public goods for the rest of society, or perform socially valuable or necessary labour, and that it would be unfair to parents for others to not share the costs of children, for example through publicly funded parental leave and schools for this reason. Critics of the public goods argument have claimed that it fails because there is no defensible principle that can serve to buttress the claims of parents. Furthermore, these same critics, as well as others, have argued that a certain view of liberal equality militates against sharing the costs of children.This paper challenges both the contention that there is no defensible principle of fairness that can buttress the public goods argument and the contention that liberal equality militates against socialisation. It accomplishes these two tasks together, arguing that the ideal of equality of resources, rather than militating against socialisation, in fact grounds a principle of productive fairness that can serve as the normative premise of the public goods argument for sharing the costs of children.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"2 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135041825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Logical Instrumentalism and Anti-exceptionalism about Logic 逻辑的工具主义与反例外论
2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2023-11-07 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00752-w
Leon Commandeur
{"title":"Logical Instrumentalism and Anti-exceptionalism about Logic","authors":"Leon Commandeur","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00752-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00752-w","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper critically examines logical instrumentalism as it has been put forth recently in the anti-exceptionalism about logic debate. I will argue that if one wishes to uphold the claim that logic is significantly similar to science, as the anti-exceptionalists have it, then logical instrumentalism cannot be what previous authors have taken it to be. The reason for this, I will argue, is that as the position currently stands, first, it reduces to a trivial claim about the instrumental value of logical systems, and second, by its denial that logic aims to account for extra-systemic phenomena it significantly differs from science, in contrast with the AEL agenda. I will conclude by proposing a different kind of logical instrumentalism that I take to have a broad appeal, but especially for anti-exceptionalists, for it is developed as analogous to—and thus much closer aligned with—scientific instrumentalism.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"43 8","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135476026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Agnosticism-Involving Doxastic Inconsistency 不可知论——涉及自相矛盾的不一致
2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2023-11-06 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00745-9
Avery Archer
{"title":"Agnosticism-Involving Doxastic Inconsistency","authors":"Avery Archer","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00745-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00745-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"15 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135678971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Opaque Grounding and Grounding Reductionism 不透明的基础和基础还原论
2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2023-11-06 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00750-y
Henrik Rydéhn
{"title":"Opaque Grounding and Grounding Reductionism","authors":"Henrik Rydéhn","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00750-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00750-y","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article aims to contribute to the largely neglected issue of whether metaphysical grounding – the relation of one fact’s obtaining in virtue of the obtaining of some other (or others) – can be given a reductive account. I introduce the notion of metaphysically opaque grounding , a form of grounding which constitutes a less metaphysically intimate connection than in standard cases. I then argue that certain important and interesting views in metaphysics are committed to there being cases of opaque grounding and demonstrate that four representative accounts of grounding available in the literature are unable to accommodate such cases. This is argued to constitute a problem for those accounts that is likely to extend to other possible reductive accounts of grounding that employ the popular strategy of explaining grounding in terms of other hyperintensional phenomena. Unless the reductionist is willing to opt for some sophisticated modalist account, the possibility of opaque grounding cases thus provides indirect support for primitivism about grounding, a view that has previously been widely embraced but rarely supported by argument.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135679138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Correction: Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence 纠正:认识上的指责与证据的规范性
2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2023-10-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00743-x
Sebastian Schmidt
{"title":"Correction: Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence","authors":"Sebastian Schmidt","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00743-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00743-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"198 10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136159304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Wissenschaftsfreiheit, Moralische Kritik und die Kosten des Irrtums 科学自由，道德批评，错误的代价
2区 哲学
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2023-10-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00715-1
Tim Henning
{"title":"Wissenschaftsfreiheit, Moralische Kritik und die Kosten des Irrtums","authors":"Tim Henning","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00715-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00715-1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article attempts to do justice to two conflicting positions in current public debates. On the one hand, it defends a strong version of scientific freedom, according to which science should be free, not only from external obstacles and pressures but also from criticism that is based on reasons “of the wrong kind.” The only admissible criterion in debates about scientific claims, I argue, is whether there is sufficient evidence for their truth. Furthermore, I accept the anti-moralistic view that (non-)conformity with moral ideals is never itself evidence. On the other hand, the article nevertheless argues that there is a possibility of legitimate moral criticism of moral claims. This argument relies on the popular (if controversial) idea that there is pragmatic encroachment – specifically, the idea that the standard of sufficiency for evidence is in part determined by pragmatic factors like the costs of error. This opens up the door for a certain type of legitimate moral criticism. For the costs that determine a standard of sufficiency for epistemic justification can also plausibly count as morally significant. There is thus a con-contingent connection between epistemic and moral defects of certain scientific claims. The resulting view is applied to concrete debates, most importantly about race, genetics and IQ.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135918510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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