Journal of Political Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"Religion and the State: Types of Relations in the Religious Market","authors":"S. Gorokhov, R. Dmitriev, M. M. Agafoshin","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-65-79","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-65-79","url":null,"abstract":"The article presents the attempt of using the marketing paradigm in the analysis of state-confessional relations. Considering such relations through the prism of market structures, the authors identify three main types: religious monopoly, religious oligopoly, and religious monopolistic competition. Religious monopoly implies the dominance of one religion, which enjoys the full support of the state that protects it from competition from other religions. In the modern world, religious monopoly exists in two forms — closed and open, with the differences between the two lying in the degree of monopolization of the market by one of the confessions. According to the authors’ conclusion, the religious monopoly imposed from above (by the state) ultimately has a secular effect, reducing the level of participation of the population in religious activities and thereby weakening the monopoly of religion, which, in turn, can lead to the termination of state support for it. Religious oligopoly implies that several dominant religions or their branches that are equally supported by the state and have the same status compete in the market; the emergence of new ones is difficult (open oligopoly) or even seriously limited (closed oligopoly). Religious monopolistic competition is characterized by the inclusion in the process of competition not only of religions and their branches, but also religious denominations. Each of these “players” produces its own unique religious product and has relatively free access to the market of religions, which is almost not limited by the state. The proposed typology is historical in its nature, which makes it possible to predict the dynamics of state-confessional relations.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81602571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"New Forms of Employment and New Social Groups: Projection into Politics (Case of Spain)","authors":"S. Khenkin","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-179-196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-179-196","url":null,"abstract":"The post-industrial era that the modern world ushered in has radically changed the labor market structure. The share of population employed in primary (agriculture) and secondary (industry) economic sectors has noticeably decreased while the third (services) and fourth (education, science, and healthcare) sectors have gained significance and increased shares of employment. However, unlike the first sector and especially unlike the second sector, in which labor is almost always systemic, the third and fourth sectors possess a huge demand for unstable (flexible, unsustainable, atypical) forms of employment. Therefore, the social structure of the society has witnessed the emergence of a massive layer of population who is not permanently employed. This is the so-called precariat, deprived of stable social guaranties that the workers enjoyed in the industrial era. In this context the case of Spain is of interest, since it outpaces the majority of the European Union countries in terms of the share of atypical employment. The precarization in this country leaves a deep imprint on various spheres of the society, including the party-political system. Precariat demonstrates a whole gamut of reactions to the surrounding world — ranging from extreme apathy and alienation from the political system to different forms of activism. Nevertheless, the precariat is far from turning into the “class for itself”, as it does not have a specific political consciousness. Without making political demands and lacking organizations that promote their interests, the politically active precariat frequently uses new types of social movements organized by social networks in order to express its discontent. The Spanish experience demonstrates that, in general, unstable employment becomes a source of societal risks. The reduction of the scale of such employment is the imperative for that part of the ruling class that is seriously concerned with the nefarious implications of mass precarization.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90771854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Alternative for Germany: Between Conservatism and Right-Wing Populism","authors":"N. Rabotyazhev","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-158-178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-158-178","url":null,"abstract":"The rise of the right-wing populism has become a distinguishing feature of the political life of European countries at the beginning of the 21st century. Over the last 20—25 years, right-wing populist parties have turned from once marginal associations into an important component of the partypolitical system of the EU countries. The key components of the ideology of the parties of this type include ethno-cultural nationalism, anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-globalism, and euroscepticism. Similarly to other populists, their representatives claim to express the interests of the “true” people, which they understand as an organic unity that is opposed to the self-serving and morally degraded establishment. The German version of right-wing populism manifests itself in the Alternative for Germany (AfD), which stands somewhat apart from the European right-wing populist organizations and differs from most of them in its genesis. The AfD was founded in 2013 by the conservatives and national liberals and in the first few years of its existence it used to be in fact a national conservative eurosceptic party. Although later its right-wing component became stronger, the party still decisively dissociates itself from right-wing radicalism and denies any connection with the German right-wing tradition. The preservation of the national and cultural identity of Germany, the restriction of the influx of immigrants, the rejection of the euro and the transformation of the European Union into an association of sovereign states are among the most important AfD’s principles set out in the party platform. The electoral base of the AfD consists of those Germans who lose out from globalization, do not accept multiculturalism and are concerned about the influx of migrants from other cultures into Germany. The party is most popular in the eastern lands of Germany. In addition to the extreme right movement, which gravitates towards right-wing radicalism, the party also retains a moderate conservative one. Nevertheless, the AfD remains a party that no one wants to “shake hands” with and has almost no chance of entering power.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77066067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"After Political Religion: Special Aspects of Russian Post-Secularism","authors":"A. Matetskaya","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-48-64","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-48-64","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of a post-secular society proposed by Jurgen Habermas has become quite popular in Russia, and not only within the framework of scientific discourse. However, in the Russian context, the very concept of “post-secular” is most often interpreted through the prism of desecularization. According to the author’s conclusion, the special aspects of the religious revival in the country after the collapse of the Soviet regime can largely explain this. The article shows that the transition to a post-secular state in Russia included not only a rethinking of the perspectives of religion in a secular society and an awareness of the need for the participation of believers in public discussions, but also a change in the institutional position of religion, the rapprochement of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the authorities, the formation of a new idea of collective identity on the basis of Orthodoxy as the dominant confession, as well as an attempt to construct an official ideology, or a secular religion, an important element of which would be the symbolic heritage of Orthodoxy. Religion turned out to be in demand primarily for solving social and political problems: determining national specifics, reviving lost cultural traditions, and legitimizing political power. Religious revival in that form did not imply proper religious conversion and thus was not accompanied by a noticeable increase in real religiosity. The author explains the predominantly “secular” perception of the functions of religion by the authorities and a significant part of society by the legacy of the Soviet political religion, which pushed traditional religions with their transcendent sacred to the periphery of social life and gave rise to specific forms of the secular sacred.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79544142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Soviet Past Theme in the 2021 Duma Campaign","authors":"Y. Korgunyuk","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-105-129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-105-129","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the theme of the Soviet past in the 2021 Duma elections. The author shows that, in comparison with 2016, the relevance of this topic has not decreased, but has in fact increased. While in the previous Duma elections the confrontations on the issues of the Soviet past dissolved into broader cleavages, this time they manifested themselves very clearly. The author documents the change in the structure of the confrontations on the issues of the Soviet past. If a year earlier such confrontations ran along the lines of “Communists vs. Anti-Communists” and “Liberals vs. Statists”, in 2021 they rather went along the lines of “Defenders of the Soviet period vs. its Critics” and “Reds vs. Whites”, with communists surpassing liberals and assuming the leading role in such confrontations. The author explains this shift by the growing importance of the topic of the Soviet past in the interparty discussion, because it is the communists who are its main promoters and beneficiaries. The article reveals that the confrontation “Defenders of the Soviet period vs. its Critics” quite convincingly explains the second electoral cleavage. In one of the models, it even displaces the general confrontation between liberals and conservatives in the worldview issues. The use of an alternative methodology based on a double factor analysis allowed the author to detect the opposition “Communists vs. Liberals”, as well as an additional one associated with the special position of the Liberal Democratic Party on the issues of the Soviet past. These confrontations colored a number of electoral cleavages, including some of those that otherwise would be impossible to interpret politically. The author interprets an increase in the importance of the Soviet past in the mass consciousness as the evidence that the process of “Left vs. Right” confrontation shifting from the socio-economic area to the socio-cultural one, which is typical for the European and North American democracies, has partially affected Russia.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79215366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Hope from Despair*","authors":"Jakob Huber","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12283","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The public discourse on climate change has long centred around hope-based narratives pushed by both the media and mainstream environmentalist agents from Greenpeace and WWF to Bill Gates and Al Gore.1 The promises of scientific and technological advance in particular, they argue, give us reason to be hopeful that it is in our hands to halt the incipient climate catastrophe. We just need to roll up our sleeves and get on with it.</p><p>In the face of humanity’s apparent inability—on display most recently at COP26 in Glasgow—to adopt the ‘rapid and far-reaching changes in all aspects of society’ required to at least keep average global temperature increases below 1.5°C,2 this narrative has come under pressure. More radical climate activists make the case for an affective shift away from hope in the face of global warming towards darker attitudes such as anger, panic, or fear, or, most surprisingly perhaps, despair. The activist group Extinction Rebellion (XR) has arguably been the most vocal in their call for hope to ‘die’.3 Hope, they worry, obscures the truth about global warming as the single largest existential threat to the planet and hampers the kind of radical action that would be required at least to rein in its consequences. ‘In facing our climate predicament’, they argue, ‘there is no way to escape despair'.4</p><p>Reactions have been mixed, both from within and beyond the climate movement. While some fellow activists express enthusiasm about an explicit invocation of despair,5 others worry about its potentially stifling and depoliticizing effects on the public. According to the American scientist Michael Mann, the rhetoric of despair ‘is in many ways as pernicious as outright climate change denial, for it leads us down the same path of inaction’;6 writer and activist George Monbiot even considers succumbing to despair to be a moral failure.7 In the media, XR are frequently portrayed as the ‘eccentric and dangerous merchants of despair’.8</p><p>This discursive backlash chimes with a philosophical scepticism about despair that is both widespread and long-standing. According to Euripides’ Amphitryon, despair is the ‘mark of a worthless man’;9 Aquinas considers it ‘the greatest of sins’;10 Kant’s greatest worry is that we might ‘succumb to despair’ in the face of moral obligation;11 Charles Peirce equates despair with insanity.12 And contemporary philosophers juxtapose celebratory accounts of hope as a motivation and source of grit with a view of despair as unproductive, impotent, or nihilistic. Despairing agents, they argue, should either give up on the relevant end or cultivate an attitude, such as hope, that strengthens their resolve rather than undermining it.13 Unsurprisingly, political philosophers tend to agree that ‘a hopeful politics, one based upon a vision of generalized global prosperity and sustainability, best addresses the problems of climate change’.14</p><p>The aim of this article is to withstand this wholehearted rejecti","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jopp.12283","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50136931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Три лика Левиафана: рациональность, институты, идеи Коктыш К.Е. Дискурс рационализма, свободы и демократии. М.: МГИМО-Университет, 2021 _","authors":"N.N. Gudalov","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-191-201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-191-201","url":null,"abstract":"The monograph written by Kirill Koktysh is devoted to the issues of constructing languages of Political Science. These languages are diverse, but the author analyzes them through three basic concepts — rationalism, institutions and ideas. Masterfully combining a limited number of concepts, he builds a large-scale construction, showing in detail how one can study languages for describing politics. According to Koktysh, the rational is constructed by specific institutions. He identifies three institutions that go back to the three functions of the Indo-European gods, highlighted by Georges Dumézil. These institutions correspond to the three functions of politics — “leader” (makes decisions), “priest” (forms and maintains norms) and “merchant” (is engaged in economic reproduction). These institutions seek to extend their rationality to the society at large, using for this purpose three “big ideas” — order, justice, and freedom. According to the author’s conclusion, the institutions of the leader and the priest form the basis of stable social conditions — “political architectures”, and it is the relations between them that determine the specifics of such “architectures”. At the same time, the book pays attention not only to statics, but also to dynamics. The cognitive-structural method used by the author allows him to explore the transformations of the societies through the analysis of changes in rationalism, institutions and ideas. Koktysh’s book is valuable not only due to the novelty of its research question and fundamental nature, but also because it outlines important directions for further discussion. One of these directions concerns the popular criticism of the Enlightenment, with which the author agrees, as well as the justification for reducing rationality to mere derivatives of certain social contexts. Another direction for a discussion is about the evaluation of the Anglo-American model of democracy, which is denied the ability to produce generally valid meanings. In many ways, this book per se represents a significant contribution to a rational discussion of politics, convincingly demonstrating how complex and elusive the concepts of Political Science are.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76308723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Factor of Ethnicity in Voting at Local Level in Russia","authors":"A. Semenov","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-102-117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-102-117","url":null,"abstract":"Ethnicity, being one of the most important forms of selfidentification, plays a significant role in many political processes, including the electoral process. Many research articles document a systematic relationship between ethnic identity and voting. At the same time, there is a dearth of studies about the concrete mechanisms on how ethnicity and voting are connected at the individual level. The question of their efficiency remains debatable. In the article, based on the materials of the focus group discussions in small towns in five ethnic republics of the Russian Federation, the author analyzes such mechanisms and tries to assess their possible effects in the Russian context. The research study shows that the factor of ethnicity is very weak in voting at the local level. Although ethnic identification helps reduce information uncertainty due to the presence of the common cultural markers, these markers are not the only or even the priority basis for electoral choices — the socio-economic agenda and personal qualities of candidates are equally or even more important. Such mechanisms as group pressure and political machines that are driven by ethnicity almost fail to predict electoral behavior. The research findings call into question a number of conclusions based on the crosssectional analysis of aggregated data, indicating that even if ethnicity plays a role in voting, this role is mediated by other factors.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86378294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"On the Edge of the State: Political Formation of the Periphery of Power","authors":"L. Bliakher, K. Grigorichev, I. Peshkov","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-71-101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-71-101","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the analysis of a special political form that arises in the “empty space” on the “edge of the state”, where actors of power exist remotely, beyond the boundaries of the “emptiness”, but they can be materialized in it. The authors use the term “periphery of power” to describe this political form. The article shows that “empty space” is not a vacuum, but it does not contain what the observer (in this case, the authorities) expects to see, what he can read and comprehend as some kind of entity. It is the absence of the expected objects, actors and practices that makes the space “empty”. The paper verifies the hypothesis that, being “empty” for an observer, such space is populated and has authorities. Empirically, the study is based on the results of two field works to the upper Lena River. The territory has neither settlement structure nor legal economic activity, and the number of registered residents is minimal. The nearest authorities (police, environmental protection, municipal authorities, etc.) are located on the borders of the territory, and the distance to the nearest large city (Irkutsk) is 500—700 km. Nevertheless, the field work there revealed a fairly large community with its own hierarchy, stable forms of communication, legalization and mobilization of remote authorities. For members of this community, staying in the “empty territory” makes no sense from the economic point of view. They are registered in other places (district centers or other regional cities, including capitals) and represent relatively successful citizens. However, the city remains for them nothing else but a source of resources (material, financial, etc.). They live exactly in the “empty space”. Social networks are formed in it, statuses and communication are built, which can be turned into the space of power. The insights that the authors obtained give ground to assume that this process is not an outlier, but rather represented a more general process of separating a place to earn money and a place to live. According to their conclusion, while maintaining the current trends, the “exit space” documented by them will expand, forming more and more new forms of “emptiness”","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83445939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Political Conflicts between Governors and Regional Economic Elites (Case of the Republic of Karelia)","authors":"D. Stremoukhov","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-118-135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-118-135","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some regional entrepreneurs engage in conflicts with the heads of the subnational units of the Russian Federation within a system that puts economic elites in a deliberately unequal position in relation to the authorities? Based on the analysis of conflicts between governors and businessmen in Karelia, the author hypothesizes that contradictions around redistribution, combined with the availability of the independent resources e.g., branchy patronal networks, drive such confrontation. According to the author’s conclusion, the federal center also plays a significant role. When deciding whether to start confrontation with governors, regional actors could count on the support from Moscow and resignation of an undesirable regional leader. However, due to the peculiarity of the external environment, primarily institutional and informational, the rationality of such behavior often turns out to be low. The opaque informal rules, which electoral authoritarianism relies upon, affect the ability of actors to create adequate cognitive schemata. The informational environment, in which the regional elites operate, sends them unclear and contradictory signals about the limits of acceptable actions and their possible consequences. In turn, the formal preservation of an institution of elections and parties leads to the formation of identities that narrow the set of available behavioral strategies. The mechanism of mutual learning does not work either: under conditions when the resources available to counter-actors cannot be verified, and the rules of the game change with a governor’s turnover, reliance on the previous experience is fraught with strategic miscalculations.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83944162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}