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Personal connections, financial advisors and M&A outcomes 人脉、财务顾问和并购结果
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
Journal of Financial Research Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1111/jfir.12422
Dobrina Jandik, Tomas Jandik, Weineng Xu
{"title":"Personal connections, financial advisors and M&A outcomes","authors":"Dobrina Jandik,&nbsp;Tomas Jandik,&nbsp;Weineng Xu","doi":"10.1111/jfir.12422","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jfir.12422","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Personal connections (based on prior employment, educational, or social club membership overlaps) between top executives and board members of the bidding firm and those of the bidder financial advisor affect Mergers and Acquisition (M&amp;A) outcomes. M&amp;A deals where bidder top managers share past personal work-related connections with their advisors are associated with 1.7% lower bidder announcement returns compared to the returns for deals without such connections. We also show M&amp;A deals advised by personally connected financial advisors are more likely to be completed but take longer to get finalized. Last, when connections exist, the bidder CEO receives a higher cash bonus upon completion of the deal, and the financial advisors are rewarded by higher advisor fees. Overall, our findings suggest that personal connections between bidders and their financial advisors could be detrimental.</p>","PeriodicalId":47584,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Research","volume":"48 2","pages":"605-643"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jfir.12422","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141503764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Foreign corporations as large shareholders 外国公司作为大股东
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
Journal of Financial Research Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1111/jfir.12421
Fuxiu Jiang, Kenneth A. Kim, John R. Nofsinger, Bing Zhu
{"title":"Foreign corporations as large shareholders","authors":"Fuxiu Jiang,&nbsp;Kenneth A. Kim,&nbsp;John R. Nofsinger,&nbsp;Bing Zhu","doi":"10.1111/jfir.12421","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jfir.12421","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article, we examine foreign corporate shareholders in China. We find that they play an active and effective corporate governance role that improves firm performance. The results are robust to tests that address endogeneity, selection bias, and direction-of-causality concerns. The methods for which foreign corporations exert effective oversight are identified: (1) they actively and effectively monitor firms (i.e., they are more likely to fire [reward] managers for poor [good] firm performance), (2) they invest more in innovation, (3) they are better at selecting investment projects, and (4) they help generate more foreign sales.</p>","PeriodicalId":47584,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Research","volume":"48 2","pages":"877-904"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144214208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Social connections and information leakage: Evidence from target stock price run-up in takeovers 社会关系与信息泄露：来自收购中目标股价上涨的证据
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
Journal of Financial Research Pub Date : 2024-06-18 DOI: 10.1111/jfir.12420
Iftekhar Hasan, Lin Tong, An Yan
{"title":"Social connections and information leakage: Evidence from target stock price run-up in takeovers","authors":"Iftekhar Hasan,&nbsp;Lin Tong,&nbsp;An Yan","doi":"10.1111/jfir.12420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jfir.12420","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Does information leakage in a target's social networks increase its stock price prior to a merger announcement? Evidence reveals that a target with more social connections indeed experiences a higher pre-announcement price run-up. This effect does not exist during or after the merger announcement, or in windows ending two months before the announcement. It is more pronounced among targets with severe asymmetric information, and weaker when the information about the upcoming merger is publicly available prior to the announcement. It is also weaker in expedited deals such as tender offers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47584,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Research","volume":"48 2","pages":"645-672"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144213993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Asset versus equity acquisitions by financial institutions 金融机构的资产收购与股权收购
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
Journal of Financial Research Pub Date : 2024-06-16 DOI: 10.1111/jfir.12415
Jennifer Brodmann, Charles Armah Danso, Surendranath Rakesh Jory, Thanh Ngo
{"title":"Asset versus equity acquisitions by financial institutions","authors":"Jennifer Brodmann,&nbsp;Charles Armah Danso,&nbsp;Surendranath Rakesh Jory,&nbsp;Thanh Ngo","doi":"10.1111/jfir.12415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jfir.12415","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the impact of asset versus equity acquisitions in generating firm value for financial institutions. We find that acquirers experience statistically and economically significantly higher cumulative abnormal returns in asset acquisitions compared to equity acquisitions. We analyze the announcement-period returns and find that investors' reaction to asset acquisitions by financial institutions is met more favorably than are equity acquisitions. When employing the difference-in-differences approach, we find that asset acquisitions entail improved operating performance.</p>","PeriodicalId":47584,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Research","volume":"48 1","pages":"387-423"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jfir.12415","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143638665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Distracted institutional shareholders and debt maturity 机构股东分心和债务到期
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
Journal of Financial Research Pub Date : 2024-06-14 DOI: 10.1111/jfir.12419
Adrian (Wai Kong) Cheung, Joye Khoo, Rui Wang
{"title":"Distracted institutional shareholders and debt maturity","authors":"Adrian (Wai Kong) Cheung,&nbsp;Joye Khoo,&nbsp;Rui Wang","doi":"10.1111/jfir.12419","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jfir.12419","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine whether institutional shareholders’ distraction affects corporate debt maturity decisions. We find that firms with distracted shareholders are associated with lengthened debt maturity. The effect becomes stronger for firms with high information asymmetry or those with high levels of financial constraint. When distraction is high and debt maturity is low, firms hold more cash and use that cash in value-destroying acquisitions. This supports the prevalence of agency problems when institutional shareholders are distracted. The impact of distraction is persistent and affects the debt maturity decision in the future. Our findings are robust to endogeneity and other concerns.</p>","PeriodicalId":47584,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Research","volume":"48 2","pages":"545-577"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141340268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The threat of voiced shareholder disapproval and the value of voting 股东表达反对的威胁和投票的价值
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
Journal of Financial Research Pub Date : 2024-06-07 DOI: 10.1111/jfir.12417
Justin Balthrop, Jonathan Bitting
{"title":"The threat of voiced shareholder disapproval and the value of voting","authors":"Justin Balthrop,&nbsp;Jonathan Bitting","doi":"10.1111/jfir.12417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jfir.12417","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study how granting shareholders an advisory compensation vote affects the subsequent demand for shareholder voting rights. We find that the voting premium decreases when shareholders are given the right to disapprove firm compensation plans, consistent with shareholders preemptively negotiating concessions, which results in a diminished need to use their votes. Potential concessions extend beyond compensation; firms that experience a decrease in voting premiums also experience changes to investment and dividend policy, as well as the number of independent directors. The same firms experience positive abnormal stock returns over the following year.</p>","PeriodicalId":47584,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Research","volume":"48 2","pages":"473-502"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jfir.12417","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144213834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Who can see the iceberg's peak? How icebergs are used by information and liquidity traders 谁能看到冰山的顶峰？信息和流动性交易者如何利用冰山
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
Journal of Financial Research Pub Date : 2024-06-04 DOI: 10.1111/jfir.12414
Paul Lajbcygier, Van Hoang Vu
{"title":"Who can see the iceberg's peak? How icebergs are used by information and liquidity traders","authors":"Paul Lajbcygier,&nbsp;Van Hoang Vu","doi":"10.1111/jfir.12414","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jfir.12414","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Iceberg orders are partially disclosed limit orders that only reveal a small portion of their hidden volume at any time. Once traded, the iceberg order automatically replenishes until all its hidden volume executes. Consistent with theory, icebergs appeal to both information and liquidity traders. Information traders place orders at aggressive prices in the limit order book, which transact immediately as marketable orders. Liquidity traders use non-aggressive orders, which sit on the book as limit orders. Iceberg traders adjust the aggressiveness of their orders as market conditions change. We find the market discovers iceberg orders through repeated replenishments.</p>","PeriodicalId":47584,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Research","volume":"48 1","pages":"227-265"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jfir.12414","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141266705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Model for optimizing lender's decision on dealing with collateral of defaulted mortgage 优化贷款人处理违约抵押贷款抵押品决策的模型
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
Journal of Financial Research Pub Date : 2024-06-04 DOI: 10.1111/jfir.12416
Shu Ling Chiang, Ming Shann Tsai
{"title":"Model for optimizing lender's decision on dealing with collateral of defaulted mortgage","authors":"Shu Ling Chiang,&nbsp;Ming Shann Tsai","doi":"10.1111/jfir.12416","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jfir.12416","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article, we describe a comprehensive model for obtaining a critical gross recovery rate (GRR) for the short sale of a defaulted mortgage. Our model includes the following factors: settlement period, settlement cost, discounted sale/auction price, opportunity cost, failure probability of the short sale, and lender's willingness for the short sale. The results show that using the short sale yields a lower settlement cost, shorter settlement period, but higher loss given default (LGD). The real GRR of a short sale is about 8%–9% less than the critical GRR calculated from our model. This means the lender's willingness for the short sale is high in reality. The sensitivity analyses show that the lender's likelihood of approving a short sale is low if the settlement cost, contract rate, interest rate, and failure probability of the short sale are high. The greater the expected LGD of a foreclosure, the stronger the lender's willingness to approve the short sale. Also, a higher GRR of short sale leads to a lower expected LGD of short sale. This increases the probability of approval for the short sale. Finally, the Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) program helped struggling homeowners successfully use a short sale as an alternative to foreclosure, but the HAFA program became less effective as housing prices went up. Our model and analyses should help lenders make the optimal decision about how to efficiently deal with the collateral from a defaulted mortgage to mitigate their LGD.</p>","PeriodicalId":47584,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Research","volume":"48 2","pages":"785-806"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141265885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Organizational capital and private placements of common equity 组织资本和普通股私募
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
Journal of Financial Research Pub Date : 2024-06-02 DOI: 10.1111/jfir.12418
Oneil Harris, Thanh Ngo
{"title":"Organizational capital and private placements of common equity","authors":"Oneil Harris,&nbsp;Thanh Ngo","doi":"10.1111/jfir.12418","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jfir.12418","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the impact of organizational capital (OC) on the performance of firms that engage in private equity placements. We document larger discounts in stock sales where issuers have more OC, which suggests that private equity investors demand a higher risk premium to compensate for OC risk. We also find the private placements completed by high-OC issuers elicit more favorable announcement-period returns and superior postissue performance than those completed by low-OC issuers. These findings are consistent with the certification hypothesis and support research showing that OC improves firm efficiency and productivity. Our study sheds light on the importance of OC as a determinant of issuer outcome in private stock sales. Overall, our empirical results imply that OC reflects value-relevant information that is consistent with certification benefits.</p>","PeriodicalId":47584,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Research","volume":"48 2","pages":"807-837"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141273801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
VC ownership post-IPO: When, why, and how do VCs exit? 首次公开募股后的风险投资所有权：风险投资何时、为何、如何退出？
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
Journal of Financial Research Pub Date : 2024-05-28 DOI: 10.1111/jfir.12412
Anup Basnet, Kuntara Pukthuanthong, Harry Turtle, Thomas Walker
{"title":"VC ownership post-IPO: When, why, and how do VCs exit?","authors":"Anup Basnet,&nbsp;Kuntara Pukthuanthong,&nbsp;Harry Turtle,&nbsp;Thomas Walker","doi":"10.1111/jfir.12412","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jfir.12412","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the evolution of lead venture capital firm (VC) ownership after their portfolio companies (PCs) are publicly listed. We find that, on average, lead VCs retain their shares for three years post-IPO. Higher liquidity pressure and better stock market performance lead to faster VC exits, while higher VC reputation, better VC monitoring, and higher quality PCs lead to slower exits. VCs mostly use sales in the open market, share distributions, and mergers and acquisitions to divest their shares. Higher liquidity pressure incentivizes VCs to use majority share distributions, while better stock market performance increases their preference for continuous sales.</p>","PeriodicalId":47584,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Research","volume":"48 1","pages":"73-102"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jfir.12412","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141196716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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