CEO prior uncertainty and pay–performance sensitivity

IF 1.5 3区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Jiyoon Lee
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

A CEO's pay–performance sensitivity (PPS) is higher in the first year of their tenure than in the following years. I explain this finding with reference to chief executive officer (CEO) prior uncertainty: Because of information asymmetry and/or uncertainty about the quality of the match between a CEO and a firm, first-year compensation is often arranged to depend largely on performance. Consistent with this explanation, CEOs with higher prior uncertainty exhibit higher first-year PPS. Also, PPS is higher for outsider CEOs than insider CEOs. Among outsider CEOs, first-year PPS is lower for former executives of large public firms. An insider CEO's service time in a firm before becoming the CEO reduces first-year PPS.

CEO先验不确定性与薪酬绩效敏感性
CEO的薪酬绩效敏感性(PPS)在其任期的第一年高于随后的几年。我用首席执行官(CEO)先前的不确定性来解释这一发现:由于信息不对称和/或首席执行官与公司之间匹配质量的不确定性,第一年的薪酬通常在很大程度上取决于业绩。与这一解释相一致的是,先前不确定性较高的ceo第一年表现出更高的PPS。此外,外部ceo的PPS也高于内部ceo。在外部ceo中,大型上市公司前任高管的第一年PPS较低。内部CEO在成为CEO之前在公司的服务时间会减少第一年的PPS。
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来源期刊
Journal of Financial Research
Journal of Financial Research BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Journal of Financial Research(JFR) is a quarterly academic journal sponsored by the Southern Finance Association (SFA) and the Southwestern Finance Association (SWFA). It has been continuously published since 1978 and focuses on the publication of original scholarly research in various areas of finance such as investment and portfolio management, capital markets and institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and capital investment. The JFR, also known as the Journal of Financial Research, provides a platform for researchers to contribute to the advancement of knowledge in the field of finance.
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