Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"Grounding physicalism and ‘Moorean’ connections","authors":"Alex Moran","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2253863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2253863","url":null,"abstract":"Grounding physicalism is the doctrine that mental properties are metaphysically grounded in underlying physical properties. The present paper develops a novel challenge to this view derived from two main claims: one of them concerning the natures of phenomenal properties, the other concerning the relation between grounding and essence. The central goal of the paper is to explain how grounding physicalists can meet this challenge by means of appealing to grounding laws, thereby making room for ‘Moorean’ connections between distinct types of property.","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135943956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Duties of social identity? Intersectional objections to Sen’s identity politics","authors":"Alex Madva, Katherine Gasdaglis, Shannon Doberneck","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2270527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2270527","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTAmartya Sen argues that sectarian discord and violence are fueled by confusion about the nature of identity, including the pervasive tendency to see ourselves as members of singular social groups standing in opposition to other groups (e.g. Democrat vs. Republican, Muslim vs. Christian, etc.). Sen defends an alternative model of identity, according to which we all inevitably belong to a plurality of discrete identity groups (including ethnicities, classes, genders, races, religions, careers, hobbies, etc.) and are obligated to choose, in any given context, which among our multiple affiliations to prioritize. While Sen’s model of discrete identity prioritization is a clear advance over single-factor accounts, it overlooks significant lessons about identity from over 150 years of scholarship by feminists of color. In ignoring the experiences of women of color, Sen’s model falsely assumes that identities are in-principle separable for the purposes of practical deliberation; and, in obligating individuals to make such identity-based ‘reasoned choices,’ Sen’s model forces those with multiply marginalized identities to choose from a set of externally defined identity options, none of which sufficiently captures their experiences.KEYWORDS: Social IdentityAmartya Senintersectionalityfeminism AcknowledgmentsThis paper has benefited greatly from audiences at the Mind, Language, and Social Change Conference in Knoll Farm, VT in August 2021, especially from Gabbrielle Johnson, Kate Ritchie, Umrao Sethi, Rima Basu, Jessica Moss, Michael Brownstein, Daniel Kelly, Ellen Fridland, Daniel Harris, Jonathan Phillips, and Peter Epstein; at the Philosophy of Social Science Roundtable in Vancouver in May 2017, especially from Fiona Jenkins, Georgie Warnke, and Derick Hughes; and at the Pacific Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association in April 2015, where Ranjoo Herr provided extremely helpful and incisive commentary.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Among work contemporaneous with Sen’s, and as we will gesture toward in §6, we are most sympathetic with, and influenced by, Alcoff (Citation2006; but see also Afshar, Aitken, and Franks Citation2005; Appiah Citation2007; Barvosa Citation2008; Phillips Citation2009; Warnke Citation2008).2 Sen’s Identity and Violence is cited over 5,550 times on Google Scholar but typically just in passing or sloganized form. We cite theorists who engage more carefully with his work on identity in what follows.3 We find this example phenomenologically implausible (must a person choose rather than discover their rooting preference?) and return to related concerns in §2.2.4 See Wills (Citation2018) for discussion of the shortcomings of class-reductionist readings of Marx. Wills (Citation2018, 236, original emphasis) also draws a key distinction between class exploitation and ‘classism’: ‘Workers do experience ‘classism’ – oppression on the basis of their workin","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135995970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Nothing explains essence","authors":"Taylor-Grey Miller","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2269576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2269576","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTI argue that there is significant pressure to adopt a domain-fixing conception of essence if one wants to vindicate the claim that essentialist facts are proper ends of metaphysical explanation. I then argue that the zero-ground account best accommodates a domain-fixing view. I then respond to a number of objections to the zero-ground account and show how they can be met. I conclude that there is good reason to give the zerogrounding view more serious attention than it has received.KEYWORDS: EssencegroundexplanationZero-Groundmodality Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 For discussion of fundamentality see Fine (Citation2001), Schaffer (Citation2010), Bennett (Citation2017) and Sider (Citation2011), among others.2 For discussion of zero-grounding see Fine (Citation2012), Litland (Citation2017), Donaldson (Citation2017), Muñoz (Citation2020), and more recently, Kappes (Citation2020a; Citation2020b; Citation2022). The notion of being generated from nothing may be stronger in the case of grounding than in corresponding case of theorems. Given that validity is monotonic, it follows that a theorem is also derivable from any set of premises. But because ground is not monotonic, it may turn out that a zero-grounded fact is only grounded in the zero-ground.3 I’m not the first to advance the zero-grounding view in relation to the explanatory distinctiveness of the essentialist facts. Miller (Citation2022) and Kappes (Citation2020a) both argue that this view is motivated by taking the essentialist facts to play the role of explanatory links. These sorts of considerations will not play a particularly significant role in the argument of this paper.4 I borrow this term from Raven (Citation2020).5 In particular that it is asymmetric, transitive, irreflexive. We thus obtain a partial ordering over the domain of facts. I note the standard assumptions here to help the reader gain a sense of what grounding is supposed to be, although nothing I say in what follows hangs on these assumptions being wholly vindicated across all instances of grounding. I also take partial ground to be definable in terms of full ground. P is a partial ground for Q just in case P on its own or together with some other facts fully grounds Q. See Fine (Citation2012, 50).6 See e.g., Mason’s (Citation1967) translation of the Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence p. 13–17 for a rich expression of Leibniz’s view.7 One must, however, be careful here. On this framing, it appears that objects can have essences without existing which engages with some rather delicate issues about being, existence, and quantification, the discussion of which lie beyond the scope of the present paper. In particular, such a conception appears in tension with what Williamson calls the being constraint. Roughly, the being constraint says that having properties requires existence, and it corresponds model-theoretically to the domain constraint; that all predicate e","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135994900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Encapsulation, inference and utterance interpretation","authors":"Nicholas Allott","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2267084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2267084","url":null,"abstract":"While utterance interpretation is standardly understood as context-sensitive inference, there are prima facie reasons to doubt it is fully unencapsulated. First, utterance interpretation is normally fast and automatic, while it has been argued that unencapsulated processes are slow and reflective. Secondly, certain illusions appear to show that the processing of utterances is unrevisable in light of further information. I argue that these reasons are not conclusive, and utterance interpretation relies on indefinite tracts of background knowledge and contextual information.","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135853009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why Twitter does not gamify communication","authors":"Jacob Browning, Zed Adams","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2261489","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2261489","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTA central question for understanding social media platforms is whether the design of these systems is itself responsible for the harmful effects they have on society. Do these systems push users toward unhealthy forms of engagement? Is there something inherently toxic about the design that distorts who we are when we use it? In a recent paper, Thi Nguyen argues that the design of Twitter is responsible for many of its most toxic outcomes. Nguyen’s argument is based on an analogy between Twitter and games. He argues that Twitter’s game-like features encourage users to rack up Likes and Retweets rather than engaging in the rich and subtle activity of communication. For Nguyen, this drive for high scores leads to many of the toxic effects of the platform. In this paper, we critique Nguyen’s argument. We contend that, in a crucial respect that matters, Twitter is not game-like. We show that the apparent plausibility of Nguyen’s argument rests upon overlooking this crucial disanalogy. Moreover, drawing out how Nguyen’s analogy breaks down makes clear not just that his account fails to explain Twitter’s toxicity, but also that it actively occludes the design choices that have negative effects on its users.KEYWORDS: Social mediaphilosophy of technologynormativity of artifactsargument by analogy Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Unless noted, all emphases are in original.2 Another objection might arise at this point: what if there are games that do not have constitutive rules that sculpt temporary agency? This is an interesting objection, but it is first-and-foremost an objection to Nguyen’s account of games. If there are games that do not have constitutive rules that sculpt temporary agency, Nguyen would have to draw his proposed analogy between Twitter and games somewhere else.","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135855207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Precis of prejudice: a study in non-ideal epistemology","authors":"Endre Begby","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2269228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2269228","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis article provides an overview of ideas and arguments developed in my book Prejudice: A Study in Non-Ideal (Oxford University Press, 2021; paperback edition, 2022).KEYWORDS: Epistemologysocial epistemologynon-ideal epistemoloyepistemic rationalityprejudice Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 To be clear, this is not meant to tell us anything about whether particular prejudiced individuals are justified in believing as they do, whether particular kinds prejudiced beliefs are typically justified, and so on. Indeed, part of the point of the book is to discourage these sorts of questions: for virtually any class of beliefs, the question of whether a subject is justified in having such beliefs can only be answered after careful examination of their evidential situation and their cognitive processing. Given the proper methodology, we should not expect broad generalizations at this level. More about this in my response to Thomas Kelly below.2 Moreover, reflection suggests that even true beliefs can be prejudicially deployed in context, as I argue in Begby (Citation2021, 10–11).3 Indeed, on my view, stereotype-reasoning just is the manifestation of categorization in the domain of social cognition. To argue that our cognition should only ever track individuals qua individuals is basically to give up on the idea of social cognition altogether.4 Recall Fricker’s stipulation that ‘[t]he idea of a prejudice is […] most naturally interpreted […] as a judgement made or maintained without proper regard to the evidence’ (Fricker Citation2007, 32–33, my emphasis.)5 The fact that so-called ‘looping effects’ (cf. Haslanger Citation2011, 196–198, drawing on Hacking Citation1999) might be in play here, does nothing to change the fact that these observations might nonetheless constitute evidence.6 More about this in my response to Giulia Napolitano below.7 Note the echoes of Gordon Allport’s view (Citation1954, 9) that ‘[p]rejudgments become prejudices only if they are not reversible when exposed to new knowledge. A prejudice, unlike a simple misconception, is actively resistant to all evidence that would unseat it’.8 In particular, it helps shed light on the phenomenon of ‘echo chamber construction’, as argued in Nguyen (Citation2020).9 The mechanics of evidential preemption is further discussed in my response to Thomas Kelly below.10 These issues receive further discussion in my response to Renee Jorgensen below.11 Correspondingly, when we talk about ‘algorithmic bias’, it seems natural to assume that the phenomenon arises specifically from the deployment of algorithms in decision making (perhaps computerized algorithms, in particular).12 On this, see Begby (Citation2018). In the book (Begby Citation2021, 161–163), I explore and cautiously endorse the possibility that the considerations levied by moral encroachment are good ones: the only problem is that they don’t, strictly speaking, bear on belief, b","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135854082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A monstrous account of non-deictic readings of complex demonstratives","authors":"Joan Gimeno-Simó","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2267099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2267099","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTComplex demonstratives are often seen as a source of trouble for the idea that demonstratives are directly referential. Several authors have provided an array of counterexamples that preclude us from treating complex demonstratives as devices of direct reference, since they could hardly be considered rigid designators. In this paper I argue that a revision of the classic theories can accommodate all the counterevidence from non-deictic uses of complex demonstratives. Namely, I argue that the two chief objections that have been posed to the traditional picture, the so-called ‘quantification in’ and ‘no demonstration, no speaker reference’ problems, can be given a unified solution by treating them as instances of monstrous quantification into the character of the term.KEYWORDS: Rigid designationdirect referencemonstersindexicalityquantifying in AcknowldgementsI wish to thank Derek Ball, María de Ponte, Manuel García-Carpintero, Stefano Predelli and Jordi Valor for their comments on earlier versions of this paper, and to an anonymous reviewer for a very thorough and constructive report.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 It is in this sense that the nominal can be said to contribute to character. In these theories, the character of a complex demonstrative of the form ⟦that P⟧ is not a function F such that, for each context c, f(c) = dc, but rather a proper subfunction of F: one whose domain only includes contexts c such that ⟦P⟧(<wc, tc>)(dc) = 1. The character of any complex demonstrative is always given by a subfunction of F, and the role of the nominal is to determine exactly which of these subfunctions is to be selected.2 The validity of these arguments is debatable (cf. Braun Citation2008a, 70, footnotes 20–24), but this is not in conflict with the kind of approach advocated by c-theorists.3 Predelli (Citation2001) has posed a challenge to c-theories based on anaphora, but I have argued elsewhere that the counterevidence he points out can be given an alternative explanation (Gimeno-Simó Citation2021).4 King (Citation2001) also provides some syntactic evidence that seems to point towards the idea that complex demonstratives are quantifiers, but it has been subject to severe criticism (Altshuler Citation2007).5 Some defenders of the traditional paradigm have tried to explain away these readings by arguing that complex demonstratives can act as ‘stylistically altered definite descriptions’ (Dever Citation2001, 286; Salmon Citation2002, 522; Citation2006a, 446; Citation2006b, 272, footnote 11; Corazza Citation2003, 272; Georgi Citation2012). These ambiguity theories have been severely criticised by Ethan Nowak (Citation2014; Citation2021a; Citation2022).6 Notice in fact that the problem can be posed without even resorting to the third sentence in (18): (18*) [A student]1 was sitting in the library. Another student was sitting across from her1.Who is the referent of ‘her’ on this occasio","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136210505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Towards an account of basic final value","authors":"Timothy Perrine","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2262758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2262758","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTOrdinary and philosophical thought suggests recognizing a distinction between two ways something can be of final value. Something can be of final value in virtue of its connection to other things of value (‘non-basic final value’) or something can be of final value regardless of its connection to other things of value (‘basic final value’). The primary aim of this paper is to provide an account of this distinction. I argue that we have reason to draw this distinction as it helps avoid certain problems. I criticize accounts of this distinction due to Warren Quinn, Fred Feldman, and Michael Zimmerman. I then provide my own positive account which incorporates several of the insights of those accounts while avoiding their pitfalls. I conclude by relating my account to issues concerning partiality and appropriate attitudes.KEYWORDS: Final valuebasic final valuepro-attitudesFred FeldmanMichael Zimmerman Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1 As the examples illustrate, by things of value, I have in mind facts, events, states of affairs, or ways the world could be. I don’t have in mind specific concrete objects, like a frying pan. See fn. 3 for further relevant discussion.2 See, for instance, Brentano (Citation1902, 15f.), Ross (Citation1939, 279, 282), Ewing (Citation1947, 146ff.) Chisholm (Citation1986, 47ff.), Anderson (Citation1993, 2–3), Lemos (Citation1994, 6ff.), Scanlon (Citation1998, 78ff.), Zimmerman (Citation2001), Audi (Citation2004, 125). Merely maintaining that there is a substantive normative connection in no way identifies which property cluster is more fundamental. Further, this assumption does not require the particular kind of buck-passing popularized by Scanlon that is open to the wrong kind of reason objection. For a discussion of this last point, see Zimmerman (Citation2010).3 I focus on relationships between states of affairs of final value. Some authors might be interested in the relationships between concrete things that are of final value. For instance, Langton (Citation2007) suggests that something—e.g. a wedding ring—might be of final value but in virtue of something else—e.g., a personal relationship (see also Korsgaard (Citation1983)). These cases are sometimes called cases of ‘extrinsic final value,’ since the wedding ring is of final value, but the ‘source’ of its value is extrinsic to it. Since these cases involve individual objects, they are not the focus of my discussion. It’s an interesting question how exactly views about extrinsic final value interact with my proposals here. I don’t see any grand conflict. After all, if an object is of extrinsic final value, there’s a state of affairs about that object and its source of value that is, presumably, of final value. But I hope to explore this question in future work. For a negative view of how they might interact, see Bradley (Citation2006); for a critical discussion of extrinsic final value in general, see Tucker","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135408864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Substructural heresies","authors":"Bogdan Dicher","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2254816","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2254816","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis paper discusses two revisionary views about substructurality. The first attempts to reduce the structural features of a logic to properties of its logical vocabulary. It will be found to be untenable. The second aims to separate the structural features of a logic from the properties of logical consequence and to reinterpreted them as sui generis proof resources. I will argue that it is a viable path for a renewed understanding of substructurality.KEYWORDS: Substructural logiclogical consequencesequents Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 These ‘collections’ can be sequences (lists), multisets (lists with repetitions but without order), sets simpliciter, etc. A full characterisation of a sequent (in a specific calculus) requires the specification of their precise mathematical nature. But here we allow, in principle, variations of the components of the sequents. Therefore generality is preferable to precision hence the use of the term ‘collection’ – with the caveat that the default choice will be to treat collections as sets.2 I follow the usual notational conventions and use minuscules from the second half of the Latin alphabet as sentential variables. Majuscules, with or without superscripts, from the beginning of the alphabet are metavariables ranging over sentential variables while those from its end range over collections (see the previous note) of formulae.3 An anonymous referee points out that the same view appears in Sambin, Battilotti, and Faggian (Citation2000). I am not convinced that this is the position advocated in that paper. The matter deserves more attention than I can give it here, but the following passage from Sambin, Battilotti, and Faggian (Citation2000) seems to be decisive for the overall understanding of their position: ‘It is an ambition of basic logic to offer a new perspective and new tools to the search for unity in logic. …[O]ur plan is to look for the basic principles and structures common to many different logics. So one aim is to obtain each specific logic by the addition of rules concerning exclusively the structure (i.e. structural rules dealing only with assertions), while keeping the logic of propositions (i.e. operational rules dealing with logical constants) absolutely fixed’. I take this to indicate a commitment to the priority of the structural level over the operational one which is quite antithetical to A-heresy.4 Henceforth I will use ‘structural property’ and ‘structural rule’ interchangeably. Each structural rules generates a structural property and each structural property correlates in some way with a structural rule.5 By ‘set-theoretic aggregate’ I mean any kind of collection that can be represented within set-theory; that includes sequences, multisets, sequences of set-theoretic aggregates, etc. For the most part, however, I will represent these using the set-theoretic accolades.6 See note 16 for details and examples.7 A model is a ","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135199759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"AI and bureaucratic discretion","authors":"Kate Vredenburgh","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2261468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2261468","url":null,"abstract":"Algorithmic decision-making has the potential to radically reshape policy-making and policy implementation. Many of the moral examinations of AI in government take AI to be a neutral epistemic tool or the value-driven analogue of a policymaker. In this paper, I argue that AI systems in public administration are often better analogised to a street-level bureaucrat. Doing so opens up a host of questions about the moral dispositions of such AI systems. I argue that AI systems in public administration often act as indifferent bureaucrats, and that this can introduce a problematic homogeneity in the moral dispositions in administrative agencies.","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135200472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}