Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"Value alignment, human enhancement, and moral revolutions","authors":"Ariela Tubert, Justin Tiehen","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2261506","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2261506","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTHuman beings are internally inconsistent in various ways. One way to develop this thought involves using the language of value alignment: the values we hold are not always aligned with our behavior and are not always aligned with each other. Because of this self-misalignment, there is room for potential projects of human enhancement that involve achieving a greater degree of value alignment than we presently have. Relatedly, discussions of AI ethics sometimes focus on what is known as the value alignment problem, the challenge of how to build AI that acts in accordance with our human values. We argue that there is an especially close connection between solving the value alignment problem in AI ethics and using AI to pursue certain forms of human enhancement. But in addition, we also argue that there are important limits to what kinds of human enhancement can be pursued in this way, because some forms of human enhancement—namely moral revolutions—involve a kind of value misalignment rather than alignment.KEYWORDS: Artificial intelligencehuman enhancementmoral revolutions AcknowledgementsBoth authors would like to thank the National Endowment for the Humanities for support for their work, the University of Puget Sound and the John Lantz Senior Fellowship for Research or Advanced Study, and the participants at the Philosophy, AI, and Society Workshop at Stanford University. Ariela Tubert would like to thank the audience at the Ethics and Broader Implications of Technology Conference at the University of Nebraska at Lincoln.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See for instance Russell (Citation2019), Christian (Citation2020), Gabriel (Citation2020), Wallach and Vallor (Citation2020).2 Appiah (Citation2010). See also Baker (Citation2019).3 Russell and Norvig (Citation2010).4 Gershman (Citation2021, 156) makes this point while arguing that the ‘folklore’ about how machine learning has its origins in neuroscience overstates the level of influence neuroscience has actually had.5 See for instance Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (Citation1982), Kahneman and Tversky (Citation2000), Kahneman (Citation2011).6 Lieder et al. (Citation2019).7 Lieder et al. (Citation2019, 1096).8 Lieder and Griffiths (Citation2019). The notion of ‘rational analysis’ is drawn from Anderson (Citation1990).9 This is a point of focus in Griffiths (Citation2020).10 Lieder et al. (Citation2019, 1096).11 Lieder et al. (Citation2019, 1096). On gamification and AI more generally, see Deterding et al. (Citation2011).12 Chasse (Citation2021).13 Lieder et al. (Citation2019).14 Sinnott-Armstrong (Citation2008).15 Tversky and Kahneman (Citation1981).16 As Kühberger (Citation2017, 79) notes, the effect is robust and has been replicated across hundreds of papers.17 Kahneman and Tversky (Citation1979).18 Sometimes this point is used as part of an argument that we should be skeptical of moral facts at all, but this move requires a further","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135579780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Who whom? Uptake and radical self-silencing","authors":"Maximilian de Gaynesford","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2261500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2261500","url":null,"abstract":"Radical self-silencing is a particular variety of speech act disablement where the subject silences themselves, whether knowingly or not, because of their own faults or deficiencies. The paper starts with some concrete cases and preparatory comments to help orient and motivate the investigation. It then offers a summary analysis, drawing on a small number of basic concepts to identify its five individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions and discriminating their two basic forms, ‘internalist’ and ‘externalist’. The paper then explicates and defends what has been proposed, where the most salient and pressing objections concern the use of two basic concepts: ‘uptake’ and ‘silencing’. Finally, the paper gives a longer-term motivation for deepening our understanding of radical self-silencing, what it is, and what it implies.","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135579774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Uptake and refusal","authors":"Quill R Kukla","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2258207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2258207","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTDiscussions of uptake in the philosophy of language focus our attention on what role other people have in fixing the import, success, influence and social life of a speech act. The general idea in most discussions of uptake, despite their differences and disagreements, is whether and how an audience is cooperative or uncooperative when a speaker plays a critical role in how speech acts function. This essay is primarily concerned with “refusals”, or uncooperative uptakes. The essay analyzes the varieties of refusal; when refusal is possible why it might be challenging and when it is ethical. It examines how and when the uptake of a speech act can constitute the pragmatic form and force of the original speech act.KEYWORDS: Uptake; refusal; speech act theory; discursive injustice; sexual consent Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 We can think of this point as an extension of Grice’s famous development of the maxims of conversation (Grice Citation1975). Grice argued that in functional conversations, responses are always semantically constrained: the content of our responses needs to be relevant, informative, and so forth. We can add that our responses are also pragmatically constrained; which responsive actions count as felicitous will be shaped by the original speech act, in its the social and material context.2 McDonald (Citation2021) claims that any constitution that goes beyond ratification is impossible, because speaking is the exercise of a normative power, and exercising normative power necessarily requires intentional will. So, performing any speech act you did not intend is impossible. But I am not sure why I should accept that we can exercise normative powers only intentionally, nor that, when we do, the exercise must go exactly as I intended. As I already pointed out near the start of this essay, speech acts have all kinds of normative effects that I did not intend! When I say, ‘I do!’ in a marriage ceremony, this has tax and legal implications I did not intend. A speech act may constitute a racist microaggression even if the speaker did not intend to be racist. A professor who wants to invite a student over to his house for wine but does not want to pressure her may make pressure her anyhow. In general, our speech acts do all sorts of unintended things, even apart from any constitutive work uptake does. We could, of course, define ‘exercising’ normative power as an intentional act by stipulation, but there seems then to be no reason to think that discursive power is always exercised in this sense, nor that whatever intentions we may in fact have need to map exactly onto the normative impact of what we perform.3 This is, perhaps, part of why gaslighters often try to isolate their victims; when speech receives uptake only from one person, it is much easier for that person to use their uptake to constitutively manipulate the situation.4 This point is consonant with points made b","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135770017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The curious case of uncurious creation","authors":"Lindsay Brainard","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2261503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2261503","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis paper seeks to answer the question: Can contemporary forms of artificial intelligence be creative? To answer this question, I consider three conditions that are commonly taken to be necessary for creativity. These are novelty, value, and agency. I argue that while contemporary AI models may have a claim to novelty and value, they cannot satisfy the kind of agency condition required for creativity. From this discussion, a new condition for creativity emerges. Creativity requires curiosity, a motivation to pursue epistemic goods. I argue that contemporary AI models do not satisfy this new condition. Because they lack both agency and curiosity, it is a mistake to attribute the same sort of creativity to AI that we prize in humans. Finally, I consider the question of whether these AI models stand to make human creativity in the arts and sciences obsolete, despite not being creative themselves. I argue, optimistically, that this is unlikely.KEYWORDS: Creativityartificial intelligencecuriosityaestheticsagency Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 I am grateful to Ian Cruise, Marc Lange, Grace-Anna Perry, Nathaniel Sharadin, Keshav Singh, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this paper.2 For a historical overview of early work in AI, see Crevier (Citation1993) and McCorduck (Citation2004).3 See Bubeck et al. (Citation2023) for some illustrative examples.4 This declaration is the title of a post on Bill Gates’ blog, GatesNotes. See Gates (Citation2023).5 One exception to this is the Zhuangzist account of creativity drawn out by Julianne Chung (Citation2020, Citation2021, Citation2022). On Chung’s interpretation, creativity as conceived by Zhuangzi doesn’t require novelty, but instead requires spontaneity.6 Among those who argue that creativity requires novelty are Beardsley (Citation1965), Boden (Citation1992, Citation2005, Citation2010), Hills and Bird (Citation2019), Gaut (Citation2003, Citation2018), Kronfeldner (Citation2009, Citation2018), Miller (Citation2019), Simonton (Citation1999), and Stokes (Citation2008, Citation2011, Citation2014).7 See, for instance, David Novitz (Citation1999), who argues that creative work must be surprising in the sense that it could not have been easily predicted by the community in which the creative work occurs. Relatedly, Robert Audi (Citation2018) also claims that unpredictability is the crucial sort of novelty for creativity, but argues that it should not be equated with surprisingness.8 Of course, the relevant sort of novelty here might not only be a matter of whether the sentence has been composed before – either historically or psychologically. It might also be a matter of how similar it is to other sentences that have been composed before. This suggests that novelty comes in degrees. For further discussion of this idea, see Brainard (Citationms). I am grateful to Marc Lange for suggesting I address this.9 For","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135817672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Predicting and preferring","authors":"Nathaniel Sharadin","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2261493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2261493","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe use of machine learning, or ‘artificial intelligence’ (AI) in medicine is widespread and growing. In this paper, I focus on a specific proposed clinical application of AI: using models to predict incapacitated patients’ treatment preferences. Drawing on results from machine learning, I argue this proposal faces a special moral problem. Machine learning researchers owe us assurance on this front before experimental research can proceed. In my conclusion I connect this concern to broader issues in AI safety.KEYWORDS: PPPmedical ethicsAIpatient preference predictorspreference shaping Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 In what follows, I mostly refer to these systems as ML systems, rather than as ‘AI’, in order to avoid unfortunate and controversial implications about machine ‘intelligence’.2 For an overview, see (Emanuel et al. Citation1991; Buchanan and Brock Citation2019).3 For discussion, see (Salmond and David Citation2005; Shalowitz, Garrett-Mayer, and Wendler Citation2006; Jezewski et al. Citation2007).4 See (Rid and Wendler Citation2014a) for discussion; for relevant machine learning research, see (O. Evans et al. Citation2018).5 For a selection of moral criticism, see (N. Sharadin Citation2019; N. P. Sharadin Citation2018; Ditto and Clark Citation2014; Kim Citation2014; John Citation2014; Dresser Citation2014; Tretter and Samhammer Citation2023; Mainz Citation2022). For a recent reply to autonomy-based criticism, see (Jardas et al. Citation2022).6 Compare (N. P. Sharadin Citation2018).7 For a technical overview, see (Gneiting and Raftery Citation2007).8 Well, three. We could change our scoring rule, or our performance metric. I ignore this possibility in what follows.9 I follow the literature in saying that a learner is incentivized to do something just in case doing that thing increases performance (or reward). See (Krueger, Maharaj, and Leike Citation2020, 2).10 If this sounds familiar from the Forever War between consequentialists and Kantians, that’s not an accident.11 See (Good Citation2021).12 Philosophers call a related phenomenon self-fulfilling beliefs (Silva Citationforthcoming; Antill Citation2019).13 Following (Perdomo et al. Citation2020). Begrudgingly because it can make it sound as if the model itself is doing something. It isn’t: we are doing something with the model.14 Compare (Franklin et al. Citation2022).15 This follows from broader ideas about the importance of informed consent. For an overview, see (Faden and Beauchamp Citation1986); for critical discussion, see (Manson and O’Neill Citation2007).16 This is not controversial. See (Li and Chapman Citation2020) for discussion.17 For a recent philosophical discussion, see Parmer (Citation2023). The debate over the ethics of nudging is ongoing. For the classic source on ‘nudges’ see Thaler and Sunstein (Citation2008).18 For technical discussion of the broad phenomenon, see (Krueger, Maharaj, and Leike Citati","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135865008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Appreciating the need for autonomy, or recognizing the truth of evidentialism?","authors":"Kevin McCain","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2261491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2261491","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTIn this article I raise two challenges for the primary argument of Adam Carter's Autonomous Knowledge. The first is that his argument for thinking that internalist theories of epistemic justification face problems from TrueTemp-style examples is unsound. The second is that the autonomy condition that Carter argues for is not new as it seems to be already implicit in Earl Conee and Richard Feldman's account of well-founded belief. Ultimately, I do not see these challenges as undermining the value of Carter's project. Rather, these challenges help illuminate that what Autonomous Knowledge does is provide a powerful argument for Evidentialism.KEYWORDS: autonomyAdam CarterEarl ConeeEvidentialismRichard FeldmanTrue-Temp Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 More precisely, the principle says: “for any version of a TrueTemp case, T, and any kind of epistemic justification condition, EJ, on knowledge that we might appeal to explain why Mr. TrueTemp fails to know in T, there will be a possible variation on T, T*, in which Mr. TrueTemp continues to fail to know and yet EJ is satisfied.”2 See, in particular, their Citation2004 collection of essays and their Citation2011 replies to critics. See also McCain (Citation2014) for development and defense of this sort of mentalist Evidentialism. Although there are externalist versions of Evidentialism (see Bergmann Citation2018 for helpful discussion), throughout this article I will use the term “Evidentialism” to refer to the internalist variety.3 There are various answers to what sorts of mental states in particular count as evidence. For example, as discussed below, Conee and Feldman (Citation2008) claim that experiences of various kinds are ultimate evidence, and beliefs justified by those experiences are intermediate evidence. McCain and Moretti (Citation2021) agree, though they offer a more precise take on which experiences count as ultimate evidence by insisting that only seemings/appearances are evidence.4 There are different views of what is required for a belief to be held on the basis of a given body of evidence. Some insist that one must have a meta-belief to the effect that the evidence sufficiently supports the belief (see for example, Lehrer Citation1971; Tolliver Citation1982; Foley Citation1987). Others insist that one’s evidence must cause the belief in the appropriate way (see, for example, Moser Citation1989; Pollock and Cruz Citation1999; McCain Citation2012). Still others suggest that one must simply satisfy one or the other of these conditions (see Korcz Citation2000; Mittag Citation2002 for criticism). Fortunately, we don’t have to settle the issue here because TrueTemp* doesn’t satisfy any of these conditions with respect to his belief that q.5 A number of Evidentialists are explicit in claiming that ultimate evidence is experiential, and beliefs are only intermediate evidence. In particular, they insist that the only time a beli","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136060997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Deciding what we mean","authors":"Andrew Peet","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2255219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2255219","url":null,"abstract":"Stipulation gives us a degree of control over meaning. By stipulating how I will use a term I am able to determine the meaning it will receive on future occasions of use. My stipulation will affect the truth conditional content of my future utterances. But the mechanisms of stipulation are mysterious. As Cappelen ([2018]. Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198814719.001.0001) argues, meaning is typically determined in an inscrutable way by a myriad of external factors beyond our control. How does stipulation override these factors? And the powers of stipulation are limited. Firstly, the power of stipulation is typically short-lived. Secondly, some stipulations simply don’t get off the ground. What explains the limits of stipulation? I consider two related approaches to stipulation and argue that they are unable to capture stipulation’s metasemantic effects. I then provide an explanation of the metasemantic effects of stipulation: Stipulation determines meaning by determining the word use it is fitting to hold the speaker to. This account is able to capture the mechanisms and limits of stipulation, whilst also explaining why we should care about stipulative success. I close by briefly drawing out some lessons for conceptual engineering.","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136308294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Offending by mentioning","authors":"Adam Sennet, David Copp","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2253850","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2253850","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135059879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Skills and savoir-faire: might anti-intellectualism suffice?","authors":"Ian Robertson","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2254333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2254333","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135982517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Meanings as species in communication and inquiry","authors":"Laura Schroeter, François Schroeter","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2253847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2253847","url":null,"abstract":"Can mere conceptual competence explain the apriori? Many contemporary theorists believe that conceptual competence grounds apriori conceptual truths – and that this fact helps explain how thinkers can have apriori justification for accepting these truths and reasoning in accord with them. In this chapter, I'll examine several contemporary defenses of the conceptual approach to apriority in order to clarify their core commitments about the nature of concepts. The common thread, I'll argue, is a picture of concepts that combines a conceptual role model of conceptual competence with a rationalizing approach to the determination of semantic contents. My first aim is to show how this model of concepts has the potential to ground apriori truth and justification. My second aim is to show how the model involves problematic commitments about concepts, which can be avoided on an alternative relational model of concepts.","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135982095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}