Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"What is priority monism? Reply to Kovacs","authors":"Damiano Costa","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2280615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2280615","url":null,"abstract":"Priority monism is the view that the cosmos is the basic concrete entity on which each of its parts depends. Kovacs has recently argued that none of the classical notions of dependence could be used to spell out priority monism. I argue that four notions of dependence – namely rigid existential dependence, generic existential dependence, explanatory dependence, and generalised explanatory dependence – can indeed be used to spell out priority monism and specify the conditions under which this is possible.","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134991597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ordinal type theory","authors":"Jan Plate","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2278031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2278031","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTHigher-order logic, with its type-theoretic apparatus known as the simple theory of types (STT), has increasingly come to be employed in theorising about properties, relations, and states of affairs – or ‘intensional entities’ for short. This paper argues against this employment of STT and offers an alternative: ordinal type theory (OTT). Very roughly, STT and OTT can be regarded as complementary simplifications of the ‘ramified theory of types’ outlined in the Introduction to Principia Mathematica (on a realist reading). While STT, understood as a theory of intensional entities, retains the Fregean division of properties and relations into a multiplicity of categories according to their adicities and ‘input types’ and discards the division of intensional entities into different ‘orders’, OTT takes the opposite approach: it retains the hierarchy of orders (though with some modifications) and discards the categorisation of properties and relations according to their adicities and input types. In contrast to STT, this latter approach avoids intensional counterparts of the Epimenides and related paradoxes. Fundamental intensional entities lie at the base of the proposed hierarchy and are also given a prominent part to play in the individuation of non-fundamental intensional entities.KEYWORDS: Propertiesrelationsstates of affairstype theoryhigher-order metaphysicsfundamentality AcknowledgementsFor valuable discussion of (or related to) material presented in this paper, I am grateful to Andrew Bacon, Kit Fine, Peter Fritz, Jeremy Goodman, Daniel Nolan, Robert Trueman, and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri. Special thanks to Francesco Orilia for detailed comments on an earlier draft. For financial support, I am grateful to the Swiss National Science Foundation (grants 100012_173040 and 100012_192200).Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 I mainly have in mind Williamson (Citation2013), Dorr (Citation2016), Fritz and Goodman (Citation2016), Goodman (Citation2017), Bacon (Citation2019; Citation2020), Dorr, Hawthorne, and Yli-Vakkuri (Citation2021), and Bacon and Dorr (Citationforthcoming). Major influences on this literature include Prior (Citation1971) and Williamson (Citation2003). Skiba (Citation2021) offers a survey. Critical voices include Orilia and Landini (Citation2019), Hofweber (Citation2022), Whittle (Citation2023, 1642–1645), Menzel (Citationforthcoming), and Sider (CitationMS). Also cf. Florio (Citationforthcoming).2 In the literature of higher-order metaphysics, the term ‘state of affairs’ is usually avoided in favour of ‘proposition’. Nonetheless, I shall here speak of states of affairs (or simply ‘states’), as this term goes more naturally together with ‘property’ and ‘relation’, whereas ‘proposition’ connotes something more fine-grained and sentence-like. (Cf., e.g., Dorr [Citation2016, 54n.].)3 A more detailed overview of LFO can be found in Shapiro and Kouri Kissel (Citation2018).4 This not","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134991461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Responses to critics","authors":"Endre Begby","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2278036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2278036","url":null,"abstract":"Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136351969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A new concept of replication","authors":"Vera Matarese","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2278032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2278032","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe replication crisis has spawned discussions on the meaning of replication. In fact, in order to determine whether an experiment fails to replicate, it is necessary to establish what replication is. This is, however, a difficult task, as it is possible to attribute different meanings to it. This paper offers a solution to this problem of ambiguity by engineering a concept of replication that, if compared to other proposals, stands out for being not only broadly applicable but also sufficiently specific. It features a minimal level of operationalism, which would otherwise limit its applicability, while it heavily relies on replication’s specific epistemic functions, which are inter-disciplinary. Another merit is its context sensitivity, which enables it to differentiate instances of replication from non-instances of replication in every scientific discipline according to the discipline’s own standards.KEYWORDS: Replicationambiguityconceptual engineeringresampling account of replicationcontextuality AcknowledgmentsI would like to express my sincere gratitude to Claus Beisbart and Matthias Rolffs from the University of Bern, and to two anonymous reviewers of this journal for reading my paper. Their valuable insights and constructive feedback significantly contributed to the refinement of this paper. I am also indebted to the audience at the reading group in Philosophy of Science at Caltech (California Institute of Technology). Their thoughtful questions and engaging discussions helped me enhance the quality of this work. Furthermore, I extend my heartfelt appreciation to the team of the Group of Materials Research with Neutron and Ion Beams (MRNIB) led by Dr. Jiří Vacík at the Czech Academy of Sciences for their feedback on my project on replicability. Their input, particularly the suggestion of the case of replication for thermal neutron-induced reactions in nuclear physics, significantly enriched the content of this paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 ‘Experiment’ should be understood here as a general term encompassing measurements, studies, and observations. The same is true for the use of ‘experiment’ in the definition of Replication2.2 That replication is an ambiguous term is discussed also in Schmidt (Citation2009): ‘The word replication is used as […] to describe various meanings’ (p. 90); ‘the notion of replication has several meanings and is a very ambiguous term.’ (p. 98). See Leonelli (Citation2018) for a more exhaustive list of meanings of replication.3 See for instance in the abstract, where Machery (Citation2020) states: ‘This article develops a new, general account of replication (“the Resampling Account of replication”)’ (p. 545).4 A factor of an experiment is a controlled independent variable. Levels should be understood as the states, values, or magnitudes that a factor could take. For the case of treatment, for instance, a medication could be given in differen","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135725495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Precis of Amie L. Thomasson, norms and necessity","authors":"Amie L. Thomasson","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2272355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2272355","url":null,"abstract":"Claims about what is necessary or possible play a central role in debates in metaphysics and elsewhere in philosophy. But how can we understand such claims, and how can we come to know which are true? Modal discourse has long presented formidable ontological, epistemological, and methodological problems - problems that arise or are exacerbated by assuming that modal talk aims to describe or track special features of this world, or other possible worlds. Norms and Necessity aims to revive a non-descriptivist approach to modality, holding that the function of modal discourse is not to describe or track anything, but rather to convey norms or rules (and what follows from them) in the useful form of indicatives. The book develops this ‘modal normativist’ approach, showing how it avoids the most serious objections that have kept similar approaches off the table for the past several decades (including the Frege-Geach problem, and problems of accounting for de re and a posteriori necessities). It also shows how a careful development of the normativist approach can help avoid or resolve the classic ontological, epistemological, and methodological problems of modality, as part of an overall deflationary approach to metaphysics.","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134973195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Norms and necessity: replies to critics","authors":"Amie L. Thomasson","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2271616","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2271616","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe critics in this volume raise several important challenges to the modal normativist position developed in Norms and Necessity, including whether the relation I claim holds between semantic rules and necessity claims generates spurious claims of metaphysical necessity, whether the view is circular (implicitly relying on a more 'robust' form of modal realism), and whether it conflicts with truth-conditional semantics. They also raise probing questions about how it compares to other views of modality, including a Lewisian view and an essentialist view. In these replies, I respond to these challenges in ways that precisify the relevant understanding of ‘semantic rules' and the forms they can take, that make clearer the direction of explanation in modal normativism in ways that show the view doesn't rely on a more ‘robust’ form of modal realism, and that give reason for thinking that there is actually no conflict between modal normativism and truth-conditional semantics. I also aim to give a fuller assessment of how it compares to other approaches to modality, including an essentialist approach.KEYWORDS: Modal normativism; essentialism; possible worlds; truth-conditional semantics; modal realism AcknowledgementsI would like to thank Kristie Miller, Rohan Sud, Jamie Dreier, Boris Kment, and David Plunkett for their helpful comments on prior versions of these replies.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 This builds on work I undertake more thoroughly in my more recent work on modal discourse (2023), which is intended as a further development of the work of Norms and Necessity, making use of work in systemic functional linguistics. Readers interested in developments after my (2020) may find that paper relevant.2 I come closest to discussing these issues in sections 5.2 and 5.3 of Norms and Necessity, though there is nothing exactly like Miller’s objection considered there.3 The easy ontological approach combines with modal normativism to give us simple realism about modal facts, properties, and possible worlds (see my 2020a, Chapter 6).4 See my (Citation2015, 156–157) for the fuller argument that such attempted ‘explanations’ would only be dormitive virtue explanations. Of course, from the normativist point of view, failure to provide explanatory truthmakers is no shortcoming – for it is a central part of the normativist approach that basic modal claims, as non-descriptive, don’t need truthmakers to ‘explain’ what ‘makes’ them true.5 See, e.g. Norms and Necessity, Chapter 8.6 Note that Miller seems open to the idea that such rules are incomplete and renegotiable, but this seems in tension with the requirement that we consider all possible scenarios in order to get the ‘correct’ statement of the rules.7 Though one may need additional introduction constraints to ensure that the worlds are complete and maximal etc. See Steinberg (Citation2013) and my discussion in my (2020a, 132–137).8 See Hal","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135315712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The social life of prejudice","authors":"Renée Jorgensen","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2269197","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2269197","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis article considers a particular explanation (offered in Chapter 7 of Begby 2021) for the persistence of prejudicial stereotypes: that pluralistic ignorance can motivate individuals to act according to the roles they prescribe – even if no individual in a community either believes or endorses the stereotype – and moreover this can make it rational for subsequent generations to acquire prejudiced beliefs. I begin by surveying a few different ways that ‘vestigial social practices’ can persist despite being privately disavowed by most or all members of a community. Noting that many of them are transparently compatible with not believing that the persistent practice is appropriate, I argue that rational consideration of relevant alternative explanations precludes treating others’ behaviour as a kind of testimonial evidence for such prejudicial beliefs. But while it is doubtful that social dynamics provide grounds for rationally acquiring prejudice, it is likely that they explain actual acquisition of prejudice. So when evaluating whether a society is prejudiced, Begby is right that we must look beyond the private thoughts of its individual members. We should attend to the stabilising forces of social expectations, as well as how past prejudice shaped our material environment to reproduce stereotype-conforming social outcomes.KEYWORDS: Stereotypessocial normsrationality of prejudice Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Haslanger (Citation2019, 11–13), drawing on McGeer (Citation2007) and others, suggests that the social aspects of agency in fact go much deeper, providing the foundational scaffolding for human cognition and learning. Rather than considering individual agency as prior to social interaction and predicting how others will act, McGeer argues that when we attribute beliefs or predict behaviour we are partly ‘giving ourselves over to the task of producing comprehensible patterns of well-behaved agency in ourselves and others’ (Citation2007, 149). On this picture, social coordination has a regulative and shaping role on individual agency.2 In some cases, participants are perfectly aware that few people privately endorse the norm, but still rationally expect to face second-order enforcement – penalties for either violating the norm or failing to penalize others’ violations – and so the behavioural pattern remains stable until they can be credibly assured safety from penalization. Very likely Begby is right that many vestigial norms actually persist in part through pluralistic ignorance, precisely because we are actually still invested in many of the norms we publicly disavow – including many gender norms. For excellent discussion of how the interconnectedness of a wide array of social scripts can make it very difficult to in fact cognitively move on from socially embedded role-based expectations, see Bicchieri and McNally (Citation2016).3 For Bicchieri, this is the feature that d","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135615978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Heard but not received","authors":"Grace Paterson","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2267089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2267089","url":null,"abstract":"In speech act theory, we say there has been successful uptake of a speech act when a hearer has understood what the speaker was trying to say to them. I argue that it is possible to be understood without having what you say taken seriously. For a speech act to be without defect, then, hearers must not only take up the speech act, but also be open to responding to it in appropriate ways. I call this kind of openness receptivity and argue that it should be analysed as a kind of responsiveness to reasons. A receptive hearer takes the speaker's speech act as appropriately reason giving, while an unreceptive hearer does not. This analysis reveals subtle forms of communicative breakdown that bear similarities to phenomena such as illocutionary silencing and distortion but are both posterior to, and compatible with, uptake. The analysis also helps us understand how illocutionary acts give rise to specific perlocutionary effects by way of the hearer's practical reasoning.","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135889130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The revenge of Moral Twin Earth","authors":"Alexios Stamatiadis-Bréhier","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2253275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2253275","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTIn this paper I revisit an important response to the Moral Twin Earth (MTE) challenge: The Common Functional Role strategy (CFR). I argue that CFR is open to a revenge problem. MTE-cases allegedly show that two linguistic communities can be in genuine disagreement even when they are regulated by distinct families of properties. CFR provides a way to reconcile the intuition that the two communities are in genuine disagreement with the claim that the use of moral terms by both communities is causally regulated by different families of properties. This is done by identifying a functional role that those families of properties both fulfill. Still, even if CFR is successful, its proponents need to face a serious revenge problem. Roughly, it could be that the families of properties that regulate each community are equally perfect realizers of the relevant higher-order functional state. I suggest that the proponent of CFR faces a dilemma: either CFR has controversial implications about first-order moral theory, or CFR needs to be coupled with substantive and parochial empirical/metaphysical assumptions to avoid those implications.KEYWORDS: Moral Twin Earthcommon functional rolemoral functionalismmoral disagreementmoral realism AcknowledgementsFor written comments on previous drafts I thank Pekka Väyrynen and several anonymous reviewers from Inquiry and other journals (especially Analytic Philosophy, the Journal of Value Inquiry, and the Australasian Journal of Philosophy). I also want to thank audiences from the PG Seminar at the University of Leeds, and the Philosophy and Political Theory Seminar at Panteion University. A distant precursor of this paper was written during my time as an undergraduate at the University of Athens at Stelios Virvidakis's Metaethics seminar (whom I thank for comments and encouragement).Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Causal metasemantics are typically used by naturalists (for a recent account of moral naturalism see Stamatiadis-Bréhier Citation2022). This explains why, historically, MTE cases have naturalist versions of moral realism as their target. But such metasemantics can also be used by anti-naturalist moral realists. For example, Adams’s (Citation1999) supernaturalist moral realism has a structurally identical metasemantics to Boyd’s.2 Someone might be hesitant in combining deontology with Boyd’s moral realism (although see sec. 4). Still, note that we can construct an equally powerful MTE case involving different moral theories (e.g. Freiman [Citation2014] appeals to virtue ethics).3 For the rest of this paper, I will use the phrase “Earthlings are regulated by some properties” as a shorthand for saying that the use of their terms is regulated by these properties.4 For dialectical reasons, I will grant this controversial assumption (cf. Plunkett and Sundell Citation2013). At any rate, the same argument could be presented (by adding further epicycles)","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135889284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Prejudice, generics, and resistance to evidence","authors":"M. Giulia Napolitano","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2269261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2269261","url":null,"abstract":"In his book, Prejudice, Endre Begby offers a novel and engaging account of the epistemology of prejudice which challenges some of the standard assumptions that have so far guided the recent discussion on the topic. One of Begby's central arguments against the standard view of prejudice, according to which a prejudiced person necessarily displays an epistemically culpable resistance to counterevidence, is that, qua stereotype judgments, prejudices can be flexible and rationally maintained upon encountering many disconfirming instances. By expanding on Begby's analysis, I argue that, given the variety of truth conditions for true generic statements, the generic form of stereotype judgements can sometimes make prejudice extremely resistant to encounters with statistical facts about the distribution of the property among members of a certain group. At the same time, I argue that a more careful consideration of the generic form of stereotypes also allows us to recognize that evidence about how many members of the kind instantiate a property is not the only type of evidence which could disconfirm a prejudice. Evidence of no explanatory relation between a kind and a property should also have a direct effect on a prejudicial belief. For this reason, things may not look as dim for the standard view of prejudice in assessing paradigmatic instances of prejudicial beliefs as irrationally resistant to evidence.","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135889129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}