{"title":"Liking that It Hurts: The Case of the Masochist and Second-Order Desire Accounts of Pain's Unpleasantness","authors":"Jonathan Mitchell","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.2.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.2.06","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Recent work on pain focuses on the question “what makes pains unpleasant.” Second-order desire views claim that the unpleasantness of pain consists in a second-order intrinsic desire that the pain experience itself cease or stop. This paper considers a significant objection to Second-order desire views by considering the case of the masochist. It is argued that various ways in which the Second-order desire view might try to account for the case of the masochist encounter problems. The conclusion is that until there is a convincing explanation of how Second-order desire views can handle masochistic psychology, theorists should look elsewhere for an account of pains unpleasantness.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44123384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Hope Require Belief?","authors":"Michael Milona","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.2.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.2.07","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper interrogates a widely accepted view about the nature of hope. The view is that hoping that p involves a belief about the prospects of p. It is argued that taking hope to require belief is at odds with some forms of recalcitrant hope and certain ways in which hope patterns similarly to other emotions. The paper concludes by explaining why it matters whether hope requires belief.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43482134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Paradox of Self-Blame","authors":"Patrick Todd, B. Rabern","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.2.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.2.01","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 It is widely accepted that there is what has been called a non-hypocrisy norm on the appropriateness of moral blame; roughly, one has standing to blame only if one is not guilty of the very offence one seeks to criticize. Our acceptance of this norm is embodied in the common retort to criticism, “Who are you to blame me?” But there is a paradox lurking behind this commonplace norm. If it is always inappropriate for x to blame y for a wrong that x has committed, then all cases in which x blames x (i.e., cases of self-blame) are rendered inappropriate. But it seems to be ethical common-sense that we are often, sadly, in position (indeed, excellent, privileged position) to blame ourselves for our own moral failings. And thus, we have a paradox: a conflict between the inappropriateness of hypocritical blame, and the appropriateness of self-blame. We consider several ways of resolving the paradox and contend none is as defensible as a position that simply accepts it: we should never blame ourselves. In defending this starting position, we defend a crucial distinction between self-blame and guilt.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48166723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Perfectionist Preferentism","authors":"Donald W. Bruckner","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.2.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.2.02","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper is about two seemingly inconsistent theories of well-being and how to reconcile them. The first theory is perfectionism, the view that the good of a human is determined by human nature. The second theory is preferentism, the view that the good of a human lies in the satisfaction of her preferences. I begin by sketching the theories and then developing an objection against each from the standpoint of the other. I then develop a version of each theory that is meant to address the objection from the other theory. It turns out that these modified perfectionist and preferentist theories are mutually supporting and co-extensive. They can be combined into a new theory, perfectionist preferentism, which is an independently plausible theory of well-being.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48826337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Intellectualist Dilemma","authors":"Matthew Mosdell","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.2.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.2.03","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Lewis Carroll's famous puzzle leads to an explanatory challenge: what must we know to grasp the logical necessity of deductive arguments? This paper argues that intellectualism lacks a philosophically satisfying explanation to that puzzle.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46961954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"BLIND AND INCREMENTAL OR DIRECTED AND DISRUPTIVE? ON THE NATURE OF NOVEL VARIATION IN HUMAN CULTURAL EVOLUTION","authors":"A. Mesoudi","doi":"10.2307/48600682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48600682","url":null,"abstract":"Many scholars have rejected cultural evolutionary theory on the grounds that cultural variation is directed and intentionally created, rather than incremental and blind with respect to function, as is the case for novel genetic variation in genetic evolution. Meanwhile, some cultural evolution researchers insist that cultural variation is blind and undirected, and the only directional force is selection of randomlygenerated variants. Here I argue that neither of these positions are tenable. Cultural variation is directed in various ways. While this does not invalidate cultural evolution, more attention should be paid to the different sources of nonrandomness in culturally evolving systems. Introduction Does human culture evolve? Can we draw useful parallels between genetic evolution and cultural change? Can we use similar tools, methods, concepts and theories to understand cultural change as biologists use to understand genetic evolution? The rapid increase in research adopting a cultural evolution framework in the last few decades (Youngblood and Lahti 2018) shows that increasing numbers of scholars are answering “yes” to these questions. Yet in the grand scheme of academic research, cultural evolution remains a fringe pursuit. The majority of the social sciences and humanities reject any kind of evolutionary theorizing for understanding cultural phenomena, including cultural evolution (Slingerland and Collard 2011; Perry and Mace 2010). Even within the evolutionary human behavioral sciences, the theory of cultural evolution is often treated with skepticism (Daly 1982; Atran 2001; Pinker 1997). While there are many reasons for this rejection and skepticism, one common point of contention surrounds the issue of randomness and directionality in the generation of novel cultural variation. This is also a common source of disagreement amongst cultural evolution researchers (Lewens 2015; Claidière et al. 2014). In this paper I argue that there are genuine differences between genetic and cultural evolution in this sense. While some novel cultural variation seems to be generated randomly with respect to selection, akin to the generation of novel genetic variation, there are also several forms of directed cultural variation. I argue that while the latter do not invalidate the theory, approach or methods of cultural evolution, This content downloaded from 92.72.139.75 on Tue, 26 Jan 2021 16:19:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 8 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY more attention should be paid to the different sources of directedness in culturally evolving systems and their consequences. What is Cultural Evolution? Cultural evolution is the idea that cultural change exhibits fundamental similarities to genetic evolution, such that we can pro-tably view and analyze cultural change as an evolutionary process. “Culture” here is de-ned broadly as any socially transmitted information that passes from person to person nongenetically, via im","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"58 1","pages":"7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69448129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"BELIEF-LIKE IMAGINING AND CORRECTNESS","authors":"Alon Chasid","doi":"10.2307/48614002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48614002","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the sense in which correctness applies to belief-like imaginings. It begins by establishing that when we imagine, we ‘direct’ our imaginings at a certain imaginary world, taking the propositions we imagine to be assessed for truth in that world. It then examines the relation between belief-like imagining and positing truths in an imaginary world. Rejecting the claim that correctness, in the literal sense, is applicable to imaginings, it shows that the imaginer takes on, vis-à-vis the imaginary world, the first-person perspective of a believer. Imaginings, it concludes, ‘mimic’ beliefs with respect to the property of being correct or incorrect by virtue of having true or false content.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69453888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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