{"title":"PLURALISM AND NORMATIVITY IN TRUTH AND LOGIC","authors":"Sher","doi":"10.2307/48584451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48584451","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I investigate how differences in approach to truth and logic (in particular, a deflationist vs. a substantivist approach to these fields) affect philosophers’ views concerning pluralism and normativity in these fields. My perspective on truth and logic is largely epistemic, focusing on the role of truth in knowledge (rather than on the use of the words “true” and “truth” in natural language), and my reference group includes Carnap (1934), Harman (1986), Horwich (1990), Wright (1992), Beall and Restall (2006), Field (2009), Lynch (2009), and Sher (2016a). Whenever possible, I focus on positive rather than negative views on the issues involved, although in some cases this is not possible. I. Pluralism in Truth and Logic The relation between truth-pluralism and logical pluralism has been discussed by a number of philosophers. A natural link between the two is the fact that the main logical (or rather, meta-logical) relation, logical consequence, is defined in terms of truth. A classical reference is Tarski (1936), according to which the sentence X is a logical consequence of the set of sentences K iff (if and only if) in every model in which all the sentences of K are true X is true too. It is common to say that logical consequence is defined in terms that significantly include preservation or transmission of truth. Now, if truth is plural—that is, there are different types of truth—then the preservation (transmission) of different types of truth might be based on different principles, giving rise to, or requiring, a plurality of logics. This potential connection is laid down in Lynch (2009) and Pedersen (2014), and I share their view. But whether this potential connection materializes depends on what truth-pluralism is and what is required for the transmission of different types of truth. If the plurality of truth is so deep that it allows both realist and antirealist conceptions of truth, and if transmission of realist truth requires, say, a bivalent logic while the transmission of antirealist truth requires a non-bivalent logic, then logic in some fields is bivalent, in others non-bivalent, i.e., there are different types of logic for different fields. But if truth, as truth, is essentially (hence, always) realist and its plurality is limited to variations within the domain of realist truth (e.g., truth is always based on correspondence but the patterns of correspondence vary in, say, physics and mathematics), then the plurality of truth, by itself, would not lead to logical pluralism in the way delineated above. This, however, does not rule out other connections between truth-pluralism and logical pluralism. For example, both truth and logic might share some traits, or combinations of traits, that are potentially conducive to This content downloaded from 70.179.3.18 on Sun, 18 Oct 2020 01:46:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 338 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY pluralism. And indeed, they both share such a c","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69441977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"THEORIES OF MULTIPLE REALIZATION","authors":"Lawrence Shapiro","doi":"10.2307/48570643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48570643","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Philosophers look to the realization relation as a way to make sense of the possibility that special science kinds are physical, yet not reducible to kinds in physics. A realized property fails to reduce because it can be realized in multiple ways, thus blocking its identification with lower-level properties. One prominent analysis of realization, subset realization, distinguishes multiple realizers on the basis their “left-over powers,” that is, those that don’t contribute to the individuative powers of the realizer. However, I argue, the subset analysis of realization fails to mark an important distinction between different ways that a property might be realized, and also makes questions about the reducibility of kinds—presumably an empirical issue—tractable from the armchair. I offer as an alternative mechanistic multiple realization, which avoids both these problems.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41705932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE “ALETHIC PLURALISM AND THE NORMATIVITY OF TRUTH”","authors":"Ferrari, Moruzzi, Pedersen","doi":"10.2307/48584448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48584448","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69441104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"WHAT ARE THE ODDS THAT EVERYONE IS DEPRAVED?","authors":"Scott Hill","doi":"10.2307/48574440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48574440","url":null,"abstract":"Why does God allow evil? One hypothesis is that God desires the existence and activity of free creatures but He was unable to create a world with such creatures and such activity without also allowing evil. If Molinism is true, what probability should be assigned to this hypothesis? Some philosophers claim that a low probability should be assigned because there are an infinite number of possible people and because we have no reason to suppose that such creatures will choose one way rather than another. Arguments like this depend on the principle of indifference. But that principle is rejected by most philosophers of probability. Some philosophers claim that a low probability should be assigned because doing otherwise violates intuitions about freewill. But such arguments can be addressed through strategies commonly employed to defend theories with counterintuitive results across ethics and metaphysics.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69436718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"DEFLATING TRUTH ABOUT TASTE","authors":"Ferrari, Moruzzi","doi":"10.2307/48584454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48584454","url":null,"abstract":"In Truth and Objectivity, Crispin Wright argues that because truth is a distinctively normative property, it cannot be as metaphysically insubstantive as deflationists claim. This argument has been taken, together with the scope problem, as one of the main motivations for alethic pluralism. We offer a reconstruction of Wright’s Inflationary Argument (henceforth IA) aimed at highlighting what are the steps required to establish its inflationary conclusion. We argue that if a certain metaphysical and epistemological view of a given subject matter is accepted, a local counterexample to IA can be constructed. We focus on the domain of basic taste and we develop two variants of a subjectivist and relativist metaphysics and epistemology that seems palatable in that domain. Although we undertake no commitment to this being the right metaphysical cum epistemological package for basic taste, we contend that if the metaphysics and the epistemology of basic taste are understood along these lines, they call for a truth property whose nature is not distinctively normative—contra what IA predicts. This result shows that the success of IA requires certain substantial metaphysical and epistemological principles and that, consequently, a proper assessment of IA cannot avoid taking a stance on the metaphysics and the epistemology of the domain where it is claimed to be successful. Although we conjecture that IA might succeed in other domains, in this paper we don’t take a stand on this issue. We conclude by briefly discussing the significance of this result for the debate on alethic pluralism.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69441597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"THE FORCE OF ALETHIC PLURALISM","authors":"Strollo","doi":"10.2307/48584450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48584450","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69441782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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