PLURALISM AND NORMATIVITY IN TRUTH AND LOGIC

IF 0.8 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI:10.2307/48584451

Sher

{"title":"PLURALISM AND NORMATIVITY IN TRUTH AND LOGIC","authors":"Sher","doi":"10.2307/48584451","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I investigate how differences in approach to truth and logic (in particular, a deflationist vs. a substantivist approach to these fields) affect philosophers’ views concerning pluralism and normativity in these fields. My perspective on truth and logic is largely epistemic, focusing on the role of truth in knowledge (rather than on the use of the words “true” and “truth” in natural language), and my reference group includes Carnap (1934), Harman (1986), Horwich (1990), Wright (1992), Beall and Restall (2006), Field (2009), Lynch (2009), and Sher (2016a). Whenever possible, I focus on positive rather than negative views on the issues involved, although in some cases this is not possible. I. Pluralism in Truth and Logic The relation between truth-pluralism and logical pluralism has been discussed by a number of philosophers. A natural link between the two is the fact that the main logical (or rather, meta-logical) relation, logical consequence, is defined in terms of truth. A classical reference is Tarski (1936), according to which the sentence X is a logical consequence of the set of sentences K iff (if and only if) in every model in which all the sentences of K are true X is true too. It is common to say that logical consequence is defined in terms that significantly include preservation or transmission of truth. Now, if truth is plural—that is, there are different types of truth—then the preservation (transmission) of different types of truth might be based on different principles, giving rise to, or requiring, a plurality of logics. This potential connection is laid down in Lynch (2009) and Pedersen (2014), and I share their view. But whether this potential connection materializes depends on what truth-pluralism is and what is required for the transmission of different types of truth. If the plurality of truth is so deep that it allows both realist and antirealist conceptions of truth, and if transmission of realist truth requires, say, a bivalent logic while the transmission of antirealist truth requires a non-bivalent logic, then logic in some fields is bivalent, in others non-bivalent, i.e., there are different types of logic for different fields. But if truth, as truth, is essentially (hence, always) realist and its plurality is limited to variations within the domain of realist truth (e.g., truth is always based on correspondence but the patterns of correspondence vary in, say, physics and mathematics), then the plurality of truth, by itself, would not lead to logical pluralism in the way delineated above. This, however, does not rule out other connections between truth-pluralism and logical pluralism. For example, both truth and logic might share some traits, or combinations of traits, that are potentially conducive to This content downloaded from 70.179.3.18 on Sun, 18 Oct 2020 01:46:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 338 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY pluralism. And indeed, they both share such a combination of traits, e.g., the combination of having a highly broad and a highly diverse scope. Both apply to many fields of knowledge, including fields that vary in their subject-matter and degree of abstractness. This opens up the possibility of pluralism for both. But diversity and breadth by themselves do not necessitate pluralism. In this paper I would like to explore a pair of other factors that correlate with pluralism and its opposite, monism, factors whose correlation with pluralism and monism in truth and logic has not been examined before. These factors pertain to our attitude to, or conception of, truth and logic, specifically, whether it is deflationist or substantivist. Starting with truth, I will examine whether and how deflationism and substantivism, as well as variations within substantivism, lead to different views on pluralism with respect to truth. Before turning to this question, however, let me briefly clarify the “level” on which I will speak on truth in this paper, for example, whether I will talk about the concept of truth or about the property of truth. This distinction plays a significant role in some philosophers’ thinking about truth, but it plays a less significant role in my own thinking about it. One reason is that for me philosophically important concepts are denoting concepts, so that given the philosophical importance of the concept of truth (in my view), truth is not just a concept. Another is that it is not automatically the case that if the concept of truth denotes something, it denotes a property. A further alternative is that the concept of truth denotes a norm, and there are other options as well. For reasons that I will explain below, I regard truth itself (what the concept of truth stands for) primarily as a norm and secondarily as a property—the property of satisfying the norm of truth. So, for me, talking about the concept, norm, and property of truth are all significant. Very often in this paper, though, I use “truth” to talk about the subject-matter of philosophical investigations and theories of truth. Although different philosophers have different views about what this subject-matter is, there is a certain family resemblance between the range of views discussed in the philosophical literature, and it is our familiarity with (more or less) the same literature that enables us to talk to each other about truth even when our answers to the question “What is truth?” differ significantly. A. Pluralism and Monism with Respect to Truth One well-known “manifesto” of truthdeflationism (often called “alethic deflationism”) is Horwich (1990). Horwich uses the term “minimalism” for his particular version of deflationism, but here I will treat this version as representative of the deflationist approach. It is easy to see that deflationism is associated with, or leads to, monism with respect to truth. According to deflationism, there is very little to truth: truth is a very thin property, concept, or predicate, and all there is to it is fully captured by the equivalence schema, formulated by Horwich as: (E) It is true that p if and only if p. [Horwich 1990, 7] Now, because this understanding of truth is both minimalist and exhaustive, it leaves no room for pluralism with respect to truth. Suppose there were some significant differences between truth in physics and truth in mathematics. These differences would concern features of truth other than (E), but deflationism does not recognize any such features. From the deflationist’s perspective, either there cannot be such differences or, if there could be, they would be irrelevant to our understanding of truth. The result is monism with respect to truth. Given any two fields of knowledge in the scope of truth, K1 and K2, their concept of truth is exhausted by (E). This content downloaded from 70.179.3.18 on Sun, 18 Oct 2020 01:46:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms PLURALISM AND NORMATIVITY / 339 Deflationism is too undiscerning to discern differences between fields of truth. Instead of looking and seeing whether truth behaves in the same way in all fields, deflationists limit their attention to a single, minimalistic test, one that is blind to any potential differences between truths in different fields. Generalizing, we may say that an easy way to impose unity (monism) on truth is to limit our attention to a very thin common denominator of all truths (e.g., (E)). But this way is too easy. One problem with the monistic conception of truth arrived at in this way is that it is blind to philosophically significant differences between truths. One example of such a difference is the difference between material truth (truth simpliciter) and logical truth. The difference between these two types of truth is difficult to ignore, but from a deflationist perspective, which takes only the material (E) schema into account, there is no room for two types of truth. Horwich (1990) does not say anything about logical truth, but he does say that “a central tenet of the point of view advanced here is that the theory of truth and the theory of logic have nothing to do with one another” (Horwich 1990: 76–77). This suggests that he does not recognize logical truth as a specific type of truth. In contrast to Horwich, Wright (1992), Lynch (2009), and I (2016a) are all substantivists with respect to truth. By “substantivist” I mean an advocate of a substantive theory (of any subject-matter), and by “substantive” I understand, in addition to “non-deflationist,” also having such traits as “informative,” “explanatory,” “deep,” “important,” “significant,” “theoretically grounded,” “subject to high standards of discovery and justification,” “rigorous,” “systematic,” “thorough,” “of intellectual interest,” and so on. Non-deflationism by itself may be viewed as weak substantivism; the aggregation of all or most of the traits noted above is strong substantivism. Wright’s, Lynch’s, and my substantivism about truth explains (at least in part) our attention to the plurality of truth. If truth is not exhausted by a single and simple principle, if there is more to truth than the equivalence schema, then there is room for multiple principles of truth, including principles that vary in scope. Some principles may hold in all domains of truth, others may be specific to particular domains (clusters of domains). Given the breadth of truth and the diversity of fields of truth, substantivism is open to the possibility of multiple types of truth with principled differences between them. For example, some principles governing truth in everyday physics (the physics of mid-size, observable objects) might not govern truth in mathematics, and vice versa. The acceptance of plurality by any theory, however, requires a balance between unity and diversity (disunity). And one way to introduce such a balance is to include both general and particular (global and local) principles. The former unify the theory, the latter dive","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48584451","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Abstract

In this paper I investigate how differences in approach to truth and logic (in particular, a deflationist vs. a substantivist approach to these fields) affect philosophers’ views concerning pluralism and normativity in these fields. My perspective on truth and logic is largely epistemic, focusing on the role of truth in knowledge (rather than on the use of the words “true” and “truth” in natural language), and my reference group includes Carnap (1934), Harman (1986), Horwich (1990), Wright (1992), Beall and Restall (2006), Field (2009), Lynch (2009), and Sher (2016a). Whenever possible, I focus on positive rather than negative views on the issues involved, although in some cases this is not possible. I. Pluralism in Truth and Logic The relation between truth-pluralism and logical pluralism has been discussed by a number of philosophers. A natural link between the two is the fact that the main logical (or rather, meta-logical) relation, logical consequence, is defined in terms of truth. A classical reference is Tarski (1936), according to which the sentence X is a logical consequence of the set of sentences K iff (if and only if) in every model in which all the sentences of K are true X is true too. It is common to say that logical consequence is defined in terms that significantly include preservation or transmission of truth. Now, if truth is plural—that is, there are different types of truth—then the preservation (transmission) of different types of truth might be based on different principles, giving rise to, or requiring, a plurality of logics. This potential connection is laid down in Lynch (2009) and Pedersen (2014), and I share their view. But whether this potential connection materializes depends on what truth-pluralism is and what is required for the transmission of different types of truth. If the plurality of truth is so deep that it allows both realist and antirealist conceptions of truth, and if transmission of realist truth requires, say, a bivalent logic while the transmission of antirealist truth requires a non-bivalent logic, then logic in some fields is bivalent, in others non-bivalent, i.e., there are different types of logic for different fields. But if truth, as truth, is essentially (hence, always) realist and its plurality is limited to variations within the domain of realist truth (e.g., truth is always based on correspondence but the patterns of correspondence vary in, say, physics and mathematics), then the plurality of truth, by itself, would not lead to logical pluralism in the way delineated above. This, however, does not rule out other connections between truth-pluralism and logical pluralism. For example, both truth and logic might share some traits, or combinations of traits, that are potentially conducive to This content downloaded from 70.179.3.18 on Sun, 18 Oct 2020 01:46:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 338 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY pluralism. And indeed, they both share such a combination of traits, e.g., the combination of having a highly broad and a highly diverse scope. Both apply to many fields of knowledge, including fields that vary in their subject-matter and degree of abstractness. This opens up the possibility of pluralism for both. But diversity and breadth by themselves do not necessitate pluralism. In this paper I would like to explore a pair of other factors that correlate with pluralism and its opposite, monism, factors whose correlation with pluralism and monism in truth and logic has not been examined before. These factors pertain to our attitude to, or conception of, truth and logic, specifically, whether it is deflationist or substantivist. Starting with truth, I will examine whether and how deflationism and substantivism, as well as variations within substantivism, lead to different views on pluralism with respect to truth. Before turning to this question, however, let me briefly clarify the “level” on which I will speak on truth in this paper, for example, whether I will talk about the concept of truth or about the property of truth. This distinction plays a significant role in some philosophers’ thinking about truth, but it plays a less significant role in my own thinking about it. One reason is that for me philosophically important concepts are denoting concepts, so that given the philosophical importance of the concept of truth (in my view), truth is not just a concept. Another is that it is not automatically the case that if the concept of truth denotes something, it denotes a property. A further alternative is that the concept of truth denotes a norm, and there are other options as well. For reasons that I will explain below, I regard truth itself (what the concept of truth stands for) primarily as a norm and secondarily as a property—the property of satisfying the norm of truth. So, for me, talking about the concept, norm, and property of truth are all significant. Very often in this paper, though, I use “truth” to talk about the subject-matter of philosophical investigations and theories of truth. Although different philosophers have different views about what this subject-matter is, there is a certain family resemblance between the range of views discussed in the philosophical literature, and it is our familiarity with (more or less) the same literature that enables us to talk to each other about truth even when our answers to the question “What is truth?” differ significantly. A. Pluralism and Monism with Respect to Truth One well-known “manifesto” of truthdeflationism (often called “alethic deflationism”) is Horwich (1990). Horwich uses the term “minimalism” for his particular version of deflationism, but here I will treat this version as representative of the deflationist approach. It is easy to see that deflationism is associated with, or leads to, monism with respect to truth. According to deflationism, there is very little to truth: truth is a very thin property, concept, or predicate, and all there is to it is fully captured by the equivalence schema, formulated by Horwich as: (E) It is true that p if and only if p. [Horwich 1990, 7] Now, because this understanding of truth is both minimalist and exhaustive, it leaves no room for pluralism with respect to truth. Suppose there were some significant differences between truth in physics and truth in mathematics. These differences would concern features of truth other than (E), but deflationism does not recognize any such features. From the deflationist’s perspective, either there cannot be such differences or, if there could be, they would be irrelevant to our understanding of truth. The result is monism with respect to truth. Given any two fields of knowledge in the scope of truth, K1 and K2, their concept of truth is exhausted by (E). This content downloaded from 70.179.3.18 on Sun, 18 Oct 2020 01:46:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms PLURALISM AND NORMATIVITY / 339 Deflationism is too undiscerning to discern differences between fields of truth. Instead of looking and seeing whether truth behaves in the same way in all fields, deflationists limit their attention to a single, minimalistic test, one that is blind to any potential differences between truths in different fields. Generalizing, we may say that an easy way to impose unity (monism) on truth is to limit our attention to a very thin common denominator of all truths (e.g., (E)). But this way is too easy. One problem with the monistic conception of truth arrived at in this way is that it is blind to philosophically significant differences between truths. One example of such a difference is the difference between material truth (truth simpliciter) and logical truth. The difference between these two types of truth is difficult to ignore, but from a deflationist perspective, which takes only the material (E) schema into account, there is no room for two types of truth. Horwich (1990) does not say anything about logical truth, but he does say that “a central tenet of the point of view advanced here is that the theory of truth and the theory of logic have nothing to do with one another” (Horwich 1990: 76–77). This suggests that he does not recognize logical truth as a specific type of truth. In contrast to Horwich, Wright (1992), Lynch (2009), and I (2016a) are all substantivists with respect to truth. By “substantivist” I mean an advocate of a substantive theory (of any subject-matter), and by “substantive” I understand, in addition to “non-deflationist,” also having such traits as “informative,” “explanatory,” “deep,” “important,” “significant,” “theoretically grounded,” “subject to high standards of discovery and justification,” “rigorous,” “systematic,” “thorough,” “of intellectual interest,” and so on. Non-deflationism by itself may be viewed as weak substantivism; the aggregation of all or most of the traits noted above is strong substantivism. Wright’s, Lynch’s, and my substantivism about truth explains (at least in part) our attention to the plurality of truth. If truth is not exhausted by a single and simple principle, if there is more to truth than the equivalence schema, then there is room for multiple principles of truth, including principles that vary in scope. Some principles may hold in all domains of truth, others may be specific to particular domains (clusters of domains). Given the breadth of truth and the diversity of fields of truth, substantivism is open to the possibility of multiple types of truth with principled differences between them. For example, some principles governing truth in everyday physics (the physics of mid-size, observable objects) might not govern truth in mathematics, and vice versa. The acceptance of plurality by any theory, however, requires a balance between unity and diversity (disunity). And one way to introduce such a balance is to include both general and particular (global and local) principles. The former unify the theory, the latter dive

查看原文本刊更多论文

真理与逻辑的多元性与规范性

在本文中，我研究了真理和逻辑方法的差异(特别是对这些领域的通货紧缩主义和实体主义方法)如何影响哲学家对这些领域的多元主义和规范性的看法。我对真理和逻辑的看法在很大程度上是认识论的，关注真理在知识中的作用(而不是自然语言中“真”和“真”这两个词的使用)，我的参考小组包括卡尔纳普(1934)、哈曼(1986)、霍维奇(1990)、赖特(1992)、比尔和莱斯托尔(2006)、菲尔德(2009)、林奇(2009)和谢尔(2016a)。只要有可能，我就关注所涉及问题的积极观点，而不是消极观点，尽管在某些情况下这是不可能的。真理多元主义与逻辑多元主义的关系已经被许多哲学家讨论过。两者之间的一个自然联系是，主要的逻辑(或者更确切地说，元逻辑)关系，逻辑结果，是根据真理来定义的。一个经典的参照是Tarski(1936)，根据他的理论，句子X是句子集K的逻辑推论，如果(当且仅当)在每个模型中，所有K的句子都为真X也为真。我们通常会说，逻辑结果的定义包含了对真相的保存或传递。现在，如果真理是多元的——也就是说，有不同类型的真理——那么，不同类型的真理的保存(传递)可能基于不同的原则，从而产生或要求逻辑的多元性。Lynch(2009)和Pedersen(2014)提出了这种潜在的联系，我同意他们的观点。但这种潜在的联系能否实现，取决于什么是真理多元主义，以及传播不同类型的真理需要什么。如果真理的多元性如此之深，以至于它允许现实主义和反现实主义的真理概念，如果现实主义真理的传递需要二价逻辑，而反现实主义真理的传递需要非二价逻辑，那么在某些领域的逻辑是二价的，在其他领域则是非二价的，即不同领域有不同类型的逻辑。但是，如果真理，作为真理，本质上(因此，永远)是现实主义的，它的多元性仅限于现实主义真理领域内的变化(例如，真理总是基于对应，但对应的模式在物理和数学中有所不同)，那么真理的多元性本身就不会导致上述方式的逻辑多元性。然而，这并不排除真理多元主义和逻辑多元主义之间的其他联系。例如，真理和逻辑可能共享一些特征，或特征的组合，这些特征可能有利于本内容下载自70.179.3.18(星期日，2020年10月18日01:46:55 UTC)所有使用受https://about.jstor.org/terms 338 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY pluralism约束。事实上，它们都有这样的特征组合，例如，具有高度广泛和高度多样化的范围的组合。两者都适用于许多知识领域，包括其主题和抽象程度不同的领域。这为两者开辟了多元化的可能性。但多样性和广度本身并不意味着多元主义。在本文中，我想探讨与多元主义及其对立面一元论相关的其他两个因素，这些因素与真理和逻辑上的多元主义和一元论的相关性以前没有被研究过。这些因素与我们对真理和逻辑的态度或概念有关，具体来说，无论是通缩主义者还是实体主义者。从真理开始，我将研究通货紧缩主义和实体主义，以及实体主义内部的变化，是否以及如何导致关于真理的多元主义的不同观点。然而，在讨论这个问题之前，让我简单地澄清一下我在本文中谈论真理的“层次”，例如，我是要谈论真理的概念还是真理的性质。这种区别在一些哲学家思考真理时起着重要的作用，但在我自己的思考中却起着不那么重要的作用。一个原因是，对我来说，哲学上重要的概念是表示概念，因此，鉴于真理概念的哲学重要性(在我看来)，真理不仅仅是一个概念。另一种观点是，如果真理的概念表示某物，它就表示一种性质，这种情况并不自动发生。另一种选择是，真理的概念表示一种规范，还有其他选择。由于我将在下面解释的原因，我认为真理本身(真理的概念代表什么)首先是一种规范，其次是一种属性——满足真理规范的属性。所以，对我来说，谈论真理的概念、规范和属性都很重要。在本文中，我研究了真理和逻辑方法的差异(特别是对这些领域的通货紧缩主义和实体主义方法)如何影响哲学家对这些领域的多元主义和规范性的看法。我对真理和逻辑的看法在很大程度上是认识论的，关注真理在知识中的作用(而不是自然语言中“真”和“真”这两个词的使用)，我的参考小组包括卡尔纳普(1934)、哈曼(1986)、霍维奇(1990)、赖特(1992)、比尔和莱斯托尔(2006)、菲尔德(2009)、林奇(2009)和谢尔(2016a)。只要有可能，我就关注所涉及问题的积极观点，而不是消极观点，尽管在某些情况下这是不可能的。真理多元主义与逻辑多元主义的关系已经被许多哲学家讨论过。两者之间的一个自然联系是，主要的逻辑(或者更确切地说，元逻辑)关系，逻辑结果，是根据真理来定义的。一个经典的参照是Tarski(1936)，根据他的理论，句子X是句子集K的逻辑推论，如果(当且仅当)在每个模型中，所有K的句子都为真X也为真。我们通常会说，逻辑结果的定义包含了对真相的保存或传递。现在，如果真理是多元的——也就是说，有不同类型的真理——那么，不同类型的真理的保存(传递)可能基于不同的原则，从而产生或要求逻辑的多元性。Lynch(2009)和Pedersen(2014)提出了这种潜在的联系，我同意他们的观点。但这种潜在的联系能否实现，取决于什么是真理多元主义，以及传播不同类型的真理需要什么。如果真理的多元性如此之深，以至于它允许现实主义和反现实主义的真理概念，如果现实主义真理的传递需要二价逻辑，而反现实主义真理的传递需要非二价逻辑，那么在某些领域的逻辑是二价的，在其他领域则是非二价的，即不同领域有不同类型的逻辑。但是，如果真理，作为真理，本质上(因此，永远)是现实主义的，它的多元性仅限于现实主义真理领域内的变化(例如，真理总是基于对应，但对应的模式在物理和数学中有所不同)，那么真理的多元性本身就不会导致上述方式的逻辑多元性。然而，这并不排除真理多元主义和逻辑多元主义之间的其他联系。例如，真理和逻辑可能共享一些特征，或特征的组合，这些特征可能有利于本内容下载自70.179.3.18(星期日，2020年10月18日01:46:55 UTC)所有使用受https://about.jstor.org/terms 338 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY pluralism约束。事实上，它们都有这样的特征组合，例如，具有高度广泛和高度多样化的范围的组合。两者都适用于许多知识领域，包括其主题和抽象程度不同的领域。这为两者开辟了多元化的可能性。但多样性和广度本身并不意味着多元主义。在本文中，我想探讨与多元主义及其对立面一元论相关的其他两个因素，这些因素与真理和逻辑上的多元主义和一元论的相关性以前没有被研究过。这些因素与我们对真理和逻辑的态度或概念有关，具体来说，无论是通缩主义者还是实体主义者。从真理开始，我将研究通货紧缩主义和实体主义，以及实体主义内部的变化，是否以及如何导致关于真理的多元主义的不同观点。然而，在讨论这个问题之前，让我简单地澄清一下我在本文中谈论真理的“层次”，例如，我是要谈论真理的概念还是真理的性质。这种区别在一些哲学家思考真理时起着重要的作用，但在我自己的思考中却起着不那么重要的作用。一个原因是，对我来说，哲学上重要的概念是表示概念，因此，鉴于真理概念的哲学重要性(在我看来)，真理不仅仅是一个概念。另一种观点是，如果真理的概念表示某物，它就表示一种性质，这种情况并不自动发生。另一种选择是，真理的概念表示一种规范，还有其他选择。由于我将在下面解释的原因，我认为真理本身(真理的概念代表什么)首先是一种规范，其次是一种属性——满足真理规范的属性。所以，对我来说，谈论真理的概念、规范和属性都很重要。然而，在本文中，我经常使用“真理”来谈论哲学研究和真理理论的主题。尽管不同的哲学家对这一主题有不同的看法，但在哲学文献中讨论的观点范围之间存在某种家族相似性，正是我们对(或多或少)相同的文献的熟悉使我们能够相互谈论真理，即使我们对“什么是真理?”差别很大。一个著名的真理紧缩主义(通常被称为“真性紧缩主义”)的“宣言”是霍里奇(1990)。霍里奇用“极简主义”一词来形容他的特殊版本的通货紧缩主义，但在这里，我将把这个版本作为通货紧缩主义方法的代表。很容易看出，通货紧缩主义与真理的一元论有关，或导致一元论。根据通货紧缩主义，关于真理的东西很少:真理是一个非常薄的属性、概念或谓词，所有关于真理的东西都被等价图式完全捕获，由霍里奇表述为:(E) p当且仅当p是真的。[霍里奇1990,7]现在，因为这种对真理的理解既极简又详尽，它没有给关于真理的多元主义留下空间。假设物理学中的真理和数学中的真理之间存在一些显著的差异。这些差异将涉及除(E)以外的真理特征，但通货紧缩主义不承认任何这样的特征。从通货紧缩主义者的角度来看，要么不可能有这样的差异，要么即使有，它们也与我们对真理的理解无关。其结果是对真理的一元论。给定真理范围内的任何两个知识领域，K1和K2，他们的真理概念被(E)耗尽。此内容下载自70.179.3.18,2020年10月18日太阳01:46:55 UTC所有使用均受https://about.jstor.org/terms PLURALISM and NORMATIVITY / 339 Deflationism的约束，无法辨别真理领域之间的差异。紧缩论者没有观察真理是否在所有领域都以同样的方式表现，而是把他们的注意力限制在一个单一的、极简主义的测试上，这种测试对不同领域真理之间的任何潜在差异视而不见。概括地说，我们可以说，将统一(一元论)强加于真理的一个简单方法是将我们的注意力限制在所有真理的一个非常薄的公分母上(例如，(E))。但是这种方式太简单了。以这种方式得出的一元论真理概念的一个问题是，它对真理之间的哲学意义差异视而不见。这种区别的一个例子是物质真理(简单真理)和逻辑真理之间的区别。这两种类型的真理之间的区别很难忽视，但从只考虑物质(E)图式的通货紧缩主义角度来看，没有两种类型的真理的空间。Horwich(1990)没有说任何关于逻辑真理的事情，但他确实说过“这里提出的观点的一个中心原则是真理理论和逻辑理论彼此没有任何关系”(Horwich 1990: 76-77)。这表明他不承认逻辑真理是一种特定类型的真理。与Horwich相反，Wright(1992)、Lynch(2009)和I (2016a)在真理方面都是实体主义者。我所说的“实体主义者”是指实体理论(任何主题)的倡导者，而我所理解的“实体”，除了“非通货紧缩主义者”之外，还具有“翔实的”、“解释的”、“深刻的”、“重要的”、“重要的”、“有意义的”、“理论基础的”、“符合高标准的发现和证明”、“严谨的”、“系统的”、“彻底的”、“智力兴趣的”等特征。非通货紧缩主义本身可能被视为弱实体主义;上述所有或大部分特征的集合就是强实体主义。赖特、林奇和我关于真理的实体主义解释了(至少部分地)我们对真理多元性的关注。如果真理没有被单一简单的原则所耗尽，如果真理不仅仅是等价模式，那么就有了多种真理原则的空间，包括范围不同的原则。一些原则可能适用于所有的真理领域，另一些原则可能只适用于特定的领域(领域集群)。鉴于真理的广度和真理领域的多样性，实体主义对多种类型的真理的可能性持开放态度，它们之间存在原则差异。例如，在日常物理(中等大小、可观察对象的物理)中支配真理的一些原则可能不支配数学中的真理，反之亦然。然而，任何理论对多元性的接受都需要在统一性和多样性(不统一性)之间取得平衡。然而，在本文中，我经常使用“真理”来谈论哲学研究和真理理论的主题。尽管不同的哲学家对这一主题有不同的看法，但在哲学文献中讨论的观点范围之间存在某种家族相似性，正是我们对(或多或少)相同的文献的熟悉使我们能够相互谈论真理，即使我们对“什么是真理?”差别很大。一个著名的真理紧缩主义(通常被称为“真性紧缩主义”)的“宣言”是霍里奇(1990)。霍里奇用“极简主义”一词来形容他的特殊版本的通货紧缩主义，但在这里，我将把这个版本作为通货紧缩主义方法的代表。很容易看出，通货紧缩主义与真理的一元论有关，或导致一元论。根据通货紧缩主义，关于真理的东西很少:真理是一个非常薄的属性、概念或谓词，所有关于真理的东西都被等价图式完全捕获，由霍里奇表述为:(E) p当且仅当p是真的。[霍里奇1990,7]现在，因为这种对真理的理解既极简又详尽，它没有给关于真理的多元主义留下空间。假设物理学中的真理和数学中的真理之间存在一些显著的差异。这些差异将涉及除(E)以外的真理特征，但通货紧缩主义不承认任何这样的特征。从通货紧缩主义者的角度来看，要么不可能有这样的差异，要么即使有，它们也与我们对真理的理解无关。其结果是对真理的一元论。给定真理范围内的任何两个知识领域，K1和K2，他们的真理概念被(E)耗尽。此内容下载自70.179.3.18,2020年10月18日太阳01:46:55 UTC所有使用均受https://about.jstor.org/terms PLURALISM and NORMATIVITY / 339 Deflationism的约束，无法辨别真理领域之间的差异。紧缩论者没有观察真理是否在所有领域都以同样的方式表现，而是把他们的注意力限制在一个单一的、极简主义的测试上，这种测试对不同领域真理之间的任何潜在差异视而不见。概括地说，我们可以说，将统一(一元论)强加于真理的一个简单方法是将我们的注意力限制在所有真理的一个非常薄的公分母上(例如，(E))。但是这种方式太简单了。以这种方式得出的一元论真理概念的一个问题是，它对真理之间的哲学意义差异视而不见。这种区别的一个例子是物质真理(简单真理)和逻辑真理之间的区别。这两种类型的真理之间的区别很难忽视，但从只考虑物质(E)图式的通货紧缩主义角度来看，没有两种类型的真理的空间。Horwich(1990)没有说任何关于逻辑真理的事情，但他确实说过“这里提出的观点的一个中心原则是真理理论和逻辑理论彼此没有任何关系”(Horwich 1990: 76-77)。这表明他不承认逻辑真理是一种特定类型的真理。与Horwich相反，Wright(1992)、Lynch(2009)和I (2016a)在真理方面都是实体主义者。我所说的“实体主义者”是指实体理论(任何主题)的倡导者，而我所理解的“实体”，除了“非通货紧缩主义者”之外，还具有“翔实的”、“解释的”、“深刻的”、“重要的”、“重要的”、“有意义的”、“理论基础的”、“符合高标准的发现和证明”、“严谨的”、“系统的”、“彻底的”、“智力兴趣的”等特征。非通货紧缩主义本身可能被视为弱实体主义;上述所有或大部分特征的集合就是强实体主义。赖特、林奇和我关于真理的实体主义解释了(至少部分地)我们对真理多元性的关注。如果真理没有被单一简单的原则所耗尽，如果真理不仅仅是等价模式，那么就有了多种真理原则的空间，包括范围不同的原则。一些原则可能适用于所有的真理领域，另一些原则可能只适用于特定的领域(领域集群)。鉴于真理的广度和真理领域的多样性，实体主义对多种类型的真理的可能性持开放态度，它们之间存在原则差异。例如，在日常物理(中等大小、可观察对象的物理)中支配真理的一些原则可能不支配数学中的真理，反之亦然。然而，任何理论对多元性的接受都需要在统一性和多样性(不统一性)之间取得平衡。引入这种平衡的一种方法是同时包含一般原则和特定原则(全局原则和局部原则)。前者统一理论，后者潜移默化引入这种平衡的一种方法是同时包含一般原则和特定原则(全局原则和局部原则)。前者统一理论，后者潜移默化

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Since its inauguration in 1964, the American Philosophical Quarterly (APQ) has established itself as one of the principal English vehicles for the publication of scholarly work in philosophy. The whole of each issue—printed in a large-page, double-column format—is given to substantial articles; from time to time there are also "state of the art" surveys of recent work on particular topics. The editorial policy is to publish work of high quality, regardless of the school of thought from which it derives.