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Third-Party Apologies; Theory and Form 第三方道歉;理论与形式
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2022-07-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.3.06
Marc A. Cohen, Colette Hoption
{"title":"Third-Party Apologies; Theory and Form","authors":"Marc A. Cohen, Colette Hoption","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.3.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.3.06","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 When A wrongs B while C observes, or when B tells C afterward, C might apologize. This could seem to be an imprecise or merely metaphorical use of the word ‘apology’ to refer to an expression of sympathy. But this short paper explains how third-party apologies function as apologies (they restore respect to B, the victim, that was undermined by the wrongdoer A); it explains why such an apology could be morally necessary on C's part; and it provides a preliminary account of the components of a third-party apology.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45776573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Response-Dependence in Moral Responsibility: A Granularity Challenge 道德责任中的响应依赖:粒度挑战
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2022-07-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.3.05
S. Wang
{"title":"Response-Dependence in Moral Responsibility: A Granularity Challenge","authors":"S. Wang","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.3.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.3.05","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 According to the response-dependence view of moral responsibility, a person is morally responsible just in case, and in virtue of the fact that, she is an appropriate target for reactive attitudes. This paper raises a new puzzle regarding response-dependence: there is a mismatch between the granularity of the reactive attitudes and of responsibility facts. Whereas the reactive attitudes are comparatively coarse-grained, responsibility facts can be quite fine-grained. This poses a challenge for response-dependence, which seeks to ground facts about responsibility in facts about the reactive attitudes. Specifically, reactive attitudes are not enough for grounding facts about degrees of moral responsibility. The response-dependence view thus requires significant revisions or supplementations.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" 46","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41252170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
“Epistemic Frankfurt Cases” Against the Backdrop of the Original Frankfurt Case 以法兰克福原案为背景的“认识论的法兰克福案例”
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2022-07-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.3.02
Isabelle Keßels
{"title":"“Epistemic Frankfurt Cases” Against the Backdrop of the Original Frankfurt Case","authors":"Isabelle Keßels","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.3.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.3.02","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper critically examines so-called “epistemic Frankfurt cases” (see e.g., Kelp 2016; Zagzebski 2001) against the backdrop of the original Frankfurt case. A distinction is drawn between two ways of deserving “epistemic credit,” which are subsequently compared to the concept of moral responsibility that is in play within the original Frankfurt case. Based on this analysis, Zagzebski's claim that agents in “epistemic Frankfurt cases” can be considered epistemically credible for the same reason as the agent in the original version is said to be morally responsible is challenged; raising doubts as to whether these cases really are best described as instances of knowledge. The paper concludes with the construction and discussion of a case that is a genuine epistemic analogue to the original Frankfurt case.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42617905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why Causation is Biconditional but not Proportional 为什么因果关系是双条件的而不是比例的
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2022-07-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.3.04
Lei Zhong
{"title":"Why Causation is Biconditional but not Proportional","authors":"Lei Zhong","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.3.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.3.04","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this article, I defend a biconditional counterfactual account of causation, which places equal emphasis on what I call “the presence condition” and “the absence condition,” whereas Lewis's classical counterfactual theory focuses only on the absence condition. I attempt to show that biconditionalism provides a promising treatment of supervenient causation, namely, causal cases involving the supervenience relationship. Although some philosophers confuse this account with the proportionality constraint on causation, I argue that biconditionalism is distinct from and superior to proportionalism in accommodating our reliable causal intuitions.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43531470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Epistemic Idolatry and Intellectual Vice 认识上的偶像崇拜和智力上的罪恶
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2022-07-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.3.01
J. Dolin
{"title":"Epistemic Idolatry and Intellectual Vice","authors":"J. Dolin","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.3.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.3.01","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Following Robert Adams's account of idolatry, this paper develops the concept of epistemic idolatry. Where there is devotion belonging to truth but given to a particular epistemic good, there we find epistemic idolatry. With this concept in hand, motivationalist virtue epistemologists gain two theoretical advantages: their list of defective motives can include intellectual motivation in excess without the implausible claim that, intellectually, one can be too motivated by truth; and the disvalue of many intellectual vices, including some putative counterexamples to their theory of intellectual vice, can be explained in terms of epistemic idolatry.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45971426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Contact Argument: A Little Unduly Simple? 接触争论：有点过于简单？
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2022-07-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.3.03
Landon D. C. Elkind
{"title":"The Contact Argument: A Little Unduly Simple?","authors":"Landon D. C. Elkind","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.3.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.3.03","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The contact argument is widely cited as making a strong case against a gunk-free metaphysics with point-sized simples. It is shown here that the contact argument's reasoning is faulty even if all its background assumptions and desiderata for contact are accepted. Further, the simples theorist can offer both metric and topological accounts of contact that satisfy all the contact argument's desiderata. This indicates that the contact argument's persuasiveness stems from a tacit reliance on the thesis that objects in contact are inseparable: the simples theorist must allow that separated objects might be in contact. The concluding section critically considers this contact-separability thesis and argues that rejecting it is not so terrible. The upshot of all this is that the contact argument is simply unconvincing.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41855036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Phenomenology of Hope 希望现象学
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2022-07-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.3.08
Jack M. C. Kwong
{"title":"The Phenomenology of Hope","authors":"Jack M. C. Kwong","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.3.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.3.08","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 What is the phenomenology of hope? A common view is that hope has a generally positive and pleasant affective tone. This rosy depiction, however, has recently been challenged. Certain hopes, it has been objected, are such that they are either entirely negative in valence or neutral in tone. In this paper, I argue that this challenge has only limited success. In particular, I show that it only applies to one sense of hope but leaves another sense—one that is implicitly but widely employed in the hope literature—untouched. Moreover, I argue that hope construed in this latter sense is inherently positively valenced. The paper concludes by discussing some of the implications of this defense of hope's positive phenomenology, including the ontological question of whether hope is an emotion.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46544276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Does Knowledge Intellectualism Have a Gettier Problem? 知识理智主义有更大的问题吗?
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.2.04
K. Harris
{"title":"Does Knowledge Intellectualism Have a Gettier Problem?","authors":"K. Harris","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.2.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.2.04","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Knowledge intellectualism is the view that knowledge-how requires propositional knowledge. Knowledge intellectualism has a Gettier problem, or so many of its critics allege. The essence of this problem is that knowledge-how is compatible with epistemic luck in a way that ordinary propositional knowledge is not. Hence, knowledge-how can allegedly be had in the absence of knowledge-that, a fact inconsistent with knowledge intellectualism.\u0000 This paper develops two responses to this challenge to knowledge intellectualism. First, it is not clear that propositional knowledge is incompatible with the forms of epistemic luck with which knowledge-how is allegedly compatible. Second, existing cases intended to serve as counterexamples to knowledge intellectualism are flawed, and revised versions of these cases no longer elicit the judgments necessary to challenge knowledge intellectualism.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43917445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief 乐观态度的准确性:关于信念准确性的最新研究
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.2.08
Robert Weston Siscoe
{"title":"Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief","authors":"Robert Weston Siscoe","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.2.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.2.08","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 James Joyce's article “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism” introduced an approach to arguing for credal norms by appealing to the epistemic value of accuracy. The central thought was that credences ought to accurately represent the world, a guiding thought that has gone on to generate an entire research paradigm on the rationality of credences. Recently, a number of epistemologists have begun to apply this same thought to full beliefs, attempting to explain and argue for norms of belief in terms of epistemic value. This paper examines these recent attempts, showing how they interact with work on the accuracy of credences. It then examines how differing judgments about epistemic value give rise to distinct rational requirements for belief, concluding by considering some of the fundamental questions and issues yet to be fully explored.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45080638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Modal Collapse and Modal Fallacies: No Easy Defense of Simplicity 模态崩溃和模态谬误：简单性的不易辩护
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.2.05
J. Waldrop
{"title":"Modal Collapse and Modal Fallacies: No Easy Defense of Simplicity","authors":"J. Waldrop","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.2.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.2.05","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I critically examine the claim that modal collapse arguments against the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) are in general fallacious. In a recent paper, Christopher Tomaszewski alleges that modal collapse arguments against DDS are invalid, owing to illicit substitutions of nonrigid singular terms into intensional contexts. I show that this is not, in general, the case. I show, further, that where existing modal collapse arguments are vulnerable to this charge the arguments can be repaired without any apparent dialectical impropriety. I conclude that the genuine debate over modal collapse and divine simplicity and modal collapse is substantially a controversy over the metaphysics of divine action, and that this constitutes a fruitful direction in which to take future discussions of the subject.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41954103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
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