Review of Industrial Organization最新文献_第3页

The Expansion of Incentive (Performance-Based) Regulation of Electricity Distribution and Transmission in the United States 美国配电和输电激励性（基于绩效）监管的扩展

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-06-17 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09973-x

Paul L. Joskow

{"title":"The Expansion of Incentive (Performance-Based) Regulation of Electricity Distribution and Transmission in the United States","authors":"Paul L. Joskow","doi":"10.1007/s11151-024-09973-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-024-09973-x","url":null,"abstract":"I examine developments in the application of performance-based regulation (PBR) to electricity distribution and transmission in the United States. Applications of comprehensive PBR to electricity distribution had been slow to diffuse in the U.S. prior to roughly 2000. PBR mechanisms are now being applied more frequently to electricity distribution, which reflects the changing structure of the electric power industry and the increasing obligations that are being placed on electric distribution companies. The new obligations are a consequence primarily of aggressive targets for decarbonizing the electricity sector in nearly half the states and the goal of using “clean” electricity to electrify transportation, buildings, and other sectors. PBR should be viewed as a set of “building blocks” that can be adopted in various combinations and should recognize that PBR and traditional cost-of-service regulation (COSR) are properly viewed as complements rather than substitutes. Recent reforms in the regulation of distribution companies in Great Britain—“RIIO”—have been influential in the U.S. The main reforms contained in RIIO are discussed. There has been essentially no application of PBR by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to owners of transmission assets or to independent transmission operators. FERC has applied targeted incentives to encourage investment in transmission facilities and membership in independent system operator organizations. However, the regulation of transmission rates relies primarily on COSR in the form of formula rates and has poor incentive properties. Regulation of independent system operators is a challenge because they are non-profit organizations with no equity to put at risk. Reforms here are suggested.","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":"170 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141506184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Getting Merger Guidelines Right 正确掌握合并准则

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-05-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09967-9

Keith N. Hylton

引用次数: 0

The 2023 Merger Guidelines: Law, Fact, and Method 2023 年合并指南：法律、事实和方法

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-05-18 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09963-z

Herbert Hovenkamp

{"title":"The 2023 Merger Guidelines: Law, Fact, and Method","authors":"Herbert Hovenkamp","doi":"10.1007/s11151-024-09963-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-024-09963-z","url":null,"abstract":"The final version of the 2023 Merger Guidelines, which were issued in December 2023, is a vast improvement over an earlier draft—which indicates that the Agencies took the many comments that they received on a draft very seriously. These Guidelines break some new ground that older Guidelines did not address, and make many positive contributions, which this paper spells out. They are also excessively nostalgic for a past era, however, and this may explain their propen sity to treat empirical questions as issues of law: This is one way to insulate these Guidelines from further revision. The excessive reliance on one decision, Brown Shoe, is unfortunate—particularly since that decision has been so often repudiated, even by the Supreme Court itself. This paper pays particular attention to: the Guidelines’ treatment of structural triggers and direct measures of competitive effects; their aggressive position on potential competition mergers; their willingness to weigh a “trend” toward concentration as a factor; and their treatment of serial acquisitions. The Guidelines include a welcome new section on mergers involving multi-sided networks, although their view of networks is too one-sided; and the Guidelines also contain an expanded section on mergers with harmful effects on suppliers—including labor. The Guidelines’ treatment of market definition is likely to lead to underenforcement because they define markets too broadly. Finally, the Guidelines could have made better use of recent retrospective studies—many of which would have provided further support for the substantive positions that the Guidelines take.","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141060119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Mergers in Declining Industry 衰退行业的兼并

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-05-18 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09966-w

Tirza Angerhofer

引用次数: 0

The 2023 Merger Guidelines and The Role of Economics 2023 年合并指南与经济学的作用

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-05-03 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09957-x

Michael A. Salinger

引用次数: 0

Marker Systems in Leniency Policies 宽大政策中的标记系统

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-05-02 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09955-z

Konstantinos Charistos

引用次数: 0

The 2023 Merger Guidelines: A Post-Chicago and Neo-Brandeisian Integration 2023 年合并指南》：后芝加哥与新勃兰登堡式整合

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-04-09 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09959-9

Steven C. Salop

{"title":"The 2023 Merger Guidelines: A Post-Chicago and Neo-Brandeisian Integration","authors":"Steven C. Salop","doi":"10.1007/s11151-024-09959-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-024-09959-9","url":null,"abstract":"This article is designed to explicate the somewhat misunderstood analysis in the 2023 Merger Guidelines (MGs) and situate the MGs in the context of the legal as well as economic environment in which they operate. The MGs refine economic analyses in previous MGs, renew emphasis on certain competitive concerns and approaches, and add several emerging new competitive issues. They also integrate certain goals of post-Chicago and Neo-Brandeisian approaches to merger analysis. The MGs integrate the economic analysis into the traditional legal structure of the “prima facie” and “rebuttal” evidentiary stages and place greater weight on avoiding false negatives over false positives in various places, which is a principal element in both post-Chicago and Neo-Brandeisian approaches. An important theme that runs through the 2023 MGs is that competitive effects analysis should not be limited to static competitive effects analysis of the immediate unilateral or coordinated price effects of a merger. They stress that the analysis should also account for the dynamic effects that result from the change in market structure that follows from the merger as well as the changes in the incentives of the firms. As in the seminal Spence-Dixit models, the entrant would rationally anticipate that the lower marginal costs of the merged firm could produce more intense post-entry price competition and a higher likelihood that the entry would be unprofitable. Thus, higher barriers to entry or expansion may result, which means that the merged firm’s rebuttal burden of production under the sliding scale should be increased accordingly under the decision theory risk analysis that places greater weight on avoiding false negatives.","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":"71 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140576041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Evolution of the Merger Guidelines: Is This Fox Too Clever by Half? 合并指南的演变：这只狐狸是不是太聪明了？

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-04-06 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09956-y

Carl Shapiro

{"title":"Evolution of the Merger Guidelines: Is This Fox Too Clever by Half?","authors":"Carl Shapiro","doi":"10.1007/s11151-024-09956-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-024-09956-y","url":null,"abstract":"The 2023 Merger Guidelines make some notable improvements over the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. They give greater emphasis to the idea that predicting the competitive effects of a proposed merger is inherently difficult and that to block a merger the government need only show a risk that the merger may substantially lessen competition – not that it will do so. They also give greater emphasis to dynamic competition and innovation – especially with regard to acquisitions of potential entrants – and they add useful material on multi-sided platforms. However, the treatment of market definition in the 2023 Merger Guidelines may weaken horizontal merger enforcement by demoting the role of the “hypothetical monopolist test,” which is used to define markets for the purpose of measuring market shares, and by removing extensive material from prior guidelines that explained why market shares measured in narrower markets tend to be more informative than market shares measured in broader markets. The 2023 Merger Guidelines lower the market concentration thresholds that trigger a presumption by the antitrust enforcement agencies that a merger may substantially lessen competition, but the enforcement data suggest that change will have little effect in practice. The 2023 Merger Guidelines also may lead to less effective deterrence of harmful mergers because they are not well targeted at the mergers that are most likely to substantially lessen competition. One cannot prioritize everything.","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140576245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Customer Recognition and Mobile Geo-Targeting 客户识别和移动地理定位

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-04-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09952-2

Irina Baye, Philip Hanspach, Tim Reiz, Geza Sapi

引用次数: 0

The Auction of Contracts by Consumer Groups and the Effect on Market Power 消费者团体拍卖合同及其对市场力量的影响

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-04-03 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09943-3

Pablo Serra

引用次数: 0