Review of Industrial Organization最新文献

Cartel Damages Claims, Passing-On, and Passing-Back 卡特尔损害索赔、转嫁和返还

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-09-12 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09991-9

Luke Garrod, Tien-Der Han, James Harvey, Matthew Olczak

引用次数: 0

A Transactions Cost Analysis of the Welfare and Output Effects of Rebates and Non-Linear Pricing 回扣和非线性定价对福利和产出影响的交易成本分析

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-09-12 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09992-8

Bruce H. Kobayashi, Joshua D. Wright

{"title":"A Transactions Cost Analysis of the Welfare and Output Effects of Rebates and Non-Linear Pricing","authors":"Bruce H. Kobayashi, Joshua D. Wright","doi":"10.1007/s11151-024-09992-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-024-09992-8","url":null,"abstract":"Ronald Coase famously exposed the limitations of economic analyses that rely upon assumptions of frictionless markets. He highlighted the importance of including transaction costs in economic analyses and issued a challenge to economists to think seriously about how transaction costs affect economic systems. Harold Demsetz, extended Coase’s analysis to show how these costs alter the way firms price and market their products. Demsetz’s analysis underscored that the costs of providing a market sometimes exceed the benefits of creating one in the first place and examined conditions where transaction costs imply that zero amounts of explicit market pricing will be efficient. This article extends Demsetz’s insights with respect to non-linear pricing contracts that seem not to “price” key side effects of the economic exchange. In particular, we analyze the welfare and output effects of two examples of such contracts that are commonly used by firms that are frequently subject to antitrust scrutiny: metered pricing; and loyalty discounts. The analysis demonstrates how a firm’s choice to set prices for its products are influenced by transaction and information costs and examines whether changes in output that are caused by the use of these non-linear pricing schemes are positively correlated with changes in total and consumer welfare. The article then discusses conditions under which measuring output effects can reliably differentiate between welfare-increasing and welfare-reducing uses of non-linear pricing.","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142183823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Location, Location, Quality:The Fixed Differentiation Principle 位置、位置、质量：固定的差异化原则

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-09-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09989-3

Alon Cohen, Aviad Heifetz

引用次数: 0

The Coase Conjecture When the Monopolist and Customers have Different Discount Rates 当垄断者和客户的贴现率不同时的科斯猜想

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-08-31 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09990-w

Tim Groseclose

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Heterogeneous Tax-Cut Pass-Through and Market Structure 异质减税转嫁与市场结构

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-08-24 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09986-6

Yenjae Chang

引用次数: 0

Preserving the Institutional Value of the FTC in the Digital Era 在数字时代维护联邦贸易委员会的制度价值

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-08-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09988-4

Ginger Zhe Jin, Liad Wagman

引用次数: 0

Click versus Tap: The Substitution Effects of Smartphones on Computers 点击与轻点：智能手机对电脑的替代效应

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-08-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09984-8

Stephanie Lee, Georgios Alaveras, Pai-Ling Yin

{"title":"Click versus Tap: The Substitution Effects of Smartphones on Computers","authors":"Stephanie Lee, Georgios Alaveras, Pai-Ling Yin","doi":"10.1007/s11151-024-09984-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-024-09984-8","url":null,"abstract":"With the prevalence of smartphones, it is important to understand the relationship between the smartphone channel and the computer channel. In this paper, we examine the extent to which smartphones substitute for or complement computers. We utilize unique panel data on individuals’ smartphone and computer usage, which contain detailed information on all domains and apps that individuals visit on their smartphones and computers. To examine the effect that smartphone usage has on computer usage, we exploit the panel nature of the data and use instrumental variables. We instrument for smartphone usage time with the use of the Android operating system version. We find that an increase in smartphone usage time decreases computer usage time, which indicates that smartphones and computers are overall substitutes. We find that the substitution pattern is greater on weekends compared to weekdays. We also examine how the effect of smartphone usage on computer usage differs across user characteristics. When we additionally examine the heterogeneity in substitution effects across domain and app categories, we find larger substitution effects for categories where computers may have been a dominant traditional digital channel prior to smartphones.","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":"66 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142183830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Incentive Regulation: Expectations, Surprises, and the Road Forward 激励监管：期望、惊喜和前进之路

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-08-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09976-8

Martin Cave

引用次数: 0

Exogenous Versus Endogenous Consumer Time Preferences: Oligopoly 外生与内生的消费者时间偏好：寡头垄断

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-08-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09985-7

Evangelos Rouskas, Stylianos Xanthopoulos

{"title":"Exogenous Versus Endogenous Consumer Time Preferences: Oligopoly","authors":"Evangelos Rouskas, Stylianos Xanthopoulos","doi":"10.1007/s11151-024-09985-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-024-09985-7","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a dynamic framework with consumers who have different valuations and an arbitrary number of firms that compete in quantities in each period. The consumers’ ability to behave strategically about the timing of consumption differs in the three distinct cognitive structures that we study: Under perfect rationality, consumers are strategic. Under extreme bounded rationality, consumers are myopic. Under explicit bounded rationality, consumers start the game myopic and can become strategic by incurring a cost. We make three contributions: First, we examine how the welfare of consumers is affected when new firms enter the industry, ceteris paribus. We find that under perfect rationality no consumers are worse off with a larger number of firms, whereas under extreme and explicit bounded rationality, some consumers may be worse off. Second, we reevaluate the profitability of exogenous horizontal mergers. We prove that mergers in which the merging firms represent more than 80% of the industry may be unprofitable. This outcome appears under explicit bounded rationality and represents a new merger paradox. Third, we demonstrate that, under explicit bounded rationality, an increase in the cognition cost, ceteris paribus, may decrease profits per firm. One can view the cognition cost as relevant to the transparency of the market. Thus, our finding questions the benefits from less transparent markets for oligopolistic firms.","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":"390 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142183828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Does it Matter if Competition is “Fair” or “on the Merits”? An Application to Platform Self-Preferencing 竞争是 "公平 "还是 "择优 "重要吗？平台自我参照的应用

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-08-17 DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09982-w

Michael L. Katz

{"title":"Does it Matter if Competition is “Fair” or “on the Merits”? An Application to Platform Self-Preferencing","authors":"Michael L. Katz","doi":"10.1007/s11151-024-09982-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-024-09982-w","url":null,"abstract":"Platform self-preferencing is often attacked as being “unfair.” Proponents of the consumer welfare standard complain that a fairness standard is too vague and too untethered from competitive effects to be a useful guide for antitrust enforcement. However, the consumer welfare standard relies on assessment of whether competition is “on the merits,” and the criteria for “merits” substantially overlap with those for “fairness.” Both standards generally condemn: (a) deception; (b) raising rivals’ costs; and (c) gaining too much competitive advantage from past success, especially across markets. This article examines whether these criteria help identify when the competitive effects of self-preferencing are positive or negative. The discussion is framed in terms of a platform that facilitates the interaction of buyers and sellers, and chooses whether to preference certain sellers. As the literature has shown, whether it owns a seller or not, a platform may use preferencing to promote seller competition or to promote seller market power, depending on the circumstances. Given the varying effects of self-preferencing, a blanket prohibition is unwarranted. Unfortunately, the common criteria for fairness and merit do not reliably identify the direction of self-preferencing’s competitive effects. For example, deception by a lagging firm could strengthen competition in the sense of lowering equilibrium purchase prices and raising consumer welfare. And gaining “too much” competitive advantage from past successes could facilitate entry into new markets, thus increasing competition in those markets. Instead of applying criteria for fairness and merit, a case-by-case, fact-intensive analysis of actual competitive effects is needed.","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142183683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0