Marker Systems in Leniency Policies

IF 0.8 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Konstantinos Charistos
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Leniency Programs (LPs) reward cartel-participating firms that come forward with evidence that can be used as proof of the illegal conduct in which they have participated. The marker system allows a leniency applicant to reserve its position in the reporting queue before the names of the eligible applicants are announced. We show that markers can reduce the destabilizing effect of LPs: When cartels are established either with or without a marker system, self-reporting and cartel disruption are less likely with markers, as compared to without markers. In addition, the introduction of markers in LPs may further the sustainability of collusion.

宽大政策中的标记系统
宽大处理方案(LPs)奖励那些提供证据证明其所参与的非法行为的卡特尔参与企业。标记系统允许宽大处理申请人在符合条件的申请人名单公布前保留其在报告队列中的位置。我们的研究表明,标记可以降低 LP 的不稳定效应:无论是有还是没有标记系统的卡特尔,有标记系统的卡特尔与无标记系统的卡特尔相比,自我报告和卡特尔破坏的可能性都更小。此外,在LP中引入标记可能会促进合谋的可持续性。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.10
自引率
9.10%
发文量
35
期刊介绍: New Online Manuscript Submission System The Review of Industrial Organization publishes research papers on all aspects of industrial organization, broadly defined. A main focus is on competition and monopoly, in their many forms and processes and their effects on efficiency, innovation, and social conditions. Topics may range from the internal organization of enterprises to wide international comparisons. The Review is also increasing its interest in papers on public policies such as antitrust, regulation, deregulation, public enterprise, and privatization. Papers may deal with any economic sectors and any developed economies. The Review continues its primary interest in ideas that can be verified by econometric evidence, case studies, or other real conditions. But the Review also seeks papers that advance significant theories of industrial organization and policy. Papers using abstract techniques and econometric tests should present the methods and analysis in plain enough English so that non-specialist readers can evaluate the content. The Review welcomes submissions from any source, and the Editors will make every effort to have papers reviewed quickly and to give prompt decisions. The Editors will also seek to arrange symposia on specific topics, and they are open to proposals for grouped papers. They also welcome shorter notes and commentaries on topics of interest to the profession. Officially cited as: Rev Ind Organ
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