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The Objects of Rational Thought (a Sketch) 理性思维的对象（素描）
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
MONIST Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.1093/monist/onaa017
Charles Travis
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引用次数: 0
Exploding the Realism-Antirealism Debate: Putnam contra Putnam 爆发现实主义与反现实主义之争:普特南对普特南
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
MONIST Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.1093/monist/onaa010
David Macarthur
{"title":"Exploding the Realism-Antirealism Debate: Putnam contra Putnam","authors":"David Macarthur","doi":"10.1093/monist/onaa010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Putnam is famous (or infamous) for often changing his allegiance between various forms of realism and antirealism. In this paper I want to use Putnam’s own reflections and insights on the realism-antirealism issue to provide a powerful case for skepticism about the entire debate—in spite of the fact that that is not Putnam’s own ultimate attitude. From this skeptical perspective, I shall argue that Putnam has helped us see that the realism-antirealism debate faces a dilemma: either it resolves into existence questions about particular items that are resolvable by, say, scientific or mathematical or ethical etc. practices rather than by appeal to philosophical argument; or it represents a misguided response to skepticism about an entire class or realm of items (e.g., the unobservable items posited by physics, or the manifest world of tables and chairs) given that it hopelessly attempts to answer skepticism on the skeptic’s own terms. What Putnam tends to overlook in his realist moments is that we can philosophically undermine skepticism without being committed to any philosophically substantial realism or antirealism.","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":"103 1","pages":"370-380"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/monist/onaa010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48568988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hilary Putnam’s Liberal Naturalism about Language Use, Reference, and Truth Hilary Putnam关于语言使用、指称和真理的自由自然主义
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
MONIST Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.1093/monist/onaa009
Gary Ebbs
{"title":"Hilary Putnam’s Liberal Naturalism about Language Use, Reference, and Truth","authors":"Gary Ebbs","doi":"10.1093/monist/onaa009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Hilary Putnam observes that a typical competent English speaker who cannot tell an elm tree from a beech tree may nevertheless use the word “elm” to make assertions and ask questions about elm trees. Putnam also observes that scientists may be wrong about the phenomena they investigate, while still being able to use their words to identify and raise research questions about it. This prompts him to ask what “language use” means in these contexts. He proposes two closely related methods for answering this question. The first method is to investigate and clarify the uses of sentences and words in a given linguistic practice from the point of view of a participant in the practice. The second is to explain our applications of ‘is true’ and ‘refers’ to sentences and words whose uses are described in accord with the first method. In this paper I raise several problems for Putnam’s applications of these methods and sketch a different way of applying the methods that avoids the problems.","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":"40 2","pages":"357-369"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/monist/onaa009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41306140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Necrology of Ontology: Putnam, Ethics, Realism 本体论的坏死：普特南、伦理学、现实主义
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
MONIST Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.1093/monist/onaa012
S. Laugier
{"title":"Necrology of Ontology: Putnam, Ethics, Realism","authors":"S. Laugier","doi":"10.1093/monist/onaa012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa012","url":null,"abstract":"This article aims at putting in context and at pursuing the concept elaborated by the later Putnam of an ethics without ontology, which I associate with certain other contemporary philosophers like Stanley Cavell and Cora Diamond; and in general of a philosophy without ontology. Putnam’s ambition is to get rid of ontology by refocusing reflection on ethics in a realistic spirit. This calls for a reappraisal of the entirety of Putnam’s evolution after the 1980s, especially his “Wittgensteinian turn,” which has sometimes been underappreciated. To say that ethics has nothing to do with ontology is to make a claim not only about ethics, but also about realism. That is why Putnam’s later work matters today, especially his radical break with the fact/value distinction (reflected in his claim that facts and values are entangled together in our statements and in our lives). This does not only concern ethics, for as Diamond has said and as Putnam reiterates in his own style and culture, we must refocus reflection on ethics and on the place of ethics in our forms of life and of language.","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":"103 1","pages":"391-403"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/monist/onaa012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49302955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
What if the Dead Are Never Really Dead? 如果死者从未真正死亡呢?
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
MONIST Pub Date : 2020-09-15 DOI: 10.1093/monist/onab009
Victoria S. Harrison
{"title":"What if the Dead Are Never Really Dead?","authors":"Victoria S. Harrison","doi":"10.1093/monist/onab009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onab009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper argues for the value of the ‘strange’ as a hermeneutical tool to open fresh perspectives on an issue of widespread human concern, specifically how to deal with and relate to the dead. Traditional Chinese folk religion and the animistic ghost culture found within it is introduced and the role of gods, ancestors, and ghosts explained. The view that death is not the end of life but the transition to a new relationship with the living raises questions about our potential obligations to the dead. It also has implications for our thinking about intergenerational justice and the role of our memory of the past in shaping our present and future experience.","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43336607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Barking Up the Wrong Tree: On Control, Transformative Experiences, and Turning Over a New Leaf 拨乱反正：论控制、改造经验和翻开新的一页
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
MONIST Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/monist/onaa004
Marcela Herdova
{"title":"Barking Up the Wrong Tree: On Control, Transformative Experiences, and Turning Over a New Leaf","authors":"Marcela Herdova","doi":"10.1093/monist/onaa004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I argue that we do not intentionally and rationally shape our character and values in major ways. I base this argument on the nature of transformative experiences, that is, those experiences which are transformative from personal and epistemological points of view. The argument is roughly this. First, someone who undergoes major changes in her character or values thereby undergoes a transformative experience. Second, if she undergoes such an experience, her reasons for changing in a major way are inaccessible to her beforehand. Third, if such reasons are inaccessible beforehand, she cannot act on them and thus cannot rationally and intentionally shape her character or values. I also explore some consequences of my argument, especially those related to control and responsibility.","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":"103 1","pages":"278-293"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/monist/onaa004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49648980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Agency as a Two-Way Power: A Defence 代理作为双向力量：一种防御
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
MONIST Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/monist/onaa008
H. Steward
{"title":"Agency as a Two-Way Power: A Defence","authors":"H. Steward","doi":"10.1093/monist/onaa008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper presents a dilemma which it has been alleged by Kim Frost must be faced by any defender of the notion of a two-way power and offers a solution to the dilemma which is distinct from Frost’s own. The dilemma is as follows: assuming that powers are to be individuated by what they are powers to do or undergo, then either there is a unified description of the manifestation-type which individuates the power, or there is not. If there is, then two-way powers are revealed really to be one-way powers, after all. If there is not, then it is difficult to explain why the two-way power does not simply dissolve into a mere combination of two one-way powers. The paper offers an account of what a two-way power is that is distinct from the one Frost takes for granted, and argues that this different conception is the key to avoiding the dilemma. It is also argued that this alternative conception has several further advantages over its rival and also that it has no less of a claim than Frost’s notion to be prefigured in Aristotle’s original discussion.","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":"103 1","pages":"342-355"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/monist/onaa008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49498138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Nihil Obstat: Lewis’s Compatibilist Account of Abilities Nihil Obstat: Lewis的能力相容论
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
MONIST Pub Date : 2020-06-17 DOI: 10.1093/monist/onaa002
H. Beebee, Maria Svedberg, Ann Whittle
{"title":"Nihil Obstat: Lewis’s Compatibilist Account of Abilities","authors":"H. Beebee, Maria Svedberg, Ann Whittle","doi":"10.1093/monist/onaa002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In an outline of a paper found amongst his philosophical papers and correspondence after his untimely death in 2001—“Nihil Obstat: An Analysis of Ability,” reproduced in this volume—David Lewis sketched a new compatibilist account of abilities, according to which someone is able to A if and only if there is no obstacle to their A-ing, where an obstacle is a ‘robust preventer’ of their A-ing. In this paper, we provide some background context for Lewis’s outline, a section-by-section commentary, and a general discussion of the account’s main features.","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/monist/onaa002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43365125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Outline of “Nihil Obstat: An Analysis of Ability” 《虚无障碍:能力分析》提纲
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
MONIST Pub Date : 2020-06-17 DOI: 10.1093/monist/onaa001
David Lewis
{"title":"Outline of “Nihil Obstat: An Analysis of Ability”","authors":"David Lewis","doi":"10.1093/monist/onaa001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This outline for a paper, which develops a compatibilist analysis of abilities, was completed by David Lewis during his sabbatical in the Fall semester of 2000 and is dated 20 January 2001. Starting from the claim that it’s a “Moorean fact” that we are often able to do otherwise, Lewis provides a “simple proof of compatibilism.” He then presents his own account of abilities: S is able to A if and only if there are no obstacles to their A-ing, where an obstacle is a “robust preventer”: something that would (or does) cause S not to A, and which “wouldn’t go away if things were just a little different.”","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/monist/onaa001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49046725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
It’s Up to You 这取决于你
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
MONIST Pub Date : 2020-06-17 DOI: 10.1093/MONIST/ONAA007
Randolph Clarke
{"title":"It’s Up to You","authors":"Randolph Clarke","doi":"10.1093/MONIST/ONAA007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/MONIST/ONAA007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Part of our ordinary conception of our freedom is the idea that commonly when we act—and often even when we don’t act—it is up to us whether we do this or that. This paper examines efforts to spell out what must be the case for this idea to be correct. Several claims regarding the basic metaphysics of agential powers are considered; they are found not to shed light on the issue. Thinking about agents’ psychological capacities provides some illumination, though the idea of freedom remains puzzling.","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/MONIST/ONAA007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46839910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
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