{"title":"Outline of “Nihil Obstat: An Analysis of Ability”","authors":"David Lewis","doi":"10.1093/monist/onaa001","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n This outline for a paper, which develops a compatibilist analysis of abilities, was completed by David Lewis during his sabbatical in the Fall semester of 2000 and is dated 20 January 2001. Starting from the claim that it’s a “Moorean fact” that we are often able to do otherwise, Lewis provides a “simple proof of compatibilism.” He then presents his own account of abilities: S is able to A if and only if there are no obstacles to their A-ing, where an obstacle is a “robust preventer”: something that would (or does) cause S not to A, and which “wouldn’t go away if things were just a little different.”","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2020-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/monist/onaa001","citationCount":"7","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"MONIST","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa001","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Abstract
This outline for a paper, which develops a compatibilist analysis of abilities, was completed by David Lewis during his sabbatical in the Fall semester of 2000 and is dated 20 January 2001. Starting from the claim that it’s a “Moorean fact” that we are often able to do otherwise, Lewis provides a “simple proof of compatibilism.” He then presents his own account of abilities: S is able to A if and only if there are no obstacles to their A-ing, where an obstacle is a “robust preventer”: something that would (or does) cause S not to A, and which “wouldn’t go away if things were just a little different.”