Outline of “Nihil Obstat: An Analysis of Ability”

IF 0.6 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
MONIST Pub Date : 2020-06-17 DOI:10.1093/monist/onaa001
David Lewis
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

This outline for a paper, which develops a compatibilist analysis of abilities, was completed by David Lewis during his sabbatical in the Fall semester of 2000 and is dated 20 January 2001. Starting from the claim that it’s a “Moorean fact” that we are often able to do otherwise, Lewis provides a “simple proof of compatibilism.” He then presents his own account of abilities: S is able to A if and only if there are no obstacles to their A-ing, where an obstacle is a “robust preventer”: something that would (or does) cause S not to A, and which “wouldn’t go away if things were just a little different.”
《虚无障碍:能力分析》提纲
这篇论文的大纲是由David Lewis在2000年秋季学期休假期间完成的,日期为2001年1月20日。从声称我们通常能够做其他事情这是“摩尔人的事实”开始,Lewis提供了一个“相容性的简单证明”。然后,他提出了自己对能力的描述:s能够成为a,当且仅当他们的a-ing没有障碍时,障碍是一个“强有力的预防器”:会(或确实)导致s不成为a的东西,而且“如果情况稍有不同,就不会消失。”
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
MONIST
MONIST PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
11.10%
发文量
34
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