MONISTPub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1093/monist/onaa013
Sofia Miguens
{"title":"The Human Face of Naturalism: Putnam and Diamond on Religious Belief and the “Gulfs between Us”","authors":"Sofia Miguens","doi":"10.1093/monist/onaa013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa013","url":null,"abstract":"Hilary Putnam and Cora Diamond both wrote on Wittgenstein’s Three Lectures on Religious Belief. They did it quite differently; my ultimate aim in this article is to explore this difference. Putnam’s view of religion is largely a view of ethical life; I look thus into his writings on ethics and his proposals to face the relativist menace therein. Still, in his incursions into philosophy of religion, describing religious experience through authors such as Rosenzweig, Buber, or Levinas, Putnam deals with what Diamond calls, after Wittgenstein, “the gulfs between us.” Such gulfs, and the threat of relativism they bring, need to be accounted for. With that purpose in mind I complement Putnam’s reading of the Three Lectures with Diamond’s own reading. Those who know my writings from that period [the early 1950s] may wonder how I reconciled my religious streak, which existed to some extent even back then, and my general scientific materialist worldview at that time. The answer is that I didn’t reconcile them. I was a thoroughgoing atheist, and I was a believer. I simply kept these two parts of myself separate. —Hilary Putnam (1992, 1) 1 . R E L I G I O N A S E T H I C S A N D T H E N A T U R E O F P U T N A M ’ S W R I T I N G S O N R E L I G I O N How does religion, broadly conceived, sit with Putnam’s philosophy? In what follows I try to answer this question. I will often take Wittgenstein as an object of comparison since, like Wittgenstein’s, Putnam’s view of religion is largely a view of the ethical life. This seems to be so even if Putnam explicitly pays attention to the texts of contemporary religious thinkers, namely Jewish thinkers, such as Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber or Emmanuel Levinas (as Wittgenstein paid attention to Kierkegaard, one might say). Yet Putnam’s worry, after Wittgenstein, is how we see our lives and transform our lives: Cavellian moral perfectionism guides his approach to religious thinking (Putnam 1992, 177–78; Putnam 2008, 59). *Universidade do Porto VC The Author(s), 2020. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com 404 The Monist, 2020, 103, 404–414 doi: 10.1093/monist/onaa013 Article D ow naded rom http/academ ic.p.com /m onist/artic3/4/404/5905779 by U niersity of C hago user on 03 N ovem er 2020 What then is Putnam doing exactly in his writings on religion, namely in Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life? (Putnam 2008). One thing he is doing is carefully reading continental philosophers such as Levinas, taking into consideration the background knowledge of Husserl and Heidegger it requires, and trying to summarize this material for the lay reader interested in religious thought. In fact, as Ruth Anna Putnam points out, his approach to the Jewish religious thinkers I mentioned is mostly exegetical. This means, among other things, that by sticking to the letter of their writings he evades the problems of mainstream analytic philosophy of religion","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":"103 1","pages":"404-414"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/monist/onaa013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44623049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MONISTPub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1093/monist/onaa016
Zeynep Soysal
{"title":"Descriptivism about the Reference of Set-Theoretic Expressions: Revisiting Putnam’s Model-Theoretic Arguments","authors":"Zeynep Soysal","doi":"10.1093/monist/onaa016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Putnam’s model-theoretic arguments for the indeterminacy of reference have been taken to pose a special problem for mathematical languages. In this paper, I argue that if one accepts that there are theory-external constraints on the reference of at least some expressions of ordinary language, then Putnam’s model-theoretic arguments for mathematical languages don’t go through. In particular, I argue for a kind of descriptivism about mathematical expressions according to which their reference is “anchored” in the reference of expressions of ordinary language. These anchors add enough to the content of mathematical expressions to forestall the radical kind of indeterminacy that model-theoretic arguments are purported to show, while still leaving room for a plausible, moderate kind of indeterminacy.","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":"103 1","pages":"442-454"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/monist/onaa016","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46495003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MONISTPub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1093/monist/onaa014
M. D. Caro, H. Putnam
{"title":"Free Will and Quantum Mechanics","authors":"M. D. Caro, H. Putnam","doi":"10.1093/monist/onaa014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa014","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In the last few decades, the relevance of quantum mechanics to the free-will debate has been discussed at length, especially in relation to the prospects of libertarianism (the view according to which humans enjoy an indeterministic kind of free will). Basing his interpretation on Anscombe’s seminal work, Putnam argued in 1979 that, given that quantum mechanical indeterminacy is holistic at the macrolevel—i.e., it is not traceable to atomistic events such as quantum jumps of single atoms—it can provide libertarians with the kind of freedom they seek. As shown in this article, however, Putnam ultimately reached the conclusion—together with the other author of this article—that his argument was wrong due to problems with the way it appealed to the Uncertainty Principle.**","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":"103 1","pages":"415-426"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/monist/onaa014","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44457905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MONISTPub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1093/monist/onaa018
Jean-Philippe Narboux
{"title":"Conceptual Truth, Necessity, and Negation","authors":"Jean-Philippe Narboux","doi":"10.1093/monist/onaa018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Throughout his philosophical career, Hilary Putnam was preoccupied with the question of what survives of the traditional notion of a priori truth in light of the recurring historical phenomenon, made prominent by the scientific revolutions of the early decades of the twentieth century, through which “something that was literally inconceivable has turned out to be true” (1962b). Impugning the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, Putnam’s redefinition of “conceptual truth” in terms of “quasi-necessity relative to a conceptual scheme” is meant to accommodate the possibility of transitions of just this sort. In this essay, I trace the origins and development of Putnam’s account of “quasi-necessity.” I try to defend it against some objections naturally arising in connection with the interplay of modality and negation. My main contention is that the main tenets of Putnam’s semantic externalism inform his reconception of conceptual truth, and that they must be recognized to hold of such basic logical notions as those of judgment and negation.","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/monist/onaa018","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41829280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MONISTPub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1093/monist/onaa019
J. Bouveresse, H. Putnam
{"title":"A Conversation between Jacques Bouveresse and Hilary Putnam","authors":"J. Bouveresse, H. Putnam","doi":"10.1093/monist/onaa019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The following interview took place between Jacques Bouveresse and Hilary Putnam on May 11, 2001 in Paris at the Collège de France. Sandra Laugier was present, preserved the transcription, and proposed that we publish the text here. It was translated into English by Marie Kerguelen Feldblyum LeBlevennec and lightly edited by Jacques Bouveresse, Juliet Floyd, and Sandra Laugier. Themes covered in the interview include the question of Wittgenstein’s importance in contemporary philosophy, Putnam’s development with respect to realism, especially in philosophy of mathematics, and the differences and motivations for realism in mathematics, physics, and ethics. The editors thank Marie Kerguelen Feldblyum LeBlevennec for her translation, and Jacques Bouveresse, Mario De Caro, and Sandra Laugier for permission to publish this transcription.","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":"103 1","pages":"481-492"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/monist/onaa019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41821823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MONISTPub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1093/monist/onaa011
H. Wagner
{"title":"The Significance of the Division of Linguistic Labor","authors":"H. Wagner","doi":"10.1093/monist/onaa011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This essay aims to explore the significance of Hilary Putnam’s reflections on the division of linguistic labor by putting them into contrast with those of Gareth Evans. Whereas Putnam’s reflections purport to uncover neglected aspects of the contribution of social environment to the meaning and the reference-fixing of conceptual terms, Evans’s reinterpretation of the division of linguistic labor results in obliterating its antisubjectivist and instrumentalist dimension. The crux of the disagreement between Putnam and Evans on the significance of the division of linguistic labor lies in Evans endorsing, while Putnam rejects, the principle of discrimination—a generalization of what Evans calls “Russell’s principle.”","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":"103 1","pages":"381-390"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/monist/onaa011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42785439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MONISTPub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1093/monist/onaa017
Charles Travis
{"title":"The Objects of Rational Thought (a Sketch)","authors":"Charles Travis","doi":"10.1093/monist/onaa017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa017","url":null,"abstract":"Hilary Putnam’s wide ranging thought turned on an axis: an idea of the shape of an object of rational thought, a reflection of a rational being’s unbounded capacity for unprejudiced self-criticism. The idea unfolds in a particular way the motto “The conceptual cannot take care of itself.” No stock of concepts can derive their content merely from structural relations between them, no matter how complex. What more there is to content, on this unfolding, lies in a concept’s unbounded openness to world-dependence. This essay works through that idea in and through positioning Putnam in relation to two other great philosophers, Leibniz and Frege.","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":"103 1","pages":"455-467"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/monist/onaa017","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48436112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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