{"title":"Intersectoral Conflict, Exchange Rate Uncertainty, and Delays in Macroeconomic Stabilization","authors":"Arslan Razmi","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12336","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>An important body of literature explores the political economy reasons underlying delays in macroeconomic stabilization. This paper develops a framework to analyze the conflict between two risk-averse groups of economic actors, one that has an endowment of internationally tradable goods and another that is endowed with nontradable goods: both endowments require imported inputs to consume. The focus is on the exchange rate policy in a developing country setup, where the government employs seigniorage revenue to finance prestabilization spending, and faces fiscal and balance of payments problems that necessitate stabilization with a step devaluation. Trade misinvoicing, the presence of exchange rate uncertainty and its interaction with import costs, the role of forward-looking expectations, and the possibility of foreign/IMF aid influence the likelihood, timing, and terms of a consensus on stabilization in interesting ways. Crucially, given instrument uncertainty, delays may occur even if both sets of agents have perfect foresight and nontradable endowment-holders realize that their relative position deteriorates over time.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"709-723"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Enforcement Dilemma of EU Fiscal Rules","authors":"Georg Kirchsteiger, Martin Larch","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12334","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Effective enforcement is an essential element of any fiscal rule. The EU's Stability and Growth Pact has been struggling with this truism since inception. We show that its effectiveness goes beyond the threat of fines. The notion that deficit-prone member states adopt a more virtuous fiscal behaviour to avert sanctions is overshadowed by the realization that in the event of a major shock virtuous countries will come to their rescue as the survival of the entire system is at stake. Unless the underlying issues are addressed, the effectiveness of any EU fiscal rule remains limited.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"699-708"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Roots of Populism in Poland Do Uneven Economic Development, Social Transfers, Inequality and Migration Explain the Success of Populist Parties?","authors":"Łukasz W. Olejnik, Marcin Wroński","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12335","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In this paper, we investigate the socio-economic factors affecting the electoral outcomes of the populist parties in Poland. According to estimation results, the re-election of Law and Justice in 2019 can be explained by changes in economic conditions. Slow dynamics of municipality revenues from the personal income tax, depopulation, and social transfers are crucial drivers of its success. Contrary to Western Europe, the effects of immigration and inequality on the outcomes of populist parties in Poland are not statistically significant. Populist parties were successful in gaining support in areas, which traditionally did not vote for them.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"685-698"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political Business Cycles in Varieties of Capitalistic Systems","authors":"Joscha Beckmann, Rainer Schweickert, Marvin Jahn","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12331","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study contributes to the literature on political business cycles by assessing the effect of elections on growth expectations based on expert survey data instead of using actual performance data. We analyze the different roles opportunistic and partisan politics play in varieties of capitalistic systems as a source of heterogeneity. Our results show that expectations differ remarkably between Liberal and Coordinated Market Economies (LME vs. CME) even independent of election outcomes.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"653-668"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecpo.12331","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Xin Wang, Kam Fong Chan, Millicent Chang, Yuan George Shan, Joey W. Yang
{"title":"Does Tax-Aggressive Behavior Motivate More CSR Engagement?","authors":"Xin Wang, Kam Fong Chan, Millicent Chang, Yuan George Shan, Joey W. Yang","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12333","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using an international sample of listed companies from 36 countries, we investigate whether firms' engagement in tax-aggressive behavior drives them to increase their corporate social responsibility (CSR) and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) activities. Consistent with the reputation risk mitigation theory, our results show that U.S. and Canadian firms ramp up their ESG activities 4 years after engaging in tax-aggressive practices, aligning with the typical duration for the IRS (Internal Revenue Service) investigations. In contrast, firms in other countries act sooner, within 2–3 years. Further analysis shows that firms in countries with stringent law enforcement, and those adopting International Financial Reporting Standards, are less likely to enhance CSR/ESG activities following aggressive tax policies. These findings highlight the significant influence of regulatory and disclosure environments in shaping corporate behavior in tax policies.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"669-684"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Prolonged Guesthood: How Syrian Refugees Shaped Turkish Politics?","authors":"Elif Erbay, Emine Kübra Usta","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12332","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study investigates the effects of Syrian refugee inflow on the voting behavior of natives in Turkey. We utilize administrative data at the provincial level, employ a difference-in-differences strategy for the identification and distance-based instrumental variable to account for the endogenous refugee settlement. We find a positive and significant effect of refugees on the right-wing nationalistic party's (MHP) vote share, while there are no effects on the vote share of the incumbent party (AKP) and the main opposition party (CHP). Investigating the evolution of voting reaction after 2011 shows that AKP vote share first increased in 2015 then dropped in 2018 and 2023. When the heterogeneity of refugee hosting places is considered, CHP vote share increases in highly urban and lower population areas. Overall, our results indicate a considerable voting reaction from natives. We argue that perceived threats of natives based on their sociocultural positions and sociotropic voting behavior explain the natives' reaction.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"638-652"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pawel Bialynicki-Birula, Lucie Burianová, Jacek Klich, Jan Mertl, Adam Šimčík
{"title":"One or More Payers for Healthcare Financing: The Experience From Poland and Czechia","authors":"Pawel Bialynicki-Birula, Lucie Burianová, Jacek Klich, Jan Mertl, Adam Šimčík","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12330","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper focuses on circumstances and consequences of health payers' configuration in Poland and Czechia since the 1990s. It aims to identify the differences in healthcare financing between the two neighboring countries that had started from a similar position, but eventually incorporated different arrangements of payers. The paper conducts comparative analysis of four distinctive elements: the configuration of contracting and payment methods, the power of the payers, coverage and contributions, and the dominant anchor's search attempts. The results map the evolution of healthcare in both countries with a focus on the payers' role, show the payers' economic position and behavior to providers, citizens and health policy authorities. Polish single-payer system was identified as cheaper and more effective for administratively based expenditure control, while the Czech multipayer one showed higher institutional stability and a wider coverage paid by public health insurance. The paper brings an empirical assessment of existing theoretical knowledge concerning the options for a payers' configuration, demonstrating that the choice and adjustments thereof are country-specific and depend on the preferred priorities of health policy.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"616-637"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Government Intelligent Transformation and Mixed-Ownership Reform: Evidence From China","authors":"Bin Li, Ruiqing Cao, Chenchen Shi, Jing Zhao","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12329","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Mixed-ownership reform (the Reform) is crucial for the construction of a modern market economy. Through a proprietary data set of 32 provinces in China, we find that government intelligent transformation (GIT) can attract private firms acquiring local state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and such link is stronger among target firms in central and western regions, and acquirers with lower competitive positions and higher levels of digital transformation. Additionally, we also find this effect exists both in local and nonlocal private firms. Further tests suggest that GIT can regulate government behaviors, reduce relational transactions, and enhance local policy environment quality and the level of local market legal governance, thereby promoting private firms to participate in the Reform. Moreover, in the provinces with higher levels of GIT, there is a greater likelihood that private firms will gain control rights over SOEs and obtain more resources following the Reform. Our findings may have policy implications for the world's largest emerging market.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"595-615"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Women in the Labor Market and Experienced Political Institutions","authors":"Ugo antonio Troiano","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12328","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In this paper, I first present a novel finding: women who have experienced democratic institutions during their impressionable years are more likely to participate in the labor market, while controlling for factors such as country, cohort, language and various other confounding factors. I then provide evidence suggesting that discriminatory attitudes may serve as a channel for this phenomenon. Other explanations receive less support from the data.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"582-594"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mafia and Political Competition Redirecting Votes not Discouraging Candidates","authors":"Anna Laura Baraldi","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12327","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The efforts of organized crime to affect the outcome of elections have been well documented. In the present paper, we exploit the staggered enforcement of Law 164/1991, an anticrime measure that mandates dissolution of the city council in the case of suspected mafia infiltration, to show that political competition in municipal elections in Italy, measured by the win margin between the two “strongest” candidates and the Herfindahl index, increases sharply in the first election following a compulsory administration in dissolved municipalities compared to the control group of municipalities that have never been subject to council dissolution. We find that this effect of the anti-mafia policy remains slightly significant up to the third election after dissolution, after which time it disappears. The paper suggests that mafias manipulate electoral outcomes principally by affecting voter behaviour, rather than by discouraging unfriendly candidates. We investigate several channels that might be driving these results.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"549-581"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}