{"title":"Contested Compromise: Public Policy Reforms as Share Contests","authors":"Achim Hagen","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.70024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.70024","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Public policy reforms often benefit certain societal groups while being costly for others. Both supporters and opponents of reforms can form lobby groups to influence the policy outcome in their preferred direction. This paper presents a simple two-stage model of a public policy reform that results from the partial implementation of a policy proposal. The compromise is modeled as a share contest. I analyze the influence of lobby groups on equilibrium policies and how regulators' preferences for lobbying activities influence the policy proposal. The results show that in regimes where these activities are regarded as harmful, lobby efforts lead to modest reform proposals and equilibrium reforms, whereas in regimes where regulators favor lobbying activities the levels of reform proposal and resulting policy are higher. Interest groups that suffer costs from the reform are always better off in regimes that regard lobbying as harmful, whereas groups that profit from a reform can be better off with regulators that favor lobby contributions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"38 1","pages":"327-337"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecpo.70024","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146154719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Data Elements Marketization and Corporate ESG Performance: A Quasi-Natural Experiment Based on China's Data Trading Platforms Pilot Policies","authors":"Caishi Zhang, Fangyi Lin, Yichuan Shi","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.70023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.70023","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This article investigates the impact of Data Element Marketization (DEM) on corporate Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance, using a quasi-natural experiment based on China's data trading platforms pilot policies. Employing a Difference-in-Differences (DID) framework, we find that DEM significantly enhances ESG outcomes by alleviating financing constraints, promoting digital transformation, and strengthening external supervision. Our results highlight that firms with higher intangible asset intensity and those located in more marketized regions experience stronger improvements in ESG performance. Additionally, DEM also helps mitigate greenwashing behaviors. This study contributes to the understanding how market mechanisms for data circulation can drive corporate sustainability and offers policy implications for advancing DEM reforms.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"38 1","pages":"287-305"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146139140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Zareh Asatryan, Désirée I. Christofzik, Justus Nover
{"title":"Doubling Down Political Budget Cycles: The Role of State-Owned Enterprises","authors":"Zareh Asatryan, Désirée I. Christofzik, Justus Nover","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.70025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.70025","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the degree and nature of political budget cycles in public investments when two instruments are available: investments by core governments and, more indirectly, by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). While fiscal pressure on core budgets may induce politicians to shift election-induced investments to SOEs, voters' uncertainties in clearly attributing the benefits of SOE investments to incumbent politicians may encourage the opposite. Using administrative micro-data for over 10,500 SOEs and their public owners at the municipal level in Germany, we document substantial election cycles in both instruments. This suggests that German municipal councilors use investments broadly to enhance their re-election prospects. The total effect of elections on municipal investments in our sample is over EUR 1 billion for the pre-election year in each electoral cycle, while the past literature focusing only on core budgets would miss about a third of this effect.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"38 1","pages":"306-326"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecpo.70025","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146162354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Economic Policy Uncertainty and Crime: An Asymmetric Relationship","authors":"Leo M. Doerr, Stefan Wilhelm","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.70022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.70022","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using a sample of US counties for the period 2010–2018, this study is the first to isolate the effect of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on crime rates. We employ an estimator that controls for joint endogeneity of regressors and find a crime inducing effect of rising uncertainty for violent crime. Complementary analyses reveal that this relationship is both asymmetric and transitory: spikes in uncertainty trigger temporary increases in crime rather than persistent level shifts, whereas declines in uncertainty fail to generate a comparable reduction. Finally, a comprehensive set of robustness checks confirms that our findings are not driven by changes in reporting behavior or uncertainty-induced shifts in policing policy, and that the main results extend to property crime as well.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"38 1","pages":"273-286"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecpo.70022","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146136728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of Government-Guided Funds on Enterprises Innovation Quality: Evidence From China","authors":"Chenze Song, Zhihua Guan","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.70021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.70021","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines the impact of China's government-guided fund policy on corporate innovation quality from a venture capital perspective. It holds significant implications for comprehensively understanding the economic effects of government venture capital and the realization of sustainable development of enterprises. Using a multi-period difference-in-differences (DID) approach, we analyze data from A-share-listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen (2008–2023) to empirically assess how government-guided funds influence enterprises innovation quality. Results show that firms receiving such investments exhibit a statistically significant improvement in their innovation quality. The effect is more pronounced among firms facing higher financing needs, including growth-stage enterprises, strategic emerging industries, and Nonpolitical connections enterprises. Mechanism analysis further reveals that government-guided funds enhance enterprises innovation quality by alleviating financing constraints and lowering agency costs.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"38 1","pages":"252-272"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146139213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Linking National Security to Economic Growth: An International Political Economy Approach","authors":"Panagiotis Palaios, Georgios Kapogiannis","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.70020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.70020","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper focuses on developing a utility—maximizing model, which points to an optimal defense budget allocation as well as a relationship between security and growth. We test the validity of our model empirically in the case of Greece and Turkey for the period 1971–2023, considering a set of geopolitical, institutional, and economic variables. Our results indicate that if the level of security attained is inadequate in terms of the threat faced, the economic environment becomes highly uncertain, thus depriving the economy from increasing its GDP. In addition, we point to the need for investment in domestic defense technology and infrastructure, both for facing threats and for promoting economic growth. At the institutional level our results indicate the crucial role of the regime type in smoothing the relationship between the two adversaries. The policy implications derived are based on the close relationship between national security, economic growth, and institutions, indicating the need for economies to invest in their domestic industrial base, in light of the latest technological progress and the multipolar nature of the international system.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"38 1","pages":"231-251"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146136174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Poverty and Perceptions of Electoral Integrity in the USA","authors":"Douglas Cumming, Sofia Johan, Ikenna Uzuegbunam","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.70018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.70018","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We propose two opposing forces that impact the relation between electoral integrity and poverty. On the one hand, it is more costly to provide electoral integrity in states where there is more poverty due to transaction costs and opportunity costs. On the other hand, extreme levels of poverty attract media scrutiny and greater external monitoring of electoral integrity, giving rise to more demand for electoral integrity. Taken together, we expect electoral integrity to be a U-shaped function of poverty. We also hypothesize that electoral integrity will vary depending on the strength of state electoral laws. Expert-level survey data on electoral integrity from the 2016 US presidential election and the 2018 US congressional election, in combination with US state-level data on poverty, are strongly consistent with these predictions.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"38 1","pages":"216-230"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146135919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Francisco J. Veiga, Marija Opačak Eror, Simona Prijaković
{"title":"Online Local Budget Transparency and Local Elections in Croatia","authors":"Francisco J. Veiga, Marija Opačak Eror, Simona Prijaković","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.70019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.70019","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study empirically analyses the impact of online local budget transparency (OLBT) on the electoral performance of city mayors and municipal heads who sought re-election in Croatia's local elections in 2017 and 2021. Based on the literature on political budget cycles (PBC) and voting behavior, the study tests two main hypotheses: (1) that budget transparency is rewarded by voters; and (2) that it diminishes the electoral benefits of opportunistic pre-election increases in expenditures. These hypotheses are examined using fixed-effects panel models applied to data from up to all 556 Croatian cities and municipalities where incumbents ran for re-election. The dependent variable is the vote share received by the incumbent in the first round of the local elections. The empirical results provide support for both hypotheses.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"38 1","pages":"199-215"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecpo.70019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146140158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Quality of Government and Educational Performance Across Countries","authors":"Horst Feldmann","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.70015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.70015","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using a new indicator of government quality, two different indicators of educational performance and two different datasets covering up to 120 countries, this study finds robust evidence that a higher quality of government improves educational performance. This is probably because a competent bureaucracy, a good legal system, and an able government that is responsive to its people all combine to support and impel education providers to achieve high standards. By contrast, poor governance, as exemplified by widespread corruption, military involvement in politics and a weak, incompetent and unpopular government, hampers the working of the educational system, thus reducing learning outcomes.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"38 1","pages":"183-198"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecpo.70015","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146140044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Facundo Albornoz, Matthias Dahm, Luis Frones, Todd Landman
{"title":"International Trade and Forced Labor","authors":"Facundo Albornoz, Matthias Dahm, Luis Frones, Todd Landman","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.70016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.70016","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We explore the link between trade liberalization and forced labor theoretically and empirically. Our theoretical framework predicts that the net effect of trade on the use of forced labor depends on which sectors improve their relative terms of trade and if openness to trade triggers anti-forced labor policies in the country or by trade partners. Using two datasets, we show that trade openness increases the intensive margin of forced labor but not the extensive margin. Splitting trade partners by labor standards, we show that trade with high-standard countries reduces both margins, whereas trade with low-standard countries raises the intensive margin.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"38 1","pages":"157-182"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146136138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}