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What causes polarized stagnation, corporate economy, or welfare state?: Insights from new development economics 是企业经济还是福利国家导致了两极分化的停滞?新发展经济学的启示
IF 1 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2024-09-17 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12316
Sung‐Hee Jwa
{"title":"What causes polarized stagnation, corporate economy, or welfare state?: Insights from new development economics","authors":"Sung‐Hee Jwa","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12316","url":null,"abstract":"This study explores polarized economic stagnation from the perspective of a capitalist corporate economy. It introduces two institutional policy paradigms: economic differentiation (ED) and economic egalitarianism (EE). ED‐friendly “market democracy” promotes shared growth, whereas EE‐friendly “egalitarian democracy” leads to polarized stagnation. The corporate economy is portrayed as the epitome of the ED institution leading shared growth, whereas the redistributive welfare state based on EE institutions could bring polarized stagnation. Empirical analysis tests these hypotheses and discovers that the world's polarized stagnation may be linked to “welfare policy under egalitarian democracy” rather than “corporate growth under market democracy” as commonly thought.","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142247426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The effects of non‐trade non‐rent barriers on intra‐Africa trade 非贸易非租金壁垒对非洲内部贸易的影响
IF 1 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2024-09-12 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12317
Dimitrios Asteriou, Reginald Kadzutu
{"title":"The effects of non‐trade non‐rent barriers on intra‐Africa trade","authors":"Dimitrios Asteriou, Reginald Kadzutu","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12317","url":null,"abstract":"This article evaluates the effects of non‐trade non‐rent barriers to intra‐Africa trade. Specifically, the effects of improved productivity, improved capital inflows, share of employment in non‐agricultural sectors, and ratio of rural population. We seek to investigate the impact of institutional strength measured by property rights, rule of law and control of corruption, different exchange rate regimes on the impact of the non‐trade non‐rent variables on intra‐Africa trade. We use an extensive dataset of 25 countries, by picking the most diverse and high‐income economies in each region, for the period 2000–2020 using annual data. The empirical analysis involves a linear panel analysis with a fixed effects estimator. The study provides evidence that level of labor productivity is a key factor in the growth of intra‐Africa imports and exports, the share of employment in the wholesale and services sector also has a significantly positive impact, exchange rate regimes play a magnifying role, and strong institutions (regulatory quality, rule of law and low corruption) will enhance the benefits to be drawn for increased income flows.","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142218151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Patriarchy, pandemics, and the gendered resource curse thesis: Evidence from petroleum geology 父权制、大流行病和性别资源诅咒论:石油地质学的证据
IF 1 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2024-09-04 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12312
Jubril Animashaun, Ada Wossink
{"title":"Patriarchy, pandemics, and the gendered resource curse thesis: Evidence from petroleum geology","authors":"Jubril Animashaun, Ada Wossink","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12312","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines features shared by societies built around petroleum and the impact of COVID‐19. For our cross‐sectional analysis, we use epidemiological data on COVID‐19, country‐level long‐run oil production data, and data on petroleum geology for econometric identification. We first document that a country's long‐run oil production is associated with significantly higher COVID‐19 deaths. Exploring mechanisms, we find that women's election into political offices reduces the risk from COVID‐19, but only in oil‐poor countries. Furthermore, we find robust evidence that petroleum wealth reduces the percentage of women in parliament. These findings highlight the risk and plausible mechanisms of COVID‐19 vulnerability in oil‐exporting countries. Policymakers should be aware of these effects.","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142218152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How does oil policy uncertainty influence resource rents? New empirical evidence from Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 石油政策的不确定性如何影响资源租金?石油输出国组织的新经验证据
IF 1 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2024-08-27 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12315
Umar Farooq, Jun Wen, Salem Hamad Aldawsari, Mosab I. Tabash, Khurshid Khudoykulov
{"title":"How does oil policy uncertainty influence resource rents? New empirical evidence from Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries","authors":"Umar Farooq, Jun Wen, Salem Hamad Aldawsari, Mosab I. Tabash, Khurshid Khudoykulov","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12315","url":null,"abstract":"The uncertainty surrounding oil‐related policies has raised concerns about its influence on revenues derived from resource extraction activities. In this view, the current study aims to investigate the nuanced relationship between oil policy uncertainty (OPU) and resource rents, focusing on oil rents (ORTs), natural gas rents (NRTs), and total resource rents (TRT). Analyzing data spanning from 1985 to 2019 across Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, various econometric models including DOLS, FMOLS, and autoregressive distributed lag are employed to assess the impact of OPU on resource rents. The empirical findings reveal a significant negative effect of heightened OPU levels on resource rents, indicating a reduction in ORT, NRT, and TRT. This negative impact underscores the deterrence of long‐term investments in oil exploration and production due to regulatory unpredictability, leading to decreased revenues from oil extraction activities. Additionally, increased OPU contributes to heightened volatility in oil prices, disrupting the stability of resource rents. Furthermore, variables such as FDI inflow, inflation rate, and banking sector development exhibit positive relationships with resource rents, emphasizing their role in bolstering revenues derived from natural resources. The study's implications highlight the necessity for policymakers to address and mitigate OPU to foster stability and sustainable revenues within resource‐driven economies. This study contributes to the existing literature by offering empirical insights into the adverse impact of OPU on resource rents.","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142218137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Appropriability, institutions, and welfare in a Tullock contest 图鲁克竞赛中的可分配性、制度和福利
IF 1 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2024-08-24 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12313
Ratul Lahkar
{"title":"Appropriability, institutions, and welfare in a Tullock contest","authors":"Ratul Lahkar","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12313","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12313","url":null,"abstract":"We model institutional development through Tullock contests. We define appropriability in terms of the extent to which high effort can enable agents to acquire control of the resource in the contest. At low appropriability, all agents share the resource equitably at the Nash equilibrium. Hence, institutions are inclusive and have a high aggregate payoff and equality. Social welfare is high. However, with high appropriability, the strongest agents exclude others from the resource. Institutions are then exclusive. Excessive rent seeking by the strongest agents reduces payoffs but increases inequality. Social welfare is low. We also establish the robustness of the Nash equilibrium under the best response dynamic.","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142218153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Deficit aversion: Mercantilist ideas and individual trade preferences 厌恶赤字:重商主义思想与个人贸易偏好
IF 1 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2024-07-22 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12306
Jeremy Spater
{"title":"Deficit aversion: Mercantilist ideas and individual trade preferences","authors":"Jeremy Spater","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12306","url":null,"abstract":"What factors affect trade preferences? This article focuses on current‐account balances, which despite being de‐emphasized by mainstream economic theory, play an outsized role in political rhetoric regarding the costs and benefits of free trade. This article shows that individual preferences over trade openness reflect the mercantilist belief that when a country is running a current‐account deficit, trade reduces that country's aggregate employment prospects and diminishes its status on the world stage. This article shows that current‐account balances are an important driver of individual trade preferences. The theory's predictions are borne out by hierarchical analysis of cross‐national observational survey data, and further supported by the results of an original survey priming experiment in the United States. These results contribute to a growing literature emphasizing the effect of macroeconomic factors on preferences.","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141786177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Engaged robots, disengaged workers: Automation and political alienation 投入的机器人,脱离的工人:自动化与政治异化
IF 1 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2024-07-17 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12307
Valentina Gonzalez‐Rostani
{"title":"Engaged robots, disengaged workers: Automation and political alienation","authors":"Valentina Gonzalez‐Rostani","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12307","url":null,"abstract":"I investigate the impact of automation on political behavior in postindustrial societies, particularly focusing on political disengagement. I argue that structural changes in the labor market lead to political alienation due to increased economic insecurities, diminished resources from lower wages, and greater economic polarization. Using hierarchical logistic modeling with varying intercepts by country, I present evidence from survey data across several advanced democracies. I find that workers exposed to technological change are less likely to feel close to a political party, participate in elections, and take part in protests. The impact of automation on political engagement is smaller among wealthier citizens and in highly unionized environments. The political message from these interaction effects speaks to the reinforcing forces between economic inequality and automation and the role of collective organization. My findings have important implications for understanding the links between structural change in labor markets and politics, especially since disengaged workers are the reservoir for radical right parties.","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141737376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The myth of federal reserve de facto independence 联邦储备事实上独立的神话
IF 1 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2024-07-10 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12304
Giovanni B. Pittaluga, Elena Seghezza, Pierluigi Morelli
{"title":"The myth of federal reserve de facto independence","authors":"Giovanni B. Pittaluga, Elena Seghezza, Pierluigi Morelli","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12304","url":null,"abstract":"In the literature on central banks independence these institutions are considered as being apolitical. In reality, central banks are political actors and their de facto independence changes over time even if their de jure independence remains unvaried. An example of this is the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed), whose de facto independence in the past decades has fluctuated significantly because of the pressures of Congress and the President. To counter these pressures, the Fed seeks support from certain interest groups. The success of this behavior is more likely when the President and Congress represent different political parties.","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141588131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corporate governance and firm performance: Evidence from political instability, political ideology, and corporate governance reforms in Pakistan 公司治理与公司业绩:巴基斯坦政治不稳定、政治意识形态和公司治理改革的证据
IF 1 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2024-07-02 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12303
Irfan Haider Shakri, Jaime Yong, Erwei Xiang
{"title":"Corporate governance and firm performance: Evidence from political instability, political ideology, and corporate governance reforms in Pakistan","authors":"Irfan Haider Shakri, Jaime Yong, Erwei Xiang","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12303","url":null,"abstract":"We examine impact of corporate governance on firm performance following the implementation of the changes to the Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan in 2012. Our sample period from 2008 to 2022 include periods of political instability and shifts in Pakistan's political landscape, providing an opportunity to examine the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in enhancing accounting‐ and market‐based firm performance measures. We find significant improvements attributed to reforms in the regulatory framework surrounding corporate governance practices particularly from expanded scope and composition of boards and audit committees. This led to broader capabilities and effective controls, thus improving firm performance and investor confidence more so during periods of political instability and changes in political ideology.","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141523258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Caring for minorities: The Flexible Decision Rule 关爱少数群体:灵活决策规则
IF 1 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12305
Bruno S. Frey, Andre Briviba
{"title":"Caring for minorities: The Flexible Decision Rule","authors":"Bruno S. Frey, Andre Briviba","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12305","url":null,"abstract":"Simple majority rule disregards the interests of the losing minority; their vote does not affect the outcome. When vote outcomes are narrow, close to 50% of voters, the concerns of a significant part of the voters are disregarded. This increases polarization in the population and endangers democracy. This paper proposes a new procedure for political decisions by referendums. The <jats:italic>Flexible Decision Rule</jats:italic> formally takes into account the percentage of voters accepting or rejecting a proposal. The higher the share y of voters accepting it, the more strongly the proposal is to be put into reality; the lower <jats:italic>y</jats:italic> is, the less strongly the proposal is to be put into reality. This procedure explicitly considers the concerns of both the supporters and the opponents thus raising the fairness of the vote procedure. In contrast to majority voting, each vote marginalizes the outcome and therefore raises the incentive to participate in the vote increase.","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141505325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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