发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Economics & Politics最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Optimal Supply Chain Decision With Pre- and Aftersales Services and Capital Constraints 具有售前、售后服务和资本约束的最优供应链决策
IF 1.5 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2025-03-31 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12344
Jing Wang, Junli Zhou, Fengshan Si, Yuling Wang
{"title":"Optimal Supply Chain Decision With Pre- and Aftersales Services and Capital Constraints","authors":"Jing Wang,&nbsp;Junli Zhou,&nbsp;Fengshan Si,&nbsp;Yuling Wang","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12344","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper examines a two-tier supply chain system where the manufacturer leads by managing aftersales service, and the retailer follows by handling presales service. To address the manufacturer's capital constraints, we develop three game-theoretic models: a model without capital constraints, another model with external financing under capital constraints, and yet another model with internal financing under capital constraints. We identify optimal financing strategies across these scenarios through comparative analysis. The findings reveal that external financing does not improve the level of presales service provided by the retailer. Under external financing, high consumer price sensitivity tends to increase product retail prices. Furthermore, wholesale prices are higher when financing is involved than in scenarios without financing. Interestingly, regardless of the financing model, higher consumer sensitivity to the retailer's presales service reduces wholesale prices, paradoxically benefiting the profits of both the manufacturer and retailer. An increase in the manufacturer's initial capital consistently enhances the manufacturer's profitability but may negatively impact the retailer's profits under internal financing. The manufacturer prefers internal financing, regardless of whether the manufacturer faces rising financing interest rates or increased aftersales service investments.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"826-837"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lead or Follow? Participation Decisions in Collective Development Initiatives 领导还是跟随？集体发展倡议中的参与决策
IF 1.5 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2025-03-25 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12343
Bernhard Reinsberg, Martin C. Steinwand
{"title":"Lead or Follow? Participation Decisions in Collective Development Initiatives","authors":"Bernhard Reinsberg,&nbsp;Martin C. Steinwand","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12343","url":null,"abstract":"<p>When and how do donors cooperate? While a growing literature emphasizes the importance of donor coordination for aid effectiveness, little is known about when and why donors join forces to advance common causes. We leverage the proliferation of special-purpose trust funds at multilateral organizations to cast light on this issue. We argue that not only the decision <i>whether</i> to engage but also <i>when</i> to engage—either as “lead donor” or as “follower” after other donors already contributed—carries important (yet overlooked) informational value. We develop expectations about how donors engage with trust funds building on theories of competitive regime creation and bureaucratic politics. We test these expectations using a novel data set of time-stamped funding commitment decisions by 30 OECD/DAC donors in 190 World Bank trust funds established between 1990 and 2020. We find that a donor is more likely to serve as lead donor if it is engaged in similar sectors as its peers. In addition, a donor is more likely to contribute to a fund already controlled by a group of donors if its own policy preferences are aligned with those of the existing members. The results have important implications for our understanding of donor coordination in an increasingly crowded multilateral development architecture.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"811-825"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecpo.12343","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Role of Media, Partisanship, and Macroeconomic Factors in the Economic Assessments: The Case of Poland 媒体、党派和宏观经济因素在经济评估中的作用：波兰的案例
IF 1.5 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2025-03-23 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12342
Agnieszka Choczyńska
{"title":"The Role of Media, Partisanship, and Macroeconomic Factors in the Economic Assessments: The Case of Poland","authors":"Agnieszka Choczyńska","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12342","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Ruling party supporters tend to have higher opinions of the state of national economy than the opposition supporters. Is it because of partisan bias, media, or just different conceptions of what is good for the economy? I analyze this issue in Poland, where the gap in economic assessments is particularly high and on the rise. Using monthly survey data, macroeconomic variables and sentiment from public media, I find all of the above to be true. Both groups base their assessments on macroeconomic variables, but there are differences in sign and significance of their parameters. However, media sentiment also plays a role, and there is still additional partisan bias after controlling for socioeconomic factors.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"795-810"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Employment Effects of the Italian Jobs Act: An Ex-Post Impact Evaluation 意大利就业法案的就业效应：前后影响评估
IF 1.5 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2025-03-20 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12339
Alessandro Zeli, Leopoldo Nascia
{"title":"Employment Effects of the Italian Jobs Act: An Ex-Post Impact Evaluation","authors":"Alessandro Zeli,&nbsp;Leopoldo Nascia","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12339","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In 2015, Italy adopted a new labor market policy known as the Jobs Act (JA), aimed at promoting employment and reducing the costs associated with firing employees. We investigate how the impact of the JA provisions on employment. We estimate the effect of the relief on social security contributions and and assess the impact of the new firing rules on employment through a two-step procedure: propensity score matching and difference-in-differences estimation. The results of our model do not indicate a significant impact of these measures, either on employment levels or on changes among flexible workers.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"780-794"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Commodification of Political Distrust: Do Crypto “Hodlers” Distrust Political Institutions? 政治不信任的商品化：加密货币“持有者”不信任政治机构吗？
IF 1.5 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2025-03-18 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12341
Anton Brännlund, Henrik Serup Christensen
{"title":"The Commodification of Political Distrust: Do Crypto “Hodlers” Distrust Political Institutions?","authors":"Anton Brännlund,&nbsp;Henrik Serup Christensen","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12341","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The study investigates the link between political distrust and long-term cryptocurrency investment, motivated by the cryptocurrency market's volatility and the potential of digital currencies to alter economic–political systems. Utilizing panel data from Finland 2022–2023 on duration of ownership and political attitudes, the research uncovers a correlation between political skepticism and long-term investment in cryptocurrencies, suggesting a shift from conventional assets to decentralized ones. This emphasizes the role of political trust in financial decisions and proposes further exploration of its impact on cryptocurrency investments.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"769-779"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecpo.12341","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Echo Chambers: Voter-to-Voter Communication and Political Competition 回音室：选民对选民的沟通和政治竞争
IF 1.5 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2025-03-15 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12338
Monica A. Giovanniello
{"title":"Echo Chambers: Voter-to-Voter Communication and Political Competition","authors":"Monica A. Giovanniello","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12338","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>I study how strategic communication among voters shapes both political outcomes and parties' advertising strategies in a model of informative campaign advertising. I show that echo chambers arise endogenously as a product of strategic communication. Surprisingly, a small ideological distance between voters is not sufficient to guarantee that a chamber is created, biases' direction plays a crucial role.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"752-768"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Peer Effect of Key Audit Matter Disclosure: Evidence From China 关键审计事项披露的同伴效应：来自中国的证据
IF 1.5 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2025-03-10 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12340
Xuegang Cui, Jia Xu, Yiyuan Sun
{"title":"The Peer Effect of Key Audit Matter Disclosure: Evidence From China","authors":"Xuegang Cui,&nbsp;Jia Xu,&nbsp;Yiyuan Sun","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12340","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines whether the disclosure of the Key Audit Matters (KAMs) has a peer effect within an industry. Using a sample of China-listed firms from 2017 to 2022, we find a significant industry-specific peer effect in the KAM disclosure behavior, which remains consistent across various robustness tests. The peer effect of the KAM disclosure is more substantial when corporate market competition is more fierce. Specifically, the cut-throat competition leads to higher auditing risk for auditors who have to alleviate the risk by imitating the KAM disclosure behavior of their peers within the same industry, thereby leading to a peer effect in KAM disclosure. Heterogeneity analysis exhibits that the extent of peer effect in the KAM disclosure varies among corporate ownership structure, auditor expertise, and media coverage. This study contributes to the literature on the KAM disclosure and offers important policy implications for auditing standard construction and regulation on KAM disclosure.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"735-751"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Regional Representation in the European Parliament: Parliamentary Questions on Geographical Indications 欧洲议会的区域代表权：关于地理标志的议会问题
IF 1.5 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2025-02-13 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12337
Martijn Huysmans, Niels Gheyle
{"title":"Regional Representation in the European Parliament: Parliamentary Questions on Geographical Indications","authors":"Martijn Huysmans,&nbsp;Niels Gheyle","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12337","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The European Parliament represents the citizens of the European Union. However, individual Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) also face incentives to represent more narrow regional economic interests. Geographical Indications (GIs) such as Asiago or Champagne are an ideal policy area to study regional representation. Their defined regions provide clear incentives and a reliable measurement of regional representation. This article codes and analyses the written questions on GIs posed by MEPs during the period 2009–2019. Descriptively, we find that MEPs often mention products from their region. We also find that MEPs focus their questions on contentious products and on politicized free trade agreements. Contributing to the debate on representation in the European Parliament, we find evidence for more regional representation by MEPs from countries with regional lists for EP elections. We conclude with the implications of our research for representation in the European Union and the idea of transnational lists.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"724-734"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecpo.12337","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intersectoral Conflict, Exchange Rate Uncertainty, and Delays in Macroeconomic Stabilization 部门间冲突、汇率不确定性和宏观经济稳定的延迟
IF 1.5 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2025-02-10 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12336
Arslan Razmi
{"title":"Intersectoral Conflict, Exchange Rate Uncertainty, and Delays in Macroeconomic Stabilization","authors":"Arslan Razmi","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12336","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>An important body of literature explores the political economy reasons underlying delays in macroeconomic stabilization. This paper develops a framework to analyze the conflict between two risk-averse groups of economic actors, one that has an endowment of internationally tradable goods and another that is endowed with nontradable goods: both endowments require imported inputs to consume. The focus is on the exchange rate policy in a developing country setup, where the government employs seigniorage revenue to finance prestabilization spending, and faces fiscal and balance of payments problems that necessitate stabilization with a step devaluation. Trade misinvoicing, the presence of exchange rate uncertainty and its interaction with import costs, the role of forward-looking expectations, and the possibility of foreign/IMF aid influence the likelihood, timing, and terms of a consensus on stabilization in interesting ways. Crucially, given instrument uncertainty, delays may occur even if both sets of agents have perfect foresight and nontradable endowment-holders realize that their relative position deteriorates over time.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"709-723"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Enforcement Dilemma of EU Fiscal Rules 欧盟财政规则的执行困境
IF 1.5 4区 经济学
Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2025-01-25 DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12334
Georg Kirchsteiger, Martin Larch
{"title":"The Enforcement Dilemma of EU Fiscal Rules","authors":"Georg Kirchsteiger,&nbsp;Martin Larch","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12334","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Effective enforcement is an essential element of any fiscal rule. The EU's Stability and Growth Pact has been struggling with this truism since inception. We show that its effectiveness goes beyond the threat of fines. The notion that deficit-prone member states adopt a more virtuous fiscal behaviour to avert sanctions is overshadowed by the realization that in the event of a major shock virtuous countries will come to their rescue as the survival of the entire system is at stake. Unless the underlying issues are addressed, the effectiveness of any EU fiscal rule remains limited.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 2","pages":"699-708"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：604180095
Book学术官方微信