Optimal Supply Chain Decision With Pre- and Aftersales Services and Capital Constraints

IF 1.5 4区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Jing Wang, Junli Zhou, Fengshan Si, Yuling Wang
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper examines a two-tier supply chain system where the manufacturer leads by managing aftersales service, and the retailer follows by handling presales service. To address the manufacturer's capital constraints, we develop three game-theoretic models: a model without capital constraints, another model with external financing under capital constraints, and yet another model with internal financing under capital constraints. We identify optimal financing strategies across these scenarios through comparative analysis. The findings reveal that external financing does not improve the level of presales service provided by the retailer. Under external financing, high consumer price sensitivity tends to increase product retail prices. Furthermore, wholesale prices are higher when financing is involved than in scenarios without financing. Interestingly, regardless of the financing model, higher consumer sensitivity to the retailer's presales service reduces wholesale prices, paradoxically benefiting the profits of both the manufacturer and retailer. An increase in the manufacturer's initial capital consistently enhances the manufacturer's profitability but may negatively impact the retailer's profits under internal financing. The manufacturer prefers internal financing, regardless of whether the manufacturer faces rising financing interest rates or increased aftersales service investments.

具有售前、售后服务和资本约束的最优供应链决策
本文研究了一个两层供应链系统,其中制造商通过管理售后服务而领先,零售商通过处理售前服务而跟随。为了解决制造商的资本约束问题,我们建立了三种博弈论模型:无资本约束的模型、资本约束下外部融资的模型和资本约束下内部融资的模型。我们通过比较分析确定了这些情景下的最佳融资策略。研究结果表明,外部融资并没有提高零售商提供的售前服务水平。在外部融资的情况下,消费者对价格的高敏感度往往会提高产品的零售价格。此外,涉及融资的批发价格高于没有融资的批发价格。有趣的是,不管融资模式如何,消费者对零售商的售前服务的敏感度越高,批发价格就越低,这对制造商和零售商的利润都有利。制造商初始资本的增加持续提高了制造商的盈利能力,但在内部融资下可能会对零售商的利润产生负面影响。制造商更倾向于内部融资,无论制造商是否面临融资利率上升或售后服务投资增加。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
10.00%
发文量
32
期刊介绍: Economics & Politics focuses on analytical political economy, broadly defined as the study of economic and political phenomena and policy in models that include political processes, institutions and markets. The journal is the source for innovative theoretical and empirical work on the intersection of politics and economics, at both domestic and international levels, and aims to promote new approaches on how these forces interact to affect political outcomes and policy choices, economic performance and societal welfare. Economics & Politics is a vital source of information for economists, academics and students, providing: - Analytical political economics - International scholarship - Accessible & thought-provoking articles - Creative inter-disciplinary analysis
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